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)!eat under an umbrella while waiting in line to
:get Ch1-Chi vaccinated against rabies Sunday
•at the fire station located at 5600 Franklin
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Pair want class, textbooks banned
SHREVEPORT - Two
women say textbooks
for a high school cour~e in
envirnnmt>ntal science promote
communism, ev ution and abortion, and they want the Atate to
deny approval of both the books
and the elective course offering.
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Kay Rt>iboldt, have made the
~me complaint in the past about
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home economics. histnry and
science books.
On April 23, a committeE' of
the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education will review
the boolui, and the full board will
vo~ on them dn April 24.
"It's a OOUJ'IIe that could probably be taught in six weeks •... "
Reiboldt eaid. "First, I don't see a
nef'd for the whole course. Secondly, none of the books I
reviewed are acceptable."
The women said they object to
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the books ~use they promotA!
p<~pulation control and evolution
and denounce Ameru:il'and free
enterprise.
One book. "Global Science," in
a discussion of free enterprise
cited by McDade, says, "argtt·
menta against the market sya·
tem" include thoae that "the free
market can allow the rich to hold
on to economic and political
power" and that "free market
forcrs by themselves do not provide for social nl't'da."
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 2, 1986 Conference
1, s h ee t 1

L is t

No. 85-1513 ~
EDWARDS , e t al • ( gov' r)

s1f25'

from CA 5 (!3-z:'.own
~
Poli
, ,lolly) (~, .~ ark,
_,-'-""'-'.,.. ley, Ga i\-?ood ,
- ~.,,
vfi igginbotham, . Hill, Janes,
~
diss ~al of petn
for reh g en ban~)

v.
AGUILLARD, et al.
1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

(public schools) Fed./Civ.

Petrs argue that the CAS erred by affirming

the invalidation of a state statute on Establishment Clause

__

__,
grounds.

2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

In 1981, the Louisiana

legislature enacted a statute known as the "Balanced Treatment
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act."

J·.

't

:,t::-:;1;~

,..

,'tt

See La. Rev.

-

- 2 -

Stats. §§17:286.1 to 17:286.7.

The lav-1 provides that oif the
~

l

public schools address the origin of life, they must g,~ ve
balanced treatment to evidence for both the evolution and the
creation theories of life, and refrain from misrepresenting
either as a proven fact.
others

A group of parents, educators, and

now appellees -- brought suit in federal court, seeking

a declaratory judgment that the Act violates either the Louisiana
Constitution or the Establishment Clause of the Federal
Constitution, and a permanent injunction against implementation
r

of the Ac/
~he

DC initially ruled that the statute violated the

Louisiana Constitution.

~

On appeal, the CAS certified the

question to the Louisiana Supreme Court which found no violation
of the state constitution.
(La. 1983).

Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So.2d 704

The CAS remanded with instructions to address the

federal constitutional issue.

Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F.2d 676

(CAS 1983).
On remand, appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the Act was simply another effort by fundamentalist
Christians to attack the theory of evolution and to incorporate
in the public school curricula the Biblical theory of creation.
Appellant state officials countered that the purpose and effect
of the Act is to promote the legitimate secular purpose of
academic freedom.
appellees.

....--

The DC granted summary judgment in favor of

It observed that under Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403

u.s.

602, 612 (1971), a statute violates the Establishment Clause if
it (1)

has a religious purpose,

(2)

has a primary effect of

-

3 -

advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) fosters an e»cessive
government entanglement with religion.

l

The .....coyrt reas b

d that

because the doctrine of creation-science necessarily involves
teaching the existence of a divine creator and
..... because the

-

concept of a creator is an inherently religious tenet, the
of the Act was to promote religion in violation of the
first prong of the Lemon test.

The court expressly declined to

review the legislative history.

The~ 5

affirmed.

After noting that the Lemon test controls

this case, the court observed that "the theory of creation is a
religious belief" and that "evolution has historically been
offensive to religious fundamentalists because the theory cannot
be reconciled with the Biblical account of the origin of man."
Against this background, the court concluded that the plain
language of the statute demonstrated that it had no secular
legislative purpose.

To support this holding, the court examined

the statute's potential secular purposes and concluded that it
did not promote them.

The statute was counterproductive to its

stated purpose of promoting academic freedom because its effect
is to restrict rather than to expand free choice.

Nor does the

statute promote academic freedom by overcoming a misperception
among school teachers that teaching creation-science is against
the law.

The court reasoned that "[n]o court of which we are

aware has prohibited voluntary instruction concerning purely
scientific evidence that happens ••• to be consistent with
religious doctrine belief," apparently to show that such a
misperception of the law among school teachers is unlikely.

The

-

4 -

Act also fails to promote creation science as a genuine academic
'

interest because it does not require the teaching of s +ch science
unless evolution science also is taught.

The intended effect of

the Act "is to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its
teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a
religious belief.

For these reasons, we hold that the Act fails

to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test and thus is
unconstitutional."
Appellants filed a petn for a rehearing en bane,
denied over a dissent by Judge Gee.

whic~

was

The dissent argued that

there is nothing pernicious about a state requirement that
educators present a balanced view of the scientific evidence
concerning all theories of the origin of life and that they not
misrepresent as established fact views which are theory only.
The panel has no basis other than its extra-record hunch that the
statute was enacted for a religious purpose.

But even if this

hunch were true -- that the statute was motivated by parents who
resent having the theory of evolution misrepresented to their
children as scientific fact -- there is nothing illiberal in
forbidding either of two bona fide theories to be taught as fact.
Moreover, the argument that religious motivation invalidates a
statute proves too much.

Not only is it inconsistent with a

recent decision upholding Louisiana's Sunday closing laws, but it
would result in the invalidation of laws such as those
prohibiting bigamy, which "carry tell-tale indicia of having been
passed with a motive to favor the Judea-Christian religious
preference for monogamy, singling it out for adoption over the

..

-

equally workable Moslem view."

5 -

Unlike statutes involving school

prayer, the statute here has no direct religious
dissent ended by saying, "It comes as news to me

l
refer ~nce.

The

that the

Constitution forbids a state to require the teaching of truth."
In a heated response to the dissent, Judge Jolly wrote:
"First, as writer of the panel opinion, I offer my
apologies to the majority of this court for aligning it
with the forces of darkness and anti-truth. Second, I
do not personally align myself with the dissenters in
their commitment to the eternal search for truth
through state edicts. Third, I commend to the
dissenters a serious rereading of the majority opinion
that they may recognize the hyperbole of the opinion in
which they join. And, finally, I respectfully submit,
the panel opinion speaks for itself, modestly and
moderately, if one will allow its words to be carefully
heard. n
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants argue that the statute involved

here does not fail under the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test
because it was not motivated by a purpose to advance religion.
Under Wallace v. Jaffree,

472

u.s.

__, __,

a law does not

violate the purpose requirement unless it is "entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion.
465

u.s.

668,

(1984)

See also Lynch v. Donnelly,

(statute fails "purpose" prong only if

"motivated wholly by religious considerations").

Moreover, the

Court has stressed its "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional
motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular
purpose" appears on "the face of the statute."
463 U.S. _ _ , 394-395 (1983).

Mueller v. Allen,

TheCA misapplied these principles

by simply assuming that the legislature had an impermissible
religious motive and by assuming that only statutes with a
predominantly secular purpose survive the Establishment Clause.
Creation science is as scientific and nonreligious as

-

6 -

evolution science, and simply describes theories involving abrupt
appearances of life in complex form.

It is

associate ~

with such

theories about the origin of the universe as big bang,
inflationary universe, and continuous creation, as well as the
directed panspermia theory of life.

The concept of a creator is

not a necessary part of creation science because evidence of
creation need not include speculation about a source.

Just as

the theory of evolution does not resolve the question of who or
what originated matter and energy in the cosmos, and what
mechanism brought about macroevolution, creation science does not
address the source or cause of creation.

An overwhelming number

of scientists including avowed evolutionists and agnostics
acknowledge that creation science is a viable alternative theory
supported by significant evidence.

See, e.g.,

Lipson,~

Physicist Looks at Evolution, 31 Physics Bull. 138, 138 (1980);
Gould, Evolution's Erratic Pace, Natural History, May 1977, at
12.
Even if creation science were to involve references to a
creator, that does not automatically involve it with religion or
render it violative of the Establishment Clause.

The concept of

a creator is not necessarily religious, but often is
philosophical or metaphysical.

The Establishment Clause does not

prohibit references to creation as a scientific theory just as it
does not prohibit references to God, so long as they are not
designed to propagate religious doctrines.
370

u.s.

421, 435, n.21 (1961).

See Engel v. Vitale,

References to creation in a

science class are no different from the references to God in the

-

7 -

Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Star Spangled
,,•

Banner, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the National Mo.,to.
This Court has stressed that a law's stated purpose should
not lightly be disregarded.

The stated purpose of the statute at

issue is to promote academic freedom by providing additional
scientific information about the origin of life.
§17:286.2.

La. Rev. Stat.

In the famous Scopes trial, which challenged a policy

to teach only creation theory to the exclusion of evolution,
Clarence Darrow stated that it is "bigotry for public schools to
teach only one theory of origins."

The statute in this case

recognizes that this statement has as much force with respect to
evolution as it does to creation theory.

The CAS's decision

should be summarily reversed.
Appellees argue that the decision below should be summarily
affirmed.

Impressionable high school students will interpret the

statute as an official endorsement of religion.

The clear

purpose behind the statute is the promotion of the religious
theory of creation.

Most teachers perceive it in this manner

rather than as a means of promoting a secular purpose.
4.
2490

DISCUSSION:

In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,

(1985), this Court stated that "a statute that is motivated

in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the [purpose prong of
the Lemon test] , " but "a statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion."

-------------

In

determining whether the statute in Jaffree was "entirely
motivated" by a religious purpose, the Court asked "'whether the
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of

...

1

religion.'"

Ibid.

~

-

The Court determined that the

an~wer

was

"yes" in Jaffree because "the record not only provide, t us with an
unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals that the
enactment of [the statute] was not motivated by any clearly
secular purpose."

Ibid.

This case is distinguishable from Jaffree because the lower

~

courts cited no evidence from the record in the form of

___

~

-

legislative
history
or otherwise that "unambiguously"
.:::..._
,___..............
...
demonstrated that the statute was designed to endorse religion
that it lacked a secu

ose.

~7·

or~

Indeed, the only legislative

history mentioned stated that the purpose of the statute was to
promote academic freedom.

The CAS's alleged reliance on the

"plain language of the statute" is unper suasive bee ause nothing
in the language of the statute unambiguously demonstrated a

------- It

design to endorse religion.

would be an extension of Jaffree

to hold that a statute fails the purpose prong of Lemon simply
because a court's view of "common sense" suggests that a statute
was enacted primarily for a religious purpose.
I therefore think that this case raises a substantial
federal question.

Of course, if ever there are cases in which a

"common sense" argument is persuasive, this is one of them.

Not

much common sense is required to conclude that this statute was
enacted primarily to benefit religious views about the creation
of life.

Nevertheless, since this Court has upheld Sunday

closing laws in the face of such "common sense" arguments, see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.

420, 429-453 (1961), they

apparently are not sufficient by themselves to establish an

~

-

9 -

impermissible religious purpose under the Lemon test .'

I believe
. jl•

that noting probable jurisdiction would allow the Cot.i't t

to set

forth the appropriate means for finding a religious purpose when
it is not unambiguously obvious from the statutory language or
legislative history.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend noting probable

jurisdiction.
There is a response.
April 25, 1986

Guynn
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NOT YO'riNG

John Newton Thomas
107 Berkshire Road
Richmond, Virginia 23221

August 2, 1986

Dear Lewis,
Let me repeat the oral apology I made to you Sunday
for my failure to respond to your gracious and thoughtful
letter, with your opinion, on the Alabama prayer case.
Upon reading your letter and opinion, I agreed immediately with
your decision. Given the Court's position on neutrality, I
think you had no other option. Please forgive my lack of
courtesy and apparently of appreciation in not responding
immediately.
At the time your letter was received I was active on a
Citizens' Committee appointed to celebrate the 200th Anniversary
of the Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom. The contrast
between that document and the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment, as presented in your letter and opinion, has
engrossed me e ver since. I decided - how mistakenly - to send
you some thoughts on the general subject along with my response
to your letter. The fact that they are forthcoming only now, after
some thirteen or fourteen months, indicates how many problems I
have faced and how slowly my mind works at age 83.
What I am sending is an outline of some major ideas.
If I could issue a command to you, it would be to leaf through
it hurriedly, throw it in the waste basket and send no answer.
Sincerely,

lliE

VIRGINI( r:::tD~ r::..~:;NDMENT

The preamble of the Statute, drafted by Thomas Jefferson in 1777 and
adopted by the Virginia Assembly in 1786, begins with the following words:
"Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free ... all attem{i:sto influence
it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only
to beget habits of

hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan

of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet
chose not to propagat e it by coercions on either, as was in His Almighty power
to do ... "

These words are reminiscent of Jefferson's earlier statement in the

Declaration of Independence, that all men are "endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights •.. "
What is said in these statements is enough to convince me that Jefferson,
while not an evangelical Christian and probably a deist, believed in the JudeaChristian God and attributed human rights to Him.
The fact that he refers once in the Statute to one's having a "natural
right" and once to "the natural rights of mankind" is enough to lead some to
the conclusion that he based human rights on natural law, following his philosophical mentor, John Locke.

However, the idea of natural law is historically

associated in philosophy with the theistic position and there is no contradiction
in holding that God is the author of natural law.
are safe in saying that Jefferson >who wrote the

I believe therefore that we

Statut~ and

the members of the

majority in the Assembly who voted for it believed in God as the author of our
right to freedom.

/6 e,

Establishment Clause

It is generally agreed that the definition of freedom enacte d in the
Virginia Statute became the basis of the First Amendment.

This would suggest

2

a very close relationship between the Statute and the Amendment, close enough,
I should think, to place the burden of proof on those who find significant
divergencies in them.

For instance, the absence of any mention of God in the

Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution and the refusal of its framers to declare the Christian faith as official, while admittedly posing a question,
should not be interpreted as a rejection of religion or even as betokening a
waning of religious belief among the political leaders of the late 18th century.
Accordingly, I cannot agree that the establishmen·i-. clause was originally
conceived as an effort to separate the state from religion.

Rather it was de-

signed to prevent the state from elevating any particular religious institution
as "the established Church."

Mr.

Jeffer5on, in his letter to the Danbury

Baptists as late as 1802, made it clear that the "wall of separation" was
between church and state.

It is important also to remember that while forbidding

"an establishment of religion," the Amendment said nothing about religion as
such, except in the "free exercise" clause.
In ruling that the establishment clause requires the state to assume a
position of neutrality- i . e . , non-commitment- toward religion, we have come
full circle from the theology of those two great pre-Constitutional documents,
the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.
Furthermore, we have moved beyond the First Amendment's silence in regard to
religion to a position which definitely forbids any recognition of or commitment
to religion.

In short, we have become a secular state .

Having used the term, I should say that I understand secularism as
designating any position or attitude which leaves God out of the picture.

It may

take the form of anything from atheism, agnosticism, refusal to yield to God or
simple neglect of Him .

It hardly needs to be added that the real struggle today

-----

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

is no longer between churches seeking establishment but between religion and
secularism.
The Concept of Neutrality
I must apologize for discussing the Court's use of this principle when
I am ignorant of the reasoning which led to its adoption.
First, let me clarify the sense in which I understand it.

After sorting

through the variant definitions of the term in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary,
the following seems to me to be the common factor in them all:

to be neutral

means "not being engaged on either side; not taking part with or assisting
either of two or more contending parties."
According to this definition, neutrality presupposes the existence of
at least two contending parties and consists in not being engaged with or
committed to either party, thus according equal treatment to both.

A position

favoring one party against one or more others, such as the judgment in the
Alabama school prayer case, would of course not be neutral in the light of this
definition, however justified on other grounds .

But are we to conclude that,

in calling for the state to be neutral toward religion, the Court did not intend
to include those acts of the state embodied in judicial decisions regarding
religion?
I

should think that most Court decisions would fall short of neutrality

in Webster•s sense, since they are usually bound to side with one party against
the other .

There are also the cases where the positions of the contending

parties are mutually contradictory, such for instance as religion versus · nonreligion, as a result of which there is no neutral ground between them.
To affirm one is to deny the other and vice versa.
appropriate, "He that is not for me is against me . "

Jesus' words might be

4

The Court certainly has a right to define its own terms.

One thing

which inclines me to think it has done this is the fact that it apparently
reserves the term, neutrality, for religion alone, not religion in relation to
any contending party.

On this basis neutrality might be thought of as being

neither for nor against religion, but this is not the position of the Court.
The one invariable in its opinion, as I understand it, is that the state must
not be for religion.

Your letter and opinion, I think, make this perfectly

clear .
This is the essence of the interpretation of the establishment clause as
requiring separation of religion and state.

The interpretation can be stated

in plain English, as you have done in your letter.

There is thus no need for

the dubious concept, neutrality, since it is neither the source of the Court's
understanding of the establishment clause nor a necessary or effective means

t

of clarifying its

interpret~

~ In~n ~o;;_d like to ~z- ~at the American state is
.

.

t)r'"'- -/_.,

-J-Lu -S

.

+o h

in

.

the unique position of being ne~ther Marx~st: ~~lcomm~ttea;at e~s jA.,. nor,
like the nations of Western Europe, nominally Christian.
us in a none-too-enviable situation.

Our secularism leaves

Our forefathers fled Europe where religious

states denied, or limited, religious freedom and came to our shores where they
proclaimed religious freedom on the basis of religious faith.

Today a secular

American state still proclaims religious freedom, having inherited the free exercise
clause, but, like the ACLU, without reference to God.

This means that our cele-

brated rights, religious and otherwise, are no longer "unalienable" endowments
bestowed by the Creator on every human individual but only civil rights bestowed
by the government and revocable at its pleasure.

September 16, 1986
EDWARDS GINA-POW
8S-1Sl3

Edwards v. Aguillard(Appeal from CAS)

MEMO TO CLERK:
This

case

that

has

received

a

great

deal

of

publicity - involves the validity of the Louisiana statute
entitled

"Balanced

Evolution-Science

Treatment
Act",

for

enacted

Creation-Science
by

the

and

Louisiana

Legislature in 1981.
The

Act,

elementary

applicable

schools,

is

to

all

described

public
in

secondary

CAS's

opinion

follows:
"The statute requires the public schools to
give balanced treatment to creation-science and
to
evolution-science.
Creation-science
and
evolution-science are similarly defined in the
statute
as
"the
scientific
evidences
for
creation (or evolution) and the inferences from
those scientific evidences." Under the Act no
school is required to give any instruction Tn
the--sws--j~!n "of manKTnO, buf" if a
scho ol c hoos est o t eaeh -either e V5n:i tion-science
or creation-science, it Fs€:!:~bo th ~ and it
must give balanced treatment to eac t eory. In
addition, the statute prohibits discrimination

'.

and
as

against any teacher
"who chooses to be a
creation-scientist or to teach scientific data
which points to creationism."FR3

1.
The statute does not
prohibiting discrimination
evolution.

contain a similar provision
against teachers who teach

,.

The plaintiffs and defendants in the case below were
a

The

"mixed-bag".

plaintiffs

included

a

group

of

Louisiana Legislators, religious leaders, parents, and the
Louisiana
The

Board

defendants

governor,

of
(now

attorney

Education.

The DC

Constitution.

Elementary

On

and

appellants
general
found

before
the

us)

included

State

back

federal

to

the

DC

contitutional

the

Department of

to

CAS

certified

with

the

state

the Louisiana Supreme Court.

It found no violation of the Constitution.
went

Education.

the Act violated the Louisiana

appeal

constitutional question

and

Secondary

instructions

questions.

The

The case then
to

DC

address

the

sustained

the

plaintiffs summary judgment motion despite the fact that
there were conflicting affidavits expressing opinions with
respect

to

On appeal,
Jolly

"creation-science"

and

"evolution-science".

a panel composed of Judges Brown, Politz and

affirmed

the

DC's

On

decision.

a

suggestion

for

rehearing en bane, by vote of 8 to 7 en bane rehearing was
denied.

Judge Gee, who has a distinctive and

writing

style,

rehearing.

dissented

from

the

denial

Judge

of

en

bane

His dissent was joined by 6 other CA judges,

including 2 whom I particularly admire:
and

attractive

Higginbotham.

Judge

Gee's

Chief Judge Clark
opinion

heaped

ridicule on the panel decision, and - at least on its face
- was a very persuasive dissent.

Judge Jolly was prompted

to respond in a brief (A-6) paragraph in which he invited
the dissenters to reread the panel opinion that speaks for
itself, "modestly and moderately".
Judge Jolly's opinion
opinion)
brief

(referred to herein as the CA

is certainly framed in moderate language.

and

namely,

well-written,

whether

of

by

on

the

"sole

issue",

the Balanced Treatment Act violates the

religious clauses of
disposed

focusing

It is

the First Amendment.

CAS's

negative

answer

---

The case was

to

the

II.

question
'\

"whether the Act has a secular legislative purpose"?

The

CA, largely ignored the legislative history that it viewed
as

having

"secular

been

tailored

purpose".

The

specifically
court

properly

to

establish

recognized

a

that

normally a state prescribes the academic curriculum of its
public

schools,

and

that

courts

should

"exercise great

care and restraint when called upon to intervene in the
operation of public schools" - a view with which I warmly
agree.

But the CA further said that a states'

right "to

prescribe its public school curriculum is limited to the
extent that it may not compel or prohibit the teaching of
a theory or doctrine for religious reasons". Epperson v.

~

..

N

'

·'

:,

''I
Arkansas,

393

u.s.

97,

107.

Citing our decision in the

Alabama "moment of silence" case, Wallace v. Jaffree, the
CA noted

that

criteria

[of

"no consideration of
the Lemon

test]

the

second or

is necessary

does not have a clearly secular purpose".

if a

third

statute

It recognized,

as I said in my Wallace concurring opinion - and also as
stated in the Court opinion -

a statute that does have a

clearly secular purpose is not invalidated simply because
it may also have religious implications.
The CA, after citing and quoting from several of our
decisions,
reality,

examined the Act "to determine whether it,
establishes

recognize

that

the

religious

theory

is

ourselves

from the historical

We

belief.

creation
We

belief.
fact

that

(the

Book

cannot

must
of

divorce

the controversy

the proponents of evolution and creationism has

religious
legislative
"plain

religious

of

Genesis)

between

a

a

in

overtones".
history

language

of

Finally,

as
the

having

pretextual,
Act

embodies a secuJ.ar purpose".

to

CAS

rejected
looked

determine

to

whether

the
the
it

Although its stated purpose

was "to protect academic freedom", CAS rejected this and
other

"self-serving

statements"

as

being

a

deliberate

effort to establish that the legislation was truly secular

6.

in its primary purpose.
statute
purpose".

makes

Rather, the plain language of the

apparent

"its

predominantly

religious

Finally, the CA concluded as follows:

"Not only does the Act fail to promote
academic freedom, it fails to promote creation
science as a genuine academic interest.
If
primarily concerned with the advancement of
creation-science, the Act, it certainly appears
to us,
would
have
required
its
teaching
irrespective of whether evolution was taught.
Thus a primary academic interest in creationscience would seem to be gainsaid because the
Act requires the teaching of the creation theory
only if the theory of evolution is taught.
"Finally,
this scheme of the statute,
focusing
on
the
religious
bete
noire of
evolution,
as
it
does,
demonstrates
the
religious purpose of the statute.
Indeed, the
Act continues the battle William Jennings Bryan
carried to his grave. The ~ ct's intended effect
is to di ~credi t e_yo.lut :lQ.rl · ill' co!:!_nterbalaocing
it ~c fi
f
v
u
with the teaching of
c~,
a religious belief.
The s atute
therefore is a law respecting a particular
religious belief.
For these reasons, we hold ~
''that the Act fails to satisfy the first prong of
the Lemon test and thus is unconstitutional."
~~
~
~~k

AA-t!>*

*

*

*

~~-

The briefs of the appellants and the appellees are
long and contentious and there are a dozen or more amici
briefs.

I will not undertake in this memo to summarize

the long and tedious arguments made by the parties.
make a few observations.

I do

We

should

have

rejected

the

form

in

which

the

questions are "presented", as they are unnecessarily long
and

argumentative.

The

state's

first

argument

is

that

summary jud ment should not have been en ered because the
"uncontroverted \affidavits"
taken as true
issues

of

(as

on behalf of the state -

the Rule requires)

material

These

fact."

included as Appendix B (A7-A47).

-

if

created "genuine

five

affidavits

are

I have scanned several

of these, and I am inclined to think the DC was correct in
not regarding the views expressed as "facts" for purposes
of

ruling

heard

on

of

the

summary

judgment motion.

"Creation-science"

prior

to

I

this

had never
case.

In

simplistic terms, as I understand it, a school of thought
has

developed

Genesis

account

evolution",
for

in

and

doubting

evolution.

recent
of

the

years

to

creation

the
is

effect

"as

that

scientific

the
as

that there are even "substantial reasons
the

truth"

of

the

presuppositions

Relying on these affidavits,

of

the state argues

that "creation-science is non-religion", is "scientific",
and

"can

concepts

be
and

evolution."

taught
in

in

fact

public
can

be

schools
taught

without
as

religious

feasibly

as

8.

The
properly
joined

state's
upon

by

statement
quite

brief

Judge

six

reference

Gee's

other CAS

that

the

different"

Jeffrey,

on

etc.;

this

relies,

dissent"

which

concerns

v.

Kurtzman,

Lemon

merely

quite

that

was

It quotes Judge Gee's

judges.

statute

and

merits

"forceful

"statute
from

whatever

the

has

no

us

Wallace

direct

requires

today

that

is
v.

religious
"the

whole

scientific truth be taught on the subject if any subject
is taught".

Neither Judge Gee's oipinion nor the 50 page

brief of the State Attorney General cites any decision of
this Court that lends substantial support for the validity
of

I

the Act.

do

think,

as Judge Gee emphasizes,

that

customarily we rely heavily on the legislative history in
determining the intent and purpose of a statute.
rather

critical,

for

example,

This was

to my opinion in Wallace.

And on its face, perhaps one's first reaction is that the
Louisiana
approach
classrooms

Legislature
that
of

should
both

has

adopted

assure

points

of

a

fair

and

balanced

the

presentation

in

the

view

with

to

the

fine

law

respect

Biblical view of creation and evolution.
Appellees
firm,

brief,

although

is unattractive to me.

anti-religion -

in its tone.

prepared

by

a

It is sarcastic - and even
It ridicules the view that

there is anything "scientific" about the "creation" view.
Indeed,

the

brief

argues

forecloses scientific inquiry.

that

"creation-science"

The unifying principle of

"creationism is not the law of nature but of divinity".FR2

2.
One unattractive feature of the appellees brief is
that it invariably refers to the Act as the "Creationism
Act", which of course is not the title of the Act at all.

I

find

the amicus brief on behalf of the National

Academy of Sciences to be more persuasive than that of the
appellees.

It makes a frontal attack on the view that

there is such a thing as "creation-science".

The Academy

created a committee in 1981 on "Science and Creationism".
The committee's report (1984) was reviewed and approved by
the Governing Council.
reached was as follows:

Among other things, the conclusion
"The Academy states unequivocally

that the tenents of "creation-science" are not supported
by scientific evidence, that creationism has no place in a
science

curriculum

at

any

level,

that

its

proposed

teaching would be impossible in any constructive sense for
well-informed and conscientious science teachers, and that
its teaching would be contrary to the nation's need for a
scientifically literate citizenry .•. ".

*

*

*

The case is troubling for me because, having served
on the Virginia State Board of Education for eight years,
I

feel

rather

strongly that courts should leave to the

states the determination of the curriculum of the public
schools.

Although I am not up-to-date, I am certain that

it was considered permissible - though not required - for
courses on the Bible to be taught in the public schools

··~·

:,

''I
just as they are in universities.

Nor would it ever have

occurred to me as a Board member that students also could
not

be

taught

that

there

is a

strongly held

scientific

view as to evolution.

I personally have thought that the

book

the

of

Genesis

necessarily

and

conflict.

theory

There

of

is

evolution

abundant

do

room

not
for

interpretation of the books of the Old Testament that were
written

in

light

of

the

knowledge at that time.

rather

limited

universe

of

But we need not get into this in

this case.
I do not think the case itself is of vast importance
because

few

states

would

enact

comparable

legislation.

But this case will receive enormous publicity, however we
decide it.
on

inclined tentatively to affirm

ground

that

this

"legislative history"
purpose.

particular
-

does

statute

despite

the

not have a primary secular

But Judge Gee's opinion cannot be brushed aside

lightly.

I

therefore

will welcome

the views of my law

clerk.
I
could

believe
be

colleges.

"comparative

taught

in

high

religious"

schools

just

courses
as

they

lawfully
are

in

My clerk should request the Library to examine

the catalogs of several colleges.

LFP, JR.

To:

Justice Powell

From:

ks 1//J. I

December 5, 1986

Leslie

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
The affidavits filed in this case define creation-science
as

"origin through abrupt appearance

in complex form."

A-19.

The affidavits then state that creation-science, as thus defined,
is a scientifically accepted theory of origins.
these affidavits to preclude summary judgment.
summary judgment despite the affidavits.
ry

Petrs introduced
The DC granted

Petrs argue that summa-

judgment was improper because the affidavits create a genuine

issue of fact as to whether the Louisiana legislature had a secular purpose in enacting the statute.
The proper question appears to be whether the affidavits,
created as they were 11after ' 'enactment of the Louisiana statute,

page

L..

fairly put into issue the intention of the , legislatu~e
in requirjl
ing that creation-science be taught.

There is a st;t ng argument

that the affidavits demonstrate that creation-science can be considered secular.
secular

If it can, then the legislature arguably had a

purpose

in

requiring

that

this aspect of

"science" be

----

It would ~ be difficult to write an opinion stating C~

taught.
1

that iummary judgm:n"'i

~

improp::--; iven

-;;:--dispu~ed i~e

of

~.

~

legislative intent.
of

the

would

Such a decision would not define the

Establishment

remand

the case

.
respecting

Clause
for

trial.

limits ~-

·
·
creation-science,

b ut~
~
t .. ~ .. /n~

This Court could then late§rv

review findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.

T~

This

approach may be most in accord with your position that a court
should not second guess a legislature's stated secular purpose.
I will not present the arguments in favor of this result in detail.

Instead, I will present the strongest argument in favor of

affirmance.

If you are unconvinced, then a remand is appropriate

based on the fact that the affidavits fairly put the purpose of
the legislature in issue.
The other

side of

the

argument

is

that post-enactment

statements made for the purpose of litigation should not put the
original legislative intent into issue.

This Court's inqyiry __,
is
~

~(

~ as

~~

II

~·

to the purpose of the Louisiana Legislature in enacting the

statute in the

first place.

You have expressed skepticism of

'S'~

~"'}~ ·

~st-enactment statements as to legislative intent, especially by ~~~
Interested parties.
(1985).

Wallace v.

Jaffree,

105 S.

Ct.

2479,

2495

These statements create a genuine issue of material fact

only if they bear on the legislative understanding of creation-

page

J.

'
The relevant indiQators of the

science at the time of enactment.

~

legislative intent are the words of the statute and l he legisla- 1U>
tive

The

history.

statute

itself

does

not

define

~

creation~~
J•~

science.

the legislature's definition of the term must be ~,·

Thus,

gleaned from the legislative history.
There

is

term of art.

a

strong

argument

that

creation-science

is

a

Under normal principles of statutory construction,

the legislature should be presumed to ascribe the ordinary meaning to such a term. ' \.Creationism':· is ~~ed \ n the dictionary

____...

-

as "The doctrine ascribing the origin of
forms

as

the

contain

a

definition

of

Since the statute does

creationism,

it

is

questionable

whether the legislature can escape the dictionary definition by
submitting affidavits after

the fact.

that "concepts concerning .•.

A lower court has found

a supernatural being of some sort

are manifestly religious ..• These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as philosophy or as a
science

... "

Malnak v.

Yogi,

440

F.

Supp.

1284,

1322

(D.N.J.

1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979) •
.
11 y, ~~
.8--C..
Spec1. f 1ca
a court has

found,

after an 8-day trial,

that the four tenets of creation-science are:
(1)

that a divine Creator created the world "from noth-

ing" (ex nihilo);
(2)
"types)
"kinds:;

:f ...

of

that
plants

the
and

Creator
animals

fashioned
that

~~411
-=--

all matter and living ( /

now exist to distinct acts of creation by God." )

New American Heritage Dictionary at 311.
not

/ J.

distinct

cannot

give

"kinds"

(or

rise

new

to

page 4.

( 3)

that a "worldwide flood" or ''Deluge" fqrmed fossils

,.,1

and other paleontological and geological phenomena; and
(4) that the universe had a "relatively recent inception"
(within the last 10,000 years).

~
(E.D.

v. Arkansas Board of Education,
Ark.

case).

1982)

(quoting Arkansas statute invalidated in that

McLean is cited a number of times in the CAS's decision

in this case.
na~re

529 F. Supp. 1255, 1264

This case goes into a detailed analysis of the

~ ce

and its relationship to science.

The

court examined testimony of some of the same witnesses who testified before the legislature, and who offer the affidavits in this
case.

If the question of whether creation-science is viewed as a

question of law, then the affidavits offered in this case do not
preclude summary judgment.

This view makes some sense,

because

it would seem odd to require an entire trial each time some group
contends that creation-science is science.

A copy of the McLean

opinion is attached.
In addition to McLean, there is authority for the proposition that creation-science is not scientifically accepted.
problem is that this evidence is not in the record.

The National

Academy of Sciences has recently stated:

..-----

It is ... our unequivocal conclusion that creationism,
with its accounts of the origin of life by supernatural
means, is not science.
It subordinates evidence to
statements based no authority and revelation.
Its documentation is almost entirely limited to the special
publications of its advocates.
And its central hypothesis is not subject to change in
light of new data or demonstrat o
rror. Mo eover,
wh ~nce for creationism has been subjected to
the tests of the scientific method, it has been found
invalid.
National Academy of Sciences, Science and

..~.'·

The

page

!).

Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences 26 (1984).
,.)
Although it would be convenient,

this statement does not appear

to be the proper subject of judicial notice.
In contrast,

the

history of

nc-f~h.-,~k
~ ~~

religious

fundamentalists'

efforts to discredit the theory of evolution may well be an appropriate subject of judicial notice.
393

u.s.

2d 738,

97

(Q
(19 ~ 6};

741-743

Crowley v.

(CADC 1 9Se>) ;

Independent School District,
Tex.

1972},

See Epperson v. Arkansas,

Smithsonian Institution, 636 F.

McLean,

supra; Wright v.

Houston

366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209-1211

aff'd per curiam,

486 F.

2d 137

(CAS 1973}.

(S.D.
This

statute specifically ties the teaching of evolution to the teaching of creation-science.

-

This could well be viewed as an effort

~

to do indirectly what the Court held could not be accomplished
directly -- prohibit the teaching of evolution because it conflicts with certain religious beliefs.
The

"sequence and history"

of a statute's enactment is

~

probative as to legislative intent.

--------~------~--~--------

Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2495.

Note that the historical sequence of the statute's enactment in
similar to this case.

There, the Court stated:

~~~~~J

is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction ~A It~
was and is the law's reason for existence.
Its ante- ~
SZ5il
cedent, Tennessee's "monkey law," candidly stated its ...Jt. _._~ 1 ~ 1 '
purpose:
to make it unlawful "to teach any theory that ,...,~f4.1,/
denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as k.Ae-4..._..:;
1
taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has __,., ~- /descended from a lower class of animals." Perhaps the -, ---~
sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial
induced Arkansas to adopt less explicit language.
It
eliminated Tennessee's reference to "the story of the
Divine creation of man" as taught in the Bible, by
there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was )
the same:
to suppress the teaching of a theory which,
it was thought, "denied" the divine creation of man.

page 6.

393

u.s.,

at 109.

The creation-science tenets listed
in the Ar~~
'·I

kansas statute

invalidated

in McLean were originally listed in

the Louisiana statute as the definition of the phrase "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences form those scientific
evidences."

After suit was filed challenging the Arkansas stat-

ute with the same definition,
statute was deleted.

the definition from the Louisiana

According to a committee member, the dele-

tion was "intended to try to produce some good for the bill and
not intended to try to gut it in any way, or defeat the purpose
[for]

which Senator

Keith

provide authority for

introduced

his

bill."

Epperson may

the Court to look to the Arkansas statute

and the decision in McLean to determine the true meaning and motivation behind the Louisiana statute.
There is evidence in the legislative history as to the
religious nature of creation-science, but most of it relates to
the 1980 version of the bill that contained the four tenets.

Ac-

cording to Senator Keith, creation-science "relates ... scientific origins

to

a

creator,"

App.

E-29,

and

involves

"the

truth

about those evidences that support the concept of special ere~ion."

App. E-36.

Testimony on behalf of the first bill often

linked creation-science to a "creator."
tions from the

~~islative

The following are selec-

history}

It is inherent in the basic tenet of uniformitarian
evolution that special creation by a supernatural intelligence is not only unnecessary, but is not to be
believed.
Furthermore, evolutionists invariably maintain that creation is religion 'merely because the only
basic reference to it is in the Bible.' App. E-130.

j~J(l)

page 7.

The creation model postulates that all the bas.~c systems of nature, including elements, stars, B'f!- anets,
life and the major kinds of organisms, including man,
were created fully developed by super-natural creative
processes during a primeval period of special creation,
following which conservative (rather than creative)
processes were established to govern the completed creation. App. E-169.

The Institute for Creation Research is working to bring
about a revival of belief in special creation as the
true explanation of the origin of the world. the evolutionary philosophy has dominated the world's scientific and political establishments for several generations, and there is urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, who
has a purpose for His creation ) nd to whom all people
must eventually give account.
n the past, the creation concept has been promote mainly on theological
and moral grounds.
ICR, on the other hand, is now
showing that creation is a better scientific concept
than evolution for explaining the origin of the world
and the meaning of history. App. E-197.

1~~
~
L~~·
~~
)12-~J,c..¥

.rV

~~_!~

Although this testimony was on behalf of the first bill,

17 ,p1!)

~~--' d Ication
'
.
. 1 ature In.
there
IS no 1n
t h at t h e 1 egis

not the second,

ation theory by deleting the tenets.

Dr. Boudreaux who was the

primary authority to testify on behalf of the second bill, emphasized

"the

something
search

number

like a

Society

of

people

today

in America

thousand who are members of
who

hold

doctorate

and

areas of science and equally affiliates

-

ation Resear cb ."
tains

evidence

organizations.

as

App.
to

E-503-504.

alone

numbering

th~reation

masters

degrees

wi ~nstitution

in

~;;:t(
all~

Re-

of Cre-

The legislative history con-

the nature of

these

...

two creation-science

The Institute for Creation Research is an affili-

ate of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California.
The Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our

page B.

nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent ,Creator, who
~

'I must evenhas a purpose for His creation and to whom all people
tually give account."

App. E-197.

~a

A goal of the

revival of belief in special creation as the true explanation of
the origin of the world."
on

the

"development

creationism

of

in public

Iesearch Society

is

Therefore, the Institute concentrates
new

methods

schools."

located

App.

for

teaching

E-197-199.

in Ann Arbor,

scientific

The Creation

Michigan.

must subscribe to the following statement of belief:

A member
"The Bible

is the written work of God, and because it is inspired throughout,

all of

true."

its

assertions are historically and scientifically

T~ study "creation-science" at the Society,

App. E-583.

a member must accept "that the account of origins in Genesis is a
factual presentation of simple historical truth."

App. E-583.

If it is possible from the legislative history to find
that the purpose behind the Louisiana statute was to advance religion,

then whether or not there are certain "facts" to support

.

.

the creation-science view should not matter.
ly

stated,

do

"We

not

deny

that

The CAS specificalthe

underpinnings

of

creationism may be supported by scientific evidence."

The pur-

pose of a legislative action alone can invalidate it.

For exam-

ple, a legislature could pass a statute stating that the history
of

Australia

not

be

taught.

Absent

an

would be within the legislature's domain.

invalid

purpose,

this

But, if a statute pro-

hibiting the teaching of a particular subject is motivated by a
desire

to

advance

Epperson, supra.

religion,

it

is

constitutionally

invalid.

The Court does not have to deny that some sci-

page 9.

entific evidence may exist to support ·creation-science
to find
·lj
that the particular statute was motivated by solely l y religious
concerns.

If the motivation was solely religious, then the stat-

ute is invalid.
Another argument in favor of affirmance is the rule that
"[w] hen both courts below are unable to find an arguably valid
purpose,

secular

-

one."

Wallace,

M oreover,

this
105

S.

Court
Ct.

normally
at

249 5

should
(Powell,

this Court normally "accept [s]

hesitate
J. ,

to

find

LF()

concurring) •

a reasonable construe-

tion of state law by the Court of Appeals 'even if an examination
of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified
a different conclusion."
8 (1983)

Haring v. Prosise, 462

u.s.

306, 314 n.

(quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346 (1976)).

In

light of the legislative history, the lower court's finding that
creation-science is inherently a religious concept as embodied in
the Louisiana statute and thus that the legislature's purpose was
religious may not appear clearly erroneous.

"'·
,•

,,.

~
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MEMORANDUM

To:

December 5, 1986

Justice Powell

From:

Leslie

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
You wanted to know whether comparative religion classes or
Bible study classes were taught in Louisiana universities and
secondary schools.

A number of universities offer such courses.

v-Northwestern State University of Lo. offers a course in Bible
history. ~Lo. Tech. offers two courses:

History of the Christian

Church and Philosophy of Religion. ~rambling State University
offers Philosophy of Religion.
"Religions."
courses:

'io.

~McNeese

State University offers

State University at Baton Rouge offers seven

Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament,

Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern
Religions, Philosophy of Religion .

...... .

It is more difficult to determine what courses

s~condary

'I

schools offer because they do not have published catalogs and I
did not want to authorize the library to make phone calls on this
sensitive subject.

There is nothing specifically from Louisiana,

but there are many general teaching materials that indicate that
..........

-

-

,........

many secondary schools offer such courses.

For example:

The

Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project presents materials
for grade 1-6 emphasizing religion in nature, ethnic studies,
world religions, religion in North America;
English Program;

The Bible in the

Teaching the Old Testament in English Classes;

Comparative World Religions (plan for an elective course for
grades 7-9);

Milcreek Township School District, Erie, Pa. (two-

week comparative religion course for grade 2).
People for the American Way publish a yearly edition of A
Consumer's Guide to Biology Textbooks.

This guide is published

in response to the perceived watering-down of biology textbooks
across the country in response to religious fundamentalists.

The

Guide examines all available secondary biology textbooks and
makes selected critiques.
this.

Let me know if you would like to see
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Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear
oral arguments on the constitutionality of a
1981 Louisiana law mandating the "balanced treatment" of evolution and "creation-science." The law says that schools
do not have to teach anything about the origins of life; but if evolution is to be
taught, then so must creation-science-understood to mean evidence for the "sudden
appearance of highly developed forms of
life."
Legal maneuvering to date shows how
readily the federal courts now exclude reli- ;
gion from public life. In July 1985 a narrowly divided (8-7) Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the statute violates the
establishment clause of the First Amendment because it "would have the effect of
promoting religion"- hardly what the
framers had in mind when they proscribed
religious establishment.
The Louisiana law makes no reference
to any specific religious doctrine (such as
the Flood). The appeals court majority
noted that "the theory of rreation is a theory embraced by many religions," thereby
(one would have thought) minimizing the
likelihood that the statute would tend to
favor any one religion. The appeals court
objected that "the scheme of the statute,
focusing on the bete noire of evolution as it
does. demonstrates the religious purpose of
the statute." Thus "self-serving state·
ments" as to its secular intent made in leg·
islative hearings could safely be ignored.

Qualms Expressed
In an amusing dissent joined in by almost half the court, Circuit Judge Thomas
Gibbs Gee wrote: "I await with interest
the application of this new mode of consti·
tutional analysis to other statutes. The bigamy laws, for example, carry tell-tale indicia of having been passed with a motive
to favor the Judea-Christian preference for
monogamy.... Perhaps our court, consulting its intuitive knowledge about what
motivates legislators, will presently determine that there can be no secular purpose
in such a preferment of one model of the
marital relationship over another."
Still, one has qualms about the Louisiana law-or any other law that tells
schools what they must teach. Having
failed to score the necessary intellectual
victory, creationists are attempting a
forced entry into the academic citadel
with, as it were, police escort. If successful, this will only provoke greater intellectual resistance to their ideas in the future.
The problem stems, I believe, from an
unwarranted dogmatism about evolution
that is pervasive in the biology profession.
This, in turn, has driven parents and (no

I

doubt about itJ religious groups to pressure
legislators into providing a legal remedy.
The Arkansas Legislature acted first, but
its equal-time law was effectively laughed
out of court with much guffawing about
fundamentalists and rednecks, and endless
jocular references to the Scopes trial.
We are repeatedly told that evolution is
"not a theory but a fact." This is little
more than whistling in the dark. There has
been a persistent campaign by evolutionists to bully the lay public into accepting
evolution by adopting an authoritarian pos·
ture inappropriate to science. The fact is
that we k.!!Q;V ~ry little about evolutionfar less than IriOsf educated people realize. - -"Colin Patterson, a senior paleontologist
at the British Museum of Natural History,

California Supt. Bill
Honig has been depicted
as something of a latterday Galileo, bravely standing up to the forces of reaction. But the truth is
there is great uncertainty
about what (if anything) is
known about evolution.
remarked at a public lecture in New York
in 1981 that there was "not one thing" that
he knew about evolution. "Question is," he
went on, "can you tell me anything you
know about evolution, any one thing that is
true? I tried that question on the geology
staff of the Field Museum of Natural History and the only answer I got was silence."
I so quoted him in a Harper's m~azine
article in February 1985, 'and Mr.atterson seems not to have recanted the heresy.
In a recent issue of the Creation I Evolution
Newsletter, he writes: "The awful question: 'can you tell me anything you know
about evolution ... ' Well, I still think it's
a reasonable one."
In the Louisiana case Dean Kenyon, a
professor of biology at San Francisco State
University, has submitted an affidavit in
which he attests to his belief "that a scientifically sound creationist view of origins is
not only possible, but is to be preferred
over the evolutionary view."
Mr. Kenyon, who has a doctorate in biophysics from Stanford University, is the
author of a 1969 book, "Biochemical Predestination." He taught undergraduate
courses on evolution and the Darwinian
revolution to undergraduates at San Francisco State, but he was reassigned appar-

ently when he began to raise questwns
about the subject.
Another professor who has raised questions about evolution is G. Lawrence Vankin of Williams College, in Massachusetts.
According to Mr. Vankin, after he assigned
to his students two articles from the prestigious Journal of Theoretical Biology that
questioned the plausibility of evolution by
random processes, the Williams biology
department told the library to cancel its
subscription to the journal. Mr. Vankin
was subsequently reassigned to the college's history of science department.
In conversations with me, more than
one professional staff member at the
American Museum of Natural History in
New York has expressed frustration at the
dogmatism and aiilllOi'iTaflaiilsffifharsatutare evolutionary biology. One day Gareth
~an of the ichthyology
department at the museum, characterized
the typical paleontologist's search for ancestral species in the rocks as follows:
" 'We've got to have some ancestors. We'll
pick those.' 'Why?' 'Because we know they
have to be there, and these are the best
candidates.' That's by and large the way it
has worked. I am not exaggerating."

J

'Controversial' Issue
In light of such comments, there is a
certain irony l!L!!cent decisions, both by
the Texas and the Cahfornia state boards
of education, to reject science textbooks
on the ground tlfat they "water down..,. instr':f£@n on evo(ullon. Ill Cahforma thil supermtendent of public instruction, Bill
Honig, has been depicted as something of a
latter-day Galilee, bravely standing up to
the forces of reaction by insisting that "we
must send a message to the publishing industry that we cannot tiptoe around certain subjects just because they are controversial." New texts will be more assertive
about evolution than were their predecessors, and perhaps ultimately more misleading for that reason. Nonetheless, Mr.
Honig vows: "We are going to establish
policy for the rest of the country."
Mr. Honig's use of the word "controversial" suggests that we must not shrink
from the truth just because some parents
don't like it. But the truth is that there is

gr~nytmngJ

is -lai'UW_..__at.Q!!! evol_!!l.jon.
ose who embr'lrCeCOriTfoversy should be fearless in
pointing this out. Louisiana's unsatisfactory "balanced treatment" law and the legal contest surrounding it show what can
happen when we too timidly submit to scientific authoritarianism.
Mr. Bethell, a media fellow at the Hoover lnslilulion and a contrilmtor to the
American Spectator, has been at work on
a book about evolution.
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Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear
oral arguments on the constitutionality of a
1981 Louisiana law mandating the "balanced treatment" of evolution and "creation-science." The law says that schools
do not have to teach anything about the origins of life; but if evolution is to be
taught, then so must creation-science-understood to mean evidence for the "sudden
appearance of highly developed forms of
life."
Legal maneuvering to date shows how
readily the federal courts now exclude reli, gion from public life. In July 1985 a narrowly divided (8-7) Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the statute violates the
establishment clause of the First Amend ment because it "would have the effect of
promoting religion"-hardly what the
framers had in mind when th ey proscribed
religious establishment.
The Louisiana law makes no reference
to any specific religious doctrine (such as
the FloodJ. The appeals court majority
noted that ''the theory of creation is a the·
ory embraced by many religions,·· thereby
(one would have thought) minimizing the
likelihood that t.he statute would tend to
favor any one religion. The appeals court
objected that "the scheme of the statute,
focusing on the bete noire of.evolution as it
does, demonstrates the religious purpose of
the statute." Thus "self-serving state·
ments" as to its secular intent made in legislative hearings could safely be ignored.

Qualms Expressed
In an amusing dissent joined in by al·
most half the court, Circuit Judge Thomas
Gibbs Gee wrote: "I await with interest
the application of this new mode of constitutional analysis to other statutes. The bigamy laws, for example, carry tell-tale indicia of having been passed with a motive
to favor the Judea-Christian preference for
monogamy .... Perhaps our court, consulting its intuitive knowledge about what
motivates legislators, will presently determine that there can be no secular purpose
in such a preferment of one model of the
marital relationship over another."
Still, one has qualms about the Louisiana law-or any other law that tells
schools what they must teach. Having
failed to score the necessary intellectual
victory, creationists are attempting a
forced entry into the academic citadel
with, as it were, police escort. If successful, this will only provoke greater intellectual resistance to their ideas in the future.
The problem stems, I believe. from an
unwarranted dogmatism about evolution
that is pervasive in the biolog-y profession .
This, in turn. has driven p trent:; and 1no

!-<~

doubt about itl religious groups to pressure
legislators into providing a legal remedy.
The Arkansas Legislature acted first, but
its equal-time law was effectively laughed
out of court with much guffawing about
fundamentalists and rednecks, and endless
jocular references to the Scopes trial.
We are repeatedly told that evolution is
"not a theory but a fact." This is little
more than whistling in the dark. There has
been a persistent campaign by evolutionists to bully the lay public into accepting
evolution by adopting an authoritarian posture inappropriate to science. The fact is
that we know very little about evolutionfar less than most educated people realize.
Colin Patterson, a senior paleontologist
at the British Museum of Natural History,

California Supt. Bill
Honig has been depicted
as something of a latterday Galileo, bravely standing up to the forces of reaction. But the truth is
there is great uncertainty
about what (if any thing) is
known about evolution.
remarked at a public lecture in New York
in 1981 that there was "not one thing" that
he knew about evolution. "Question is," he
went on, "can you tell me anything you
know about evolution, any one thing that is
true? I tried that question on the geology
staff of the Field Museum of Natural History and the only answer I got was silence."
I so quoted him in a Harper's magazine
article in February 1985, and Mr. Patterson seems not to have recanted the heresy.
In a recent issue of the Creation I Evolution
Newsletter, he writes: "The awful question: 'can you tell me anything you know
about evolution ... · Well, I still think it's
a reasonable one."
In the Louisiana case Dean Kenyon, a
professor of biology at San Francisco State
University, has submitted an affidavit in
which he attests to his belirf "that a scientifically sound creationist view of origins is
not only possible. but is to be prf'ferred
over the evolutionary view."
Mr. Kenyon, who has a doctorate in biophysics from Stanford Umversity, IS the
author of a 1969 book. "Biochemical Predestination." He taught undergraduate
courses on evolution and the Darwinian
revolution to undergraduates at San Fr.t n·
cisco State, but hr was rPa s ~igned .q P.u·-

ently when he began to raise questions
about the subject.
Another professor who has raised questions about evolution is G. Lawrence Vankin of Williams College, in Massachusetts.
According to Mr. Vankin, after he assigned
to his students two articles from the prestigious Journal of Theoretical Biolog-y that
questioned the plausibility of evolution by
random processes. the Williams biology
department told the library to cancel its
subscription to the journal. Mr. Vankin
was subsequently reassigned to the college's history of science department.
In conversations with me, more than
one professional staff member at the
American Museum of Natural History in
New York has expressed frustration at the
dogmatism and authoritarianism that saturate evolutionary biology. One day Gareth
Nelson, the chairman of the ichthyology
department at the museum, characterized
the typical paleontologist's search for ancestral species in the rocks as follows:
" 'We've got to have some ancestors. We'll
pick those.' ·Why?' 'Because we know they
have to be there, and these are the best
candidates.· That's by and large the way it
has worked. I am not exaggerating."

'Controversial' Issue
In light of such comments, there is a
certain irony in recent decisions, both by
the Texas and the California state boards
of education. to reject science textbooks
on the ground that they "water down" instruction on evolution. In California the superintendent of public instruction. Bill
Honig, has been depicted as something of a
latter-day Galileo, bravely standing up to
the forces of reaction by insisting that ··we
must send a message tc •.he publishing industry that we cannot ptoe around certain subjects just becau~e they are controversial." New texts will be more assertive
about evolution than were their predecessors, and perhaps ultimately more misleading for that reason. Nonetheless. Mr.
Honig vows: "We arf\ going to establish
policy for the rest of t)le country."
Mr. Honig's use of
word "controversial" suggests that Wt must not shrink
from the truth just bec,~use some parents
don't like it. But the tn~t h is that there is
great uncertainty about. what (if anything)
is known about evoluti.\n. Those who embrace controversy sho1uld be fearless in
pointing this out. Louisiana's unsatisfactory "balanced treatmP ~t" law and the legal contest surroundil ; it show what can
happen when we too ti 1idly submit to scientific authoritarianis d.

u·e

Mr. Belilell, a 1ne1t 1 fellow at tile HooL'f'r lnstitution llnli ll 'contributor to tile
American Spectator, il1 tS been 111 1rurk on
11 book llhout f!L'u/ution .•

EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD

Argued 12/10/86

13 w-d.
~

-

( ') f>

Cvvt 1- H

J4 ?- "1 Lc.j

I
I• •.~

~ ~~k ~~~~ S/~.
~ ~~kJ. ~ kA.-~k~ ~4 ~

;)c.
lA--

/.J s-1 L
~ '-t"" - '
~..

!j . ·;- j
s e~

wNf? ~ 56C ~~ ~c4 ...~f~
~~0--/ ~~~~··, ~~-~

w&~-~ ~~~\'(".'r'-~ ~
~·~·
,

.

~~--~1.-e: ~~~
~~· -. ~~~~
~1-o~~- /3~~
~..?-'1.-~.

T_&~(~

'

.

n~~w~/~~~~L-~,
~-~·~

VL.J

~ ~~~p. ~

~~~

~~j IAA-~· ~~~k ~Lk.~ LA..-e::-~~.

.,.

,.

--c.. 1- (J

~-~~-· ~
i's-;s-/' a~~"·( ~,.tk.~-,.,...,~~
C:..,VJ'(

.

f

/.

- J /~
LL:.t-.(~~ k

~

1

''j1-:•·d<. .4.~' ' )

~ ~~ - 1'2.4~6c~4 ~ ~.a..... _. reu_

/
\

:;i:~:4-~\ ~

/.J-4!4e..c..

.

r~~~~~~~~~·

Jt~~·A-t!!c.~•'-' ,..,."c•~ "~ A 4 •~~-f.-' ~

pv

~~

qt.

r-·-,,

~4-.A-k..~·-

.

~ ~

'

,
{ ~ ~·"' /..-47 ~114..J

~~~=·~~~

.

...

~d."~~

~ H-.._~"'~ ~Jt.J~
~ ~.·., ~-.-- 1-o ~~--s ~

~At q~~·

1tA-.--..!..---•. e c-f~l-·. -·t?~4'~ rA'<A.t;. c.J.f C-s ~ E

-5:-

....._.,.c

...

3~u.-,J- ~ ~~ i.-:
La.) <~• .. c- ~;(:/? k..tl-1-.8. •k;C:C) ~
~,A.c-t•D~,..t. --~~~ •

J~j&"' zd ;dij z;t;ile;c; '~~
£~ ~ .k ~1.,/- ~ ~,..~. ~.-c-al-~

~A~~•ls ~~.~~...t££. ~A

•4=

•• ~ .1-o ~ "- ~ttL~- ~k..c.l4-y-

..,

1-tJ le6d..LI- ~~ L.c ~ ~f~r

A·s~ ....,]w:~~h~~~~h &c.
...,...,~~··e.~.
·IlL~
~-/.
~~7q? u.~
~

&f7

~--------~nr·~•••••••••••••••••

. .p .t

J

'/-.

[;,..1-~t- C:~-........ ._. .........._ {I'!:.~ ~1~
' ~ ~ t2<.t ~~·~ ~ ··....., 4<~.-t-z.~~, . .>
.

&-/-/-.-Gcc.k.....k:-.d ~:

TJc..t_

t•

'

~/

-~~'

~.. ,A-~ ~ ~,u.._ ~~a-~~.

/

J

\\

~ a-~~4-4..- ~r4c='lce..,c·~ ~.
I

~

(

C

~'1- ~'( ~; ~/., ~ ~~~)
CAs- ~U-e. ~ f1~ .,~~~

k

~ ~ ~ ~ .J-t.-4. •(.. ~A

..,...

"'-4J-Jc .. {

~~~.lJu.-1-~~

IY/

<

b'f

"''

•·~~ .)c-c.•~~:- .-~/24C:«UC....J--'
~

M~

~As-
~'-...~

I)<:,

7

II

~ ~ J4 ~ ~a..- ~«~r

~~~~-~~~<'...
"\
~ "t:.J....-~.~
"'· a-=.. " J9J
~ ~ (' !J'< -~t:z
....__
..- :J_
~

~~

-

P(4;J.~

s.

''~··~-6-~~~~~~

~

L4- ~A-1.-~ .,~,·~-~~-~~··

VY-~.
·'~~ . ·-~~~-~-~ .~

~

zJ~.~~ ··~~~ ~~!~~~")
~ ~ I-4L ~ <' sbir ~
~·~~~·

~~

... ~~··1' ':(.liZ ..·• e!.c- ~ . ~ ~
Hu- ;1,~~.~~-- ~ k..t ~

I

r-dL~-1-4 .,_/--

~~--~~~".a-_~~~"~~~ .
. ~ ~ .... , • .,..J.u ~ ~
.J
'
11..A.. ~ . ...1.-~ ~~.A-· t:. ~ ~ .....~•<••
/ ~ '~ 3 4J ~ ~ 1'1.•• ...4£.~ k a,·-':. . ..-J-ta.."'c.Zc. c.::...v
/'1£~~ ~

C£jte., ~ ~~ Hu.. ~

..-:1..~ ~:~ 4

..,_..a J4c.. ~~ ~~

~1· ~f-., t~R'() ~ ·. .,.~~..!·~~~~.

~~~

U...LL.

~~._--

A..~ ,..... c,•<!) -t_,;~/frA-1-;,A",I_]

}17

-

La- ~-f ~ .,.,~.:5f-/~eJ. ~ ~ . {/'d ~;;~~
.
~
.
~~~~~

~- ~ ··~~~~--~'!~ f-AM. ··~~ ')
r. ~~~1-(J 17 ~ 2~t, . £j ";?~~ ~

~ ·~h<..e..4.c..-- (-_- -

.

-~4

~-,.~

rt/s- ~

~<.lA-:

I.

fS2j

2.

''£1~~~~~~-··: ~~7~

·~- ~
..,....

LA)

G.-c·J.. :

5~u..J... ~
1- H-~7 -;::

~4-nf.

r:..LL

~

-L~~~~./L+#~~\

(_4)/~~~;;

J.

17; 2 s~ .

+c. _

-;r..o ~~ """'""~ ~

4\r

''1Ac4..~J-ri.. ··~ ~ /1.~ ~
~~~~Ld_~~
~ ... ......,~~~-~~
~~4~~~~

-6-<..~/.c..&..vs.
~

•l

~~k.~,c..... ~~
~ ~ .... ..c-c.'!

a_c_e:.,~ ~ ,,

~ ~ rt;;¥''~~~:· k~ ~
~ ~cJ- ~ ~ /-() ~ew-~Zu>-f~"
--

3 .

~Cj~h-.- Aj''p~s~-Lu4-~L··.-, ?~~a-es~

..

~~~ ~~~ ~-::s ~

'J?~I- ~~ <],4 , ~

KS-1>13 £~~v. a~~(<As)

eLf/-

~G~1 c..,l. k

r

~

~ 1-/

11

s~~ >-·~ ~ ~~
'· 71~ fY/ es:- ~-~.~... ~ t+> '-'1 ~~'":
;'2..

~ ~~ "-a -~
b.~.~
2. 1../.A-

.,L.

3. ?~~ - "JA.4-4 ~ ~-~-4-L~~~
-

?<AS

I-~ fL'-~1- ~ ~ ~

-&-e/. ..... w:L

/>>

+

l; -

/-

-,

-

~

~- ~~ ~

.LA/'.

Edwards v. Aguillard
I.

Outline for Conference

Summary Judgment was appropriate

A. The question of legislative purpose is a question of law
for the court.

--

B. The relevant indicators of legis ~tive purpose are the
words and structure of t ~ statute and th~ legislative history.

-

C. Affidavits created after the statute's enactment by
interested parties do not raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to the question of the legislature's intent.
II. On the merits, this statute fails the first "purpose" prong
of the Lemon test.
A. The words of the Act require that the scientific
evidences supporting creation-science be taught -- the Act does
not define creation-science. The common dictionary meaning of
"creationism" refers to creation by ~ ng.
B. The legislative history of the 1980 version of the Act
demonstrates that creation-science, as understood by the
legislature, is a discipline designed to support a religious
belief; the legislative history of the 1981 version of the Act
does not indicate a change in the fundamentally religious nature
of creation-science as understood by the legislature.
C. The sequence and history of an Act's enactment is
probative as to legislative intent. This Act originally
contained 4 religious tenets to define creation-science. These
were removed only after an identical Arkansas statute was
challenged. The Arkansas case (McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ.)
is instructive. A£ter a I O=day trial, the DC determined that
creation-science is fundamentally religious. Many of the same
individual~ testified in support of the Arkansas statute who
would testify in support of this Act.
D. The history of the opposition for religious reasons to
the teaching of evolution is sub'ect to judicial notice. E.g.,
Epperson v. Arkansas. The structure of t e c 1ndicates not
only an intent to teach creation-science, but an intent to
counter the teaching of evolution.
E. These facts indicate that the Louisiana legislature
wanted the scientific evidences of creation-science taught in the
public schools solely for the purpose of advancing a particular
religious belief.

III. The inquiry in this case must focus on the intent of this
particular legislature.
~

'1

A. Public schools are free to teach facts that tend to
support certain religious beliefs if there is a demonstrable
secular purpose for teaching the material.
B. Courses on the Bible or on comparative religion are
constitutionally permissible so long as they are offered for a
literary or historic purpose and not primarily to advance a
particular religious belief.
C. The history and structure of this particular Act
indicate that the legislature sought to advance the theory of
creation-science and discredit the theory of evolution for a
solely religious reason. This religious purpose renders the Act
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
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Crea·ionists~
.
'

I.
I.

I I

~

.

·Justices
And 'Lower'
Animals
If you think the justices of the
Supreme Court lack a sense of humor,
consider this: last Wednesday, they
bent their learned ears to a whole
hour's discussion of ·"creation sci·
ence."
It came about because, in 1981, the
Louisiana legislature passed a law ,
requiring high school biology classes
to teach that pseudoscience alongside
' standard evolutionary theory. Creationists believe that the Book of Genesis offers the same sort of informa..
'· tion you might find in a biology
textbook-albeit stated in different
terms, with sharply different· coriclu·
. sions.
,
,
. But the Louisiana law represents
progress of a sort. Louisiana anti-evo·
lutionists have apparently given up
trying to cut modern biological teaching out of the curriculum. But in
exchange, they insist that creationism
be taught as an alternative "science." •
There might be little constitutional
harm in informing biology students
that some people entertain remark·
ably odd beliefs about the origins of
life. As creationists view the matter, a
witty Creator coined many thousands
of finished and immutable life forms
' during a single October afternoon
, about 4,000 years ago, mankind
among them. Then, to snare sinners,
this crafty Creator rigged a mislead·
' ing 'fossil record to suggest to errant
eyes a very different course of natural
history.
This seems odd? Well, say creation
scientists, Darwinism is, after all, only
a theory. Right. "Only" is the catch.
All scientific propositions are "theories," provisional in Lhe sense that all
are subject to revision in the light of
new findings. But the expanding fron·
tiers of science, microbiology and as·
· trophysics confirm, rather than confound. lht' t>vol1!thn1rv th Porv

The problem for creationists is not
intellectual. but emotionaL Scratch a
creationist ·and you find someone
who's insulted to be associated with
"lower" animals. True to form, a
sponsor of the Louisiana law was
quoted as warning: "If you teach chit· '
dren that they're evolved from apes, .
then they will start acting like apes." .
, That is not what Darwinian theory
; ·teaches, but. what if it did? One re·
grettable consequence of the anti·
. .evolutionary frenzy· has been to slan1 der other animals, the better to buttress a theory of.the natural goodness'
'of mankind, This theory is curiously!
antithetical to Biblical teaching about •
the sinfulness of flesh and often requires the unlearning of cruel super·
stition about our fellow creatures.
· In England, a small boy recently fell!
over a fence at a zoo into a pen of\
' giant gorillas. Onlookers held their!
breath as the animals gathered beside'
the unconscious child. Then, to their
relief, one of the apes began to caress
it as tenderly as if it had been one of' '
its own offspring. Tarzan, it would•
seem, could tell creationists a thing orl
two about the "lower" animals.
The ~ob of Supreme Court justices
can be diverting. It would be more so
if the court were a scientific debating
club. That's the way it sounded dur·
ing the arguments over the Louisiana
law, but the court's role is more
prosaic. It has tQ decide whether Lou·
isiana's "balanced teaching" law falls
afoul of the Establishment Clause by
implicating the state in the propaga·
' tion of particular religious views,
To casU<ll onlookers, the answ~J.
seems obvious. It is hard to imagine
how "creation science" could be
taught (except as an intellectual curi·
' osity) without placing the state in the
position of indoctrinating students.
Isn't that the whole point? And as a
probing question by Justice Powell
• suggested, it would be hard to monitor the teaching of "creation science"
for signs ·of indoctrination without an
"entanglement" of church and state,
which, according to prevailing judicial
doctrine, is a no·no. .
.It is one 9f the glories of this
republic that people may believe, and
teach their children, any fool thing
they ·tike-even creation science.
What they can't do, so far, and
shouldn't be allowed to do, is compel
schools to teach religious faith in the
name of biology.
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Religion: It Should Be Taught

C

REATIONISTS and conservative textbook
promoters across the country are calling
attention to a study prepared by one of their
traditional adversaries. People for the American
Way, an advocacy organization concerned with
preserving the separation of church and state,
produced the report that gives some comfort to
those who are often on the other side of a
courtroom battle. Although the organization and
the religious right strongly disagree about almost
everything, neither disputes an important point
made in the study: the treatment of religion as a
force in U.S. history continues to receive short
shrift in the schools.
We were reminded of this conclusion when we
first read an article by Kenneth Daniel that was
published in t~y. Mr. Dan·
iel, a computer scientist who lives in Arlington,
wrote that his 5-year-old son brought home from
school a newsletter dealing with December holiday
traditions. The entire newsletter contained not a
single mention of Christmas. Is it now public policy,
Mr. Daniels asked, not to mention religious holidays
in the public schools? If so, he argued, it is an
unwise decision from a secular point of view, since it
will provide children with an incomplete, even a
distorted understanding of history.

People for the American Way would agree. That
organization's study of th~ history textbooks used in
American schools revealed that religion is hardly
mentioned at all. The absence of any discussion of a
subject that has motivated, inspired and, at times,
torn apart important elements of the population is
ridiculous. The five-member panel of historians and
educators who reviewed these books believe that
publishers may be reluctant to allow any mention of
religion for fear of alienating a single religious group
or upsetting civil libertarians who would object to
the kind of indoctrination the creationists, for example, would impose. But neither reaction would be
justified if educational material presented straightforward accounts of the country's various religious
traditions and the impact they have had on American history.
A student who has no curiosity about the beliefs
of others will never be an educated person. This
doesn't mean that public institutions should pro·
mote a particular set of religious beliefs, encourage
religious observance or practice, or indoctrinate
children in a creed or dogma. But school systems
that seek to avoid controversy by ignoring religion
entirely are shortchanging the public and the stu·
dents. They are not helping to conquer ignorance,
but perpetuating it.

To:
From:

Leslie

a-''~,... ?

-

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
Cert. to CAS (Brown, Politz, Jolly}
(Gee,

Clark,

Reavley,

Garwood,

Higgenbotham,

Hill,

Jones,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane}
Wednesday, Dec. 10, 1986 (first argument)
I.
The question
Louisiana
~r

statute

teaches

Summary

presented

that

in

requires

d

evolution, .JTe

this
that

case
if

a

is

whether

public

a

school

II

give

balanced

treatment

to

11

creation-science,
Constitution.

violates the Establishment Clause of the

II.

Background

In 1981, the Louisiana legislature enacted th ~ "Balanced Treatment
Act."

for

Creation-Science and Evolution-Science

La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et

~-

The Balanced Treat-

ment Act provides:
[P] ublic schools < i thin [the] state 'shall .. give
balanced treatment to cr ea~ ion-sc te nce arur-to ~0lution,.:_§.cience.
Balance ~ treatment of these two
models sha ll be given i ~ lass~m lectures taken
as a whole for each course, in~ x ~ ok materials
taken as a whole for each course, i~ ibrary materials taken as a whole for the scien~ and taken
~ a whole for the humanities, and i ~ ther educational programs in public schools, to the extent
that such lectures, textbooks, library materials,
or educational programs deal in anl y y wi th_ the
su ·
f t
r' in of an, 11re , the earth, or
the universe.
When creation or evo ution is
taught, each shall b
t u t
s a ''theory·: rather
than as proven scientific fact
.
....
Id.

at

§17:286.4.

whatever

"Balanced

information and

evolution models

treatment"

instruction

means

"providing

in both creation and

the 1 ~ lassroom teacher determines is neces~

sary and appropriate to provide insight into both theories
in view for the textbooks and other instructional materials
available

for

use

in

his

classroom."

' ~ creati' on-sci' enc. .,e" -~----~
d~_L~-_.~ 1 -

means "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences

.,

from those scientific evidences."

'-l

Evolution-science" means

"the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from
those scientific evidences."

The Act further provides:

-n-o
k~~

No ~r

in public elementary or secondary
school or instructor in any state-supported unive ~ iana, who choosestobe a---crea ~ or to teach scienti IC data w Ich
points to creationism shall, for that reason, be
discriminated against in any way by a ny school
board~ board, or administrator.

~~
A

_)e -

•

•

•- ' •

,.e-------?

---~..-t~

La. Rev. Stat. §286.4.C.
Appellees a~ ~ indi-

Appellants are state officials.

.
pub 1'1c sc h oo 1 teac h ers, parents, an d ot h er Interested
v1'd ua 1 ~ind i v i d u a 1 s .
Duplantier,
Act.

Appellees
J.)

brought

V'

in

DC

(E.D.

La.,

constitutionality of the
~~1~c2d"·
summary judgment.
The CAS affirmed.

challenging

The DC granted

suit

the

~

The State contended that the purpose and effect of the Act
is to promote

academic

freedom.

But

the

CAS

disagreed.

The CAS found that "irrespective of whether it is fully supr:orted by scientific evidence,
religious belief."

the theory of creation is a

It found that the Act does not promote

academic freedom because it in fact removes a teacher's dis- ~~
"
cretion to teach what he chooses.
The CAS found that the

--------------·
"{

Act was

to discredit evolution
1/

--

by requiring the teaching of creation-science, a religious
belief.

,,

It

therefore concluded

that the Act violates the

Establishment Clause.
Judge

Gee,

joined

from the denial of

by

six

other

rehearing en bane.

judges,

dissented

The dissent recog-

nized that the Act was advocated by religious people,

but

concluded that the result was "modest" and did not violate
the Constitution.

It found that the affidavits proffered by

appellants established that there are two bona fide views of
creation,
both be

{

/t

and

the

taught.

Louisiana

statute

merely

requires

that

The dissent criticized the panel opinion

~~

for "mak[ing] a farce of the judicial exercise of discerning

~~

legislative intent."

~ ..

l_ TM:<-

w

The dissent argues that the panel went

~~-~t...l- R>J ~ t9j ~ .

JM-~·~-11-Vz.~~r-r~, ~~~·.

behind a neutral statute and invalidated it on the qasis of
a presumed intent.

"After ,~ today,

According to the dissent,

it does not suffice to teach the truth;
it with the approved motive."

one must also teach

The dissent thus would have

----

""

\
found that the Act had a }secular
purpose and did not violate

the Establishment Clause.
III.

Analysis

Appellants first argue that the DC's entry of summary judgment was erroneous because the DC failed to accept as
true the uncontroverted affidavits proffered.

The crux of

their argument is that the DC did not accept the statements
\

in the affidavits
not

It appears,

religious.
II

the facts

~I

that creation-science
however,

in the affidavits as true.

is

scientific and

that the DC accepted
The CAS accepted the

allegation that 's cientific evidence '' supported the theory of
This is a ' tactual allegatio~ that must be ac-

creationism.

cepted as true on a summary judgment motion.
theless

found

affidavits

that

state

the
that

J(

"'

The CAS never-

theory is relig.!_ous.

the

theory

is

not

Although the

religious,

this

would appear to be a legal judgment under the Establishment

A.) c..

~~1-uL
ft..._._ >I ~ ~ f~''
'---

~
~

~-~k-44-l_

~1~

JI'U4M4, ~ tzf. <,.,
I

~,,

~

Clause, similar to a judgment that an action was a proximate
cause in tort law, that is proper for a court to make on the
basis of the facts in uncontroverted affidavits.

Moreover,

the basic question involves
statutory interpretation which
--..
involves questions of
thus appears proper.

the court.

~

.::_. ~

"·
~
~~-

:B~f-d.U/

~r~J-

.

On the merits,

the proper

inquiry in this pase is

of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 60 ~ , 612613 (1971}:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances not inhibits
religion, ... ; finally, the statue must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion. '
The focus in this case is on the

@~ --

whether the

statute has a secular legislative purpose.
Appellants'

argument,

-----------

condensed and paraphrased,

is

that creation-science is a science, and that a statute that
merely requires that scientific truth be taught has the obvious secular purpose of promoting academic freedom.

Affi-

davits from creation-scientists support appellants' argument
that creation-science is science.
legislative

--

Numerous portions of the

history support appellants' argument that
-------------__.

the

purpose of the statute is academic freedom.

There are two methods to question the allegedly sec-

ular purpose of the statute.

First, one may look behind the

legislature's articulated purpose to determine if it is genI

uine.

As you and Justice O'Connor have explicitly recog-

nized,

"[A]

law will not pass constitutional muster if the

secular purpose articulated by the legislature is merely a
'sham.'"

Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2494

In this case,

(1985).

both the panel and the dissenters recognized
i

l

I'

that there was a great deal of religious motivation behind
this
statute.
,...______

This, however,

is not dispositive.

You have

5DC: ~

L t=tJ

noted that a statute need not be devoid of religious , motivat ion.

You have stated that yot

wo u

l=..d.:.:_ . .:u~.: p. h:.:c .oc.: . l:;=-=d"--'a;;;,._"-s.t.. :. a..: .t.;: . .q; 4~ :...:e=----t hat

I L1

has a "clear secular purpose," even if that secular purpose
is not exclusive.

------- ---

Id.

Here, the articulated purpose -- to advance academic

freedom -- is secular.

Under one view the Act achieves that

end in a facially valid manner by requiring that more, rather than less,

information be presented to school children.

One problem with this view is that in no other instance does r
the legislature mandate what theories within a single discipline must be taught.

This deviation renders the legisla-

ture's articulated purpose suspect.

In fact, the religious

,,

•'

p.trpose of the Act is obvious from the legislative history
and from the general tenets of creationists.
1-..-----~----------

Thus, the only

question is whether the Act has a secular purpose in addition to the religious purpose.
The

articulated

secular

purpose

does

clearly supported by the mandate of the statute:

not

appear

by requir-

ing equal time for two theories and by in fact labeling the

~~

two theories as competing, the legislature appears to have

~

riculum.

~ Z.~~-J.diminished academic freedom by reducing the discretion of
~~sch~ol boards and individual teachers to choose their cur7

1'Ul~

------

[ science

Moreover,
from

the Act protects teachers of creation-

discharge,

but

( teachers of evolution-science.

its purpose.

does

not

similarly

protect

Thus, the Act is not truly

In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968),

Jl-1.-

r

y~

thi~Court

held that a state may not constitutionally forbid
'

the teaching of evolution because the theory confliqi s with
certain religious beliefs.
scientists more

Where a statute treats creationthan evolution-scientists,

espe-

cially in the area of pr?tection from discharge for

their

teachings,

favorably

it appears that the State may be attempting to

achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly.

It can also

be argued that the Act's purpose is to deter the teaching of
evolution-science by placing on it the unpalatable condition
of balanced treatment to a scientifically unaccepted theory.
Finally,

you have previously found

it of "critical impor-

tance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
purpose
case,

was

to

a finding

advance

while both agreed that the

religion."

Id.

at

2495.

In

this

that there was no secular legislative pur-

pose is supported by the findings of the lower courts.
The

the purpose of the Act

is to assume
increase
whether

academic

the legislature's articulated

intent to

freedom

determine

is

genuine,

but

it is nevertheless constitutional.

ment Clause
which

that

the

imposes

a

legislature

substantive 1 imi t
can

promote

to

The Establishon

academic

the extent to
freedom.

The

legislature could not require that schools teach the "truth"
about the Holy Trinity.

Perhaps a more analogous example

would be a statute that required that all facts supporting
the literal truth of the Christmas story or the parting of
the Red Sea be presented to school children along with evi-

r\_

o~er

dence that stars generally do not shine directly

These statutes would have the vir~tue of

bles or seas part.
presenting
children.

more,

sta-

rather

than

less,

information

to

school

But, these statutes would appear to be unconstiThe difficulty

tutional.

in

this case is that appellants

have labeled the information consistent with a certain religious belief as "science" and have offered affidavits supporting this position.

Since "science"

is secular,

appel-

lants argue that the statute has a secular purpose.
I l

The second determination

is thus w_hether cr-eation-

~

'"'
science can properly be labeled a part of secular science or
''

\....

,

,,

...
whet ~!__ is

intr ~ic~y~igious.

Here,

it is impor-

tant to separate the pieces of scientific evidence from the
theory

itself.

Almost

every

theory

is

supported

by

7~
9/.J- .._ f- c,.......>
~
---:,_,. 7
~·

some

evidence, but this does not make it scientifically accepted.

/.9-0

~

?

Public schools generally teach scientifically accepted mate- /
Creation-science

rial.

is

not

scientifically

~

accepted. -- ~

This does not mean that there is any constitutional prohibiStates ani! ..J~ litr~,.s have

tion against its being taught.
wide

discretion

in

choosing

the

school

curriculum.

But

where a State chooses to require by statute that all schools
teach a particular "scientific" theory which is not accepted
by the scientific community, the motivation behind the statute is at least suspect.

.

.

~ \.

. .

I

t
''
Creationism
stems from the Bible.

"'

-

The B1ble lS a rellglOUS book and is only one of many reli-

----

gious books.

Appellants refer to creation-science, but what

they really seek to have taught are the facts that support a

.-

'

!Yv~P
tJ..iv4--l~

~~

certain biblical theory.

Yet if teaching theories that are

not scientifically accepted is to be justified on tn~ basis
of increasing academic freedom, there is no logical stopping
point.

Thus, the only apparent reason for the State to dis-

tinguish between creation-science and any other theory supported by some evidence is the link between creation-science
and

religious

belief.

Viewed

in

this

light,

the State's

purpose is to advance religion in general, and the beliefs
of a specific religious sect in particular.

This motivation

violates the Establishment Clause.
It is important to distinguish the "study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and historic view-

--------------------------------------·---- .__
---------------------education," which may be constitutionally permissible, with

pgint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of
"-

"programs or practices" adopted to "aid or oppose" religion
in general or a particular religion.
393

u.s.

97, 106 (1968).

Epperson v. Arkansas,

Religious beliefs can be presented

as part of a curriculum if they are identified as such and
if

they serve some other educational purpose,

historic.

literary or

But they cannot be presented in the guise of sci-

ence for the purpose of furthering religious belief.
t

a survey__course

on

1\

L

comparative

- ~--

----..

religion

--

--or

a

Thus,

literature

class that included the Bible could be permissible in public
schools whereas the teaching of creation-science may not.
The CAS
Lemon test,

and

did

not go beyond

the

first

prong of the

there does not appear to be a

this Court to do so.

Moreover,

reason for

the "purpose" and "effect"

tests

are

closely

if

related:

the Court

is unwiLling

to

find a purpose to advance religion by requiring the t~ aching
of creation-science,
feet.

it is unlikely to find a religious ef-

Similarly, the entanglement issue depends on whether

creation-science is viewed as religious or scientific.
IV.

~

Conclusion

/'

Summary judgment in this case appears proper because
!_ega~

the decision that creation-science is religious is a
judgment.

On the merits,

.._---

the question is whether the Bal-

1__

anced Treatment Act

~

~

0

a sesular legislative purpose.

articulated purpose is to increase academic freedom.

The
When

examined, it appears that the Act does not increase academic
freedom
the

but

instead

limits

~ienti_0.c m~al

teachers'

to _!>e

discretion

~ught.

to choose ~-

Moreover, the special

treatment of one theory within a discipline is suspicious,
especially when

the

theory

is

not

generally

supports a particular religious belief.

accepted and

This special treat-

ment leads to an inference that the purpose of the Act is
religious.
Clause.

Consequently, the Act violates the Establishment

To:
From:

Justice Powell

November 25, 1986

Leslie
No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
You asked me to determine how books are selected in

Louisiana.

It is the constitutional duty of the Legislature

to "provide of the education of the people of the state and
[to] establish and maintain a public educational system."
La. Const. Art. 8, §1.

Specifically, the Legislature "shall

appropriate funds to supply free school books and other
material so instruction prescribed by the State Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education to the children of th[e]
state at the elementary and secondary levels."
Art. 8, §13.

La. Const.

The Legislature has the ultimate power to

prescribe courses of study for the state's schools.

Thus,

(4-1~~)

;

the Balanced Treatment Act does not unconstitutionally usurp

~

the powers of the State or local school boards.
v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983).

'

Agui Ulard

See also Faul v.

Superintendent of Education, 367 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979)

(state statute that mandates the teaching of

French in public

~chools

does not usurp the powers of the

local school boards).
The Constitution also creates the State Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education. Its purpose is to
--------------- :2---.. .
"supervise and control the public elementary and secondary
schools, vocational-technical training and special schools
under its jurisdiction."

La. Const. Art. 8, §3.

The Board

consists of eleven members, who serve overlapping terms of
six years.

The duties of the Board include, "prescribling]
---~

and adopt[ing] free school bo9ks and other materials of
~

instruction for the children of th[e] state at the
elementary and secondary levels and all other schools and
programs under its jurisdiction for which the legislature
provides funds, in accordance with law" and "prepar [ingl and
adopt[ing] or approv[ing] courses of study and rules, by-

---

r.~

~~

laws, and regulations for the discipline of students and for

!L~''

the government of the public elementary and secondary
schools and other public schools and programs under its
jurisdiction, which shall not be inconsistent with law and
which shall be enforced by the parish and city school boards
and the parish and city superintendents."

Because Louisiana

-----

has a central commission that chooses the text books for the

.'

"~doption" .st~

entire state, i t is known as an

ca~ol!e,-x

states, such as New York, are

'
Other

sl:ates"

l,

betause

the local school boards are vested with the authority to
choose the text books.

There are 22 adoption states.

It is

--~

unclear exactly how many books for a certain grade and
subject that the State Board approves.

It has the authority

to prescribe an exclusive book for each grade and subject.
Customarily, however, the 6 a !_e
app~e ~te~~ oks

~oar~d~t-~-!i_st

of

and the superintendent of the parish

school board chooses from the list.

~ ~ V~ 1

s~~
~~

Op. Atty. Gen. 1942-44,

-~

le-d-

p. 266.

The Constitution also provides for the creation of
parish school boards and directs the Legislature to provide
for the election of the members.

La. Const. Art. 8, §9.

Parish school boards generally have all necessary powers not
entrusted to the Legislature or the State Board.
Specifically, they set up the schools, hire and fire
teachers, set taxes, hold meetings, discipline students,
etc.

Their authority to choose text books and the course

study is limited by the rules of the Legislature and the
State Board.

X

y

I know that this case presents a particularly
problem for you, because you have consistently emphasized
that "the States and locally elected school boards should
have the responsibility for determining the educational
policy of the public schools."
457 U.S. 853 (1982).

I~

Board of Education v. Pico,
you strongly dissented from

~Y""" ~

f

~ -~o ~

~~~~~

.

'
the Court's holding that local school boards could not
i,

exercise their discretion in a "narrowly partisan or ''I
political manner" and remove books from the school libraries
because of the ideas in them.

In this case it is the state

legislature, not the local school board, that made the
relevant educational decision.

Although you have pointed

out the "uniquely local and democratic" character of local
school boards, this does not appear determinative.

You

would accord great discretion also to a State in choosing
its educational policy.

Another problem for you is that you

accord great deference to a Legislature's stated purpose in
enacting a statute.

You have stated that if a statute has a

secular purpose, even if it also has a religious purpose,

l-IA-

~.

c.~

you will not invalidate it under the Establishment Clause.

~~-/~.

Despite the great discretion afforded States and school

&A.'\,.

w~

.

boards, there · is one overriding limitation -- the
Constitution.

~~prescribe

States and local school boards cannot

of .i4-Lt l), • -s-.

an educational policy that constitutes an

establishment of religion.

~~ 
The ~ esti qq in this case is bfS~fJ-~d

whether you think that the purpose behind the Louisiana

/.5~- ~uf

statute can fairly be said to be religious, not secular.

~LL~

As

pointed out in the previous memo, it is difficult to make
this finding from the legislative history, because the
-~
~
history carefully refers only to the secular purpose of

J(~1·

~
~
·n reasing
~·

rv

purpo

academic freedom.

To get around the stated

and to find the statute to have a religious purpose,
j
appears that you must be willing to find that creation-

science is inherently religious.
~

"=

- - - - - - - - ---

·~

Instead

I

ot getting into
· ~I

the morass of analyzing the legislative history and d~lling
the stated legislative history a "sham," you could find that
even if the Legislature genuinely wanted to promote academic
----··~----·~-~~---·~----

freedom, it cannot constitutionally do so in this way.
---~-

By

---·~-

looking at the nature of creation-science, you could find
that the only purpose of the statute could be to mandate the
teaching of facts consistent with a particular religious
viewpoint.

MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From: '

January 8, 1987

Leslie

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
I have not forgotten that you asked me to draft a
concurrence in this case.

I have spoken to Justice Brennan's

clerk who says that he (the clerk) has just started work on the
opinion and does not expect it to circulate for several

we~ks.

I

would expect to have a draft of the concurrence to you next week,
in time for it to be edited and ready for circulation shortly
after the Court opinion.

·...
,~"'·

<!fottrt of tlrt :Jlnittb iltaite
'ltae4htghtn. ~.<!f. 2Llbf'!~

~nprtmt

,.,:,

CHAMeEAS 0,.

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 3, 1987

Re:

NO. 85-1513-Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
'

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.iuprmtt Cijouri of tift~ .itab.e'
~lfin:gton. ~. Cij. 2tlc?ll~
CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March

85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill,
My

present

separately

in

inclination

this

case

and

judgment.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

is

to

concur

write
in

the

.l'upr~nu ~#Uri

..n ~~ .lltatt•

,.._~ ~. ~ 2ll~~
CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 5, 1987

Re:

85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

}vl
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

. ,

..............;... .... c.....,
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Banned in Alabama
HE JUDGE'S DECISION in the Alabama
schoolbook case is, as lawyers say, profoundly and irremediably wacko. It won't
survive appeal unless the Supreme Court chooses
to rewrite the First Amendment, But for all ita
eccentricity, the decision touches a serious question: What moral values, if any, should a public
school reflect? Many schools have succeeded in
scrubbing all of the traditional religious references out of their curricula, leaving only a mushy
indecision on matters of basic morality. That is
disquieting not only to fundamentalist- Christians
such as the parents in the Alabama case. You
don't have to read very far in the textbooks at
issue to see what the plaintiffs were complainiilg
about.
.
Legally, this whole proceeding iS a genuine
oddity. It began when a parent went into federal
court six ·years ago to protest an Alabama law
that encouraged prayer in classrooms. After·giv.ing it long study, Judge W. Brevard Hand concluded that the Supreme Court had been wrong all
these years and the Alabama law was constitu-tional. He· went on to say• that, if he were
overruled and told that religion must be kept out
of the schools, he would reopen the !'hole question to see whether secular humanism was not
also a religion that must be excluded. This auit
was the consequence. judge Hand has now found
that some 40 common achoolbooks are infected

T

with secular humanism, whatever that is, and he
has baMed them from Alabama's public schools.
The judge convicted those books of the wrong
charge. Most of them are guiltl not of promotina
eecutar atandards, but rather o offering no stand-·
· ards at all. ·Tbeir publishers, terrified of offending
any point of view, have stripped them down to a
level of vacuity and evasiveness that deserves to
be considered criminal, if not in the legal sense.
While Judge Hand -is wrong abOut much, he is
dead right in o~rving that it's impossible to give
a coherent account of American history, as some
of these books attempt, without reference to
religious belief.
No religious community is ever going to be
satisfied with the ·public schools' handling of the
deep questions of faith and ethics. That's why
·churches, aynagogues and m08ques usually run
their own programs for children.- The Constitution was not written by atheists. Jt was written by ·
people who held deep convictions of their own and
wanted to ensure that other faiths would never be
able to use public institutions to oppress theirs.
· That was a valid concern in the 18th century, and
it is no less valid now.
·
B.ut the Constitution does not require schools ~
to-avoid all descriptive reference to religion or to
auspend judgment on all questions of moral conduct. judge Hand has given a ludicrous answer,
but it's a real question.

.hprtmt <JI.nttt d tift 'Jn:ittb .ihdt•
Jl'ul{ingt4tlt. ~. <JI. 2D,?'l~ '
CHAM!!IERS 01'"

March 9, 1987

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~~

--

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 03/10/87

AGM SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Leslie

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 10, 1987

85-1513 Edwards v. Aguillard
I have had an interesting afternoon reviewing the
first draft of a concurring opinion, and commend you on
doing this so well and so quickly.

Apart from minor

editing, and a suggested change in the first paragraph, I
think the draft through Part I (pp. 1-17) is excellent,
and I have no substantive changes or additions to suggest.
You also have done quite well in incorporating
many of my views in Part II, as we have discussed.

I

think, however, that some additions - either in the text
or in notes - would strengthen the discussion of what

2.

properly can be taught and why.

I now identify possible

ideas or facts that may be included in the revision of
Part II, either in the text or in notes.
1.

It would be interesting as well as

educational to include more about the early history of our
country.

Certainly the Pilgrims, and perhaps others (my

history is bit weak here!), came to America to escape
religious persecution.

The more relevant history,

however, is that with which you are now familiar.

I refer

particularly to the history of the First Amendment.

I

have in mind Mason's Declaration of Rights followed by
Madison's Bill of Rights, and I believe by one of his
Federalist papers.

It may be that the Declaration of

Independence itself referred to religious freedom.

I see

no reason to go into Jefferson's historic role, as the

··~·

3•

'

'1

Court has talked about it, and I think Bill Rehnquist
wrote a long opinion in dissent.
2.

One of your quotes mentions the teaching of

comparative religions.

This would be a good place to add

a footnote, after you hear from the Library's research, as
to the number of major religions now practiced in the
United States with IRS exemptions.

It could be argued, I

suppose, that a statute such as Louisiana's could be
viewed as discriminatory.

Of course, this diversity of

religions is of comparatively modern origin.
3.

We should at least say at some point that the

Bible, quite apart from its prominence in the religious
history of the Christian era, is widely recognized as one
of the great works of literature read more widely than any
other book.

4.

4.

In a couple of his opinions, Chief Justice

Burger referred to history and the prominence of religion
in our history.

I

joined him in the Christmas pageant

case, but probably not in others.

* * *
At this point, you are wondering whether I am
expecting you to write 15 or 20 pages.

I have no such

thought and think the basic facts and ideas can be
included quite summarily.
I will discuss the timing on this with you.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

~1arch

lJ, 1987

85-1513 Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill:

Please ioin me in your opinion fnr the Court.
As I have some separate views, not inconsistent
with your opinion, I plan to write a concurri.nq opinion in
due time.
SincerP-ly,

Just ice Brennan
lfp/ss

cc:

•,

The Conference

'

.i1t}trtm.t <lfourt ri tl{t ~ittb .ttaft,eJlMJtittgtou, Jl.

Of.

2lJ~,.~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 16, 1987

No. 85-1513

Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Bill,
I join all but Part II of your opinion. I
may add a few words depending on the additional writing.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

.:iup:rtm:t <!Jltltrl of tlrt ~b ~hdtll
..IUlfri:nghtn. ~. <If. 2ll&f'!.;l
CHAMeERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

\

June 15, 1987

Re:

85-1513 - Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Nino:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

V)r~

Justice Scalia
cc: · The Conference

.invrtm:t (!J1t1trt oJ tqt ~ittlt .itatt,g
Jl~fti:ngtctt. ~.

<q.

2!l,;t~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 16, 1987

No. 85-1513

Edwards v. Aguillard

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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EDWARDS, ETc., ET AL. APPELLANT~.
DON AGUILLARD ET AL.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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[March-, 1987]

~·-/Oz.l~

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
@ ~ .1'1-<'
The question for decision is whether Louisiana's "Balanced
/
/~ . _ / L
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in
~ ~~- I~ Public School Instruction" Act (Creationism Act), La. Rev.
@ ~
Stat. §§ 17:286.1-286.7 (1981), is facially invalid as violative of
~ .
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

f

;'J~W-s -

f-t

I

s-

~~

If--.::,.._-

I
The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of
evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction
in "creation science." § 17:286.4A. No school is required to
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, however, the other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of
evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the
scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and the inferences from those scientific evidences." §§ 17.286.3(2) and

~ • L.-t-- .1-t:ro
(3).
~ ~ ~~-~. The respondents, who include ~arents of children attend..... .A• ..-.J.-ll
ing Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and reli~ .-,r-r--1
gious leaders, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in

.J.r

~~ ~ .,/-

District Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. 1
~tr··~ 4

( J-

·~

~ ~ ~) 'The

"1., ·---~ ~' ~

r;:;:;-

~-

defendants, the Louisiana governor, the Attorney General, the
8'tate Superintendent, the State Department of Education and the St.
Tammany Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the Creationism
Act pending the final outcome of this litigation. The Louisiana Board of

~LcrYt-k~~~~
~. s~ ~ ..,...~-~ ~ 1-<.c.-

J

~::::;;;..,-~~.t::::::~---:::;::;_1----<( ~, u.-~.. ,tZ...,,

~~~~.~~. ~~ · Sf//Jd.~~~~~~
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The defendants, Louisia
fi.cials charged with implementing the Act, ~on the ground that the purpose of the
Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom. 2 Respondents attacked the Act as facially
invalid because it violated the Establishment Clause and
made a motion for ummary 'udgmen
The District Court
. Treen, CTv. Action
granted the motion. Aguil ar
No. 81-4787 (ED La., Jan. 10, 1985). The Court held that
there can be no valid secular reason for prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a theory historically opposed by some religious denominations. The Court further concluded that "the
teaching of 'creation-science' and 'creationism,' as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the principles' of a particular religious sect or group of sects." Ibid.
(citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)).
The District Court therefore held that the Creationism Act
violated the Establishment Clause either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required the
teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a
particular religious doctrine. Ibid.
Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Oreans Parish School
Board were among the original defendants in the suit but both later realigned as plaintiffs.
2
The District Court initially stayed the action pending the resolution of
a separate lawsuit brought by the Act's legislative sponsor and others for
declaratory and injunctive relief. After the separate suit was dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Department of Education,
553 F. Supp. 295 (MD La. 1982), the District Court lifted its stay in this
case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana Constitution. The court ruled that the State Constitution grants authority over
the public school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education rather than the state legislature. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
certified the question to the Lo~~ Court, which found the
Creationism Act did ot violate the State"""Constitution, Aguilr;a;:;:dV:Treen,
440 So. 2d
a. 1983).
lie Court o
pea s then remanded the case
to the District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates
the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1983).

Li
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The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court observed that
the statute's avowed purpose of protecting academic freedom
was inconsistent with requiring, upon risk of sanction, the
teaching of creation science whenever evolution is taught.
765 F . 2d 1251, 1257 (CA5 1985). The Court found that the
Louisiana legislature's ~t ?was "to~olu
tion by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the
teaching of creationism, a religious belief." Ibid. Because
the Creationism Act was thus a law furthering a particular
religious belief, the Court of Appeals held that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. A suggestion for rehearing
en bane was denied over a dissent. 778 F . 2d 225 (CA5
1985). We noted probable jurisdiction, 476 U. S. - (1986), and now affirm.
II

The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "3 The Court
has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the
legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's p~ect must
be one that neither advances ~r ~ts religion. Third,
the statute mus not result in an ex~ssive entanglement of
government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S.
602, 612-613 (1971). 4 State action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.
3

The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion . . .. " Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
this "fundamental concept of liberty" applies to the States. Cantwell v.
Connecticut , 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
•The Lemon test has been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971 ,
except in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held
that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening a session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of
the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining the
proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public educa-

85-1513---0PINION
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In this case, the Court must determine whether the Establishment Clause was violated in the special context of the
public elementary and secondary school system.
tates a_!ld
local c ool boards afe generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools. See Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.-S. - - , - - (1.'986); id., at-(BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des
Moines :fchool Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969). "At the
same time . . . we have necessarily recognized that interventions by States in matters of education must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of
the First Amendment." Board of Education v. Pico , 457
u. s. 853, 864 (1982).
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not ur osel be used
to advance religiOus views t t may conflict with the rivate
beli~d his or er fami y. Stu ents in such
institutions are imp~ionable and their attendance is involuntary. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U. S. 373, 383 (1985);!-Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60,
n. 51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 252-253
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The state exerts great
authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to
peer pressure. 5 See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fration was virtually non-existent at the time the Constitution was adopted.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in judgment) (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,
238, and n. 7 (1963) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring)).
$The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard to
college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. "This distinction war-

85-1513-0PINION
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ser, supra, at--; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 81 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, "[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools .... " Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Consequently, the Court has been required often to invalidate statutes which advance re~n in public elementary and
secondary schools. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, supra (school.)iistrict's use of religious school teachers
in public schools);"Wdllace v. Jaffree, supra (Alabama statute
authorizing moment ·of silence for school prayer);v§tone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (posting copy of Ten Commandments on public classroom wall); VEpperson v. Arkansas,
supra (statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Abington
School District v. chempp, supra daily reading of Bible);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962) (recitation of "denominationally neutral" prayer).
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we
must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the
context of public elementary and secondary schools. We
now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test.

III
Lemon's first prong focuses on the ~ that animated
adoption of the Act. "The purpose prong of the Lemon test
asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a
rants a difference in constitutional results." Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp , supra, at 253 (BRENNAN, J. , concurring). Thus, for instance,
the Court has not questioned the authority of state colleges and universities to offer courses on religion or theology. See Widman v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (POWELL, J.); id., at 281 (STEVENS, J., concurring).

I
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law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, see Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 52-53 (Establishment Clause protects individual freedom of conscience "to select any religious faith or
none at all"), or-by advancement of a particular religious belief, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41 {1980) (invalidating
requirement to post Ten Commandments, which are "undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths") (footnote omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra (holding that
banning the teaching of evolution in public· schools violates
the First Amendment since "teaching and learning" must not
"be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious
sect or dogma"). If the law was enacted for the purpose of
endorsing religion, "no consideration o{ the .second or third
criteria [of Lemon] is necessary." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra,
at 56. In this case, the petitioners have identified no clear
secular pm:pose for the :Louisiana Act:
:=
True, the Act's ~is top otect academic freedom. La. Rev.
This phrase might, in common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the
freedom of teachers to teach what they will. The Court of
Appeals, however, correctly concluded that the Act was not
designed to further .-that goal. 6 We find no merit in the

Stat.~

The Court of Appeals stated that: "[a)cademic freedom embodies the
principle tliat indi.viduat instructors are at li~ that which they
deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment."
765 F . 2d, at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in public
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are
not free, absent permission, to teach courses differeiif from what is reqUired. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. "Academic freedom, " at least as it is
commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in this context. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals explained, th~ct ·~~ presumably
upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of creation-science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may prescrtbe public;choo~ing science instruction under ordinary circumstances, the _mpu sion m ere in the Balanced Treatment
Act is, on its face , inconsistent wtth t e 1 ea of academic freedom as it is
universally understood." 765 F. 2d, at 1257 (emphasis in original). The
6

I

~
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State's argument that the "legislature may not [have] use[d)
the terms "academic freedom" in the correct legal sense.
They might have [had] in mind, instead, a basic concept of
fairness; teaching all of the evidence." Tr. of Oral Arg. 60.
Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean "teaching all the
evidence" with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act
does not further this purpose. The goal of providing a more ·
comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by
outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teach·
ing of creation science.
A
While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement
of such purpose be sincere and not a sham. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 75
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham,
supra, at 41; Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at
223-224. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR stated in Wallace: "It is
not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature
manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored
to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government not intentionally endorse religion or religious practice." 472 U. S., at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in
judgment).
It is clear from the Wgtslativen1s! on:J that the pur2ose of
the legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the
science curr~lum. During the legislative hearings, Senator '"Keith stated: "My preference would be that neither
[creationism nor evolution] be taught." 2 App. E621. Such
a ban on teaching does not promote-indeed, it underminesthe provision of a comprehensive scientific education.
Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolutLon without also teaching creation science, even if teachers determine that such curriculum results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction.
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It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom.
The Act does not ant teachers a flexibility that they did not
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about
the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' found that
no law prohibited Louisiana RubJ!c schoolteachers from teaching ap~ sc~--neory. 765 F . 2d, at 1257. As the president of the Louisiana Science Teachers Association testified,
"[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation allowing this is necessary." 2 App. E616. The Act provides
Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus the
state purpose 1S not rurt ere y 1 .
The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, 1s analogous. I,n Wallace, the State characterized its new law~ designed to provide a one-minute
period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as
insufficient, because a previously adopted Alabama law already provided for such a one-minute period. Thus, in this
case, as in Wallace, "[a]ppellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by [existing state law]
before the enactment of [the statute in question]." 472
U. S., at 59.
Furthermore, the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly furthered by the Act's discriminatory reference for the teaching of creation science-aruragamst the teaching of evolution. 7
While requirTr}gthat curricuhim guioes be aevefoped for creation science, the Act says nothing of comparable guides for
7

The Creationism Act's provisions appear among other provisions prescribing the courses of study in Louisiana's public schools. These other
provisions, similar to those in other states, prescribe courses of study in
such topics as driver training, civics, the Constitution, and free enterprise.
None of these other provisions, apart from those associated with the
Creationism Act, nominally mandates "equal time" for opposing opinions
within a specific area of learning. See, e. g., La. Rev. Stat.§§ 17:261-281.
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evolution. La. Rev. Stat. § 17:286. 7A. Similarly, research
services are supplied for creation science but not for evolution. I d., at § 17:286. 7B. Only "creation scientists" can
serve on the panel that supplies the resource services. Ibid.
The Act forbids school boards to discriminate against anyone
who "chooses to be a ·creation-scientist" or to teach
"creationism," but fails to protect those who choose to teach
evolution or any other non-creation science theory, or who
refuse to teach creation science. Id., at § 17:286.4C.
If the Louisiana legislature's purpose was solely to maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theor·es about the or1 ·ns o humankind.
ut under the
Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to teach {
any and all facets of this sub· ect are now unab e o do so.
Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science
will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught. Thus we
agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does
not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly
different purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalancing the teaching of evolution at every turn with the teaching
of creation science .... " 765 F. 2d 1251.
B

Stone v. Graham, supra, invalidated the State's requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms. "The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that
fact." 449 U. S., at 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the
contention that the law was designed to provide instruction
on a "fundamental legal code" was "not sufficient to avoid
conflict with the First Amendment." Ibid. Similarly Abington School Ditrict v. Schempp held unconstitutional a
statute "requiring the selection and reading at the opening of
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the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison," despite
the proffer of such secular purposes as the "promotion of
moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of
our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature." 374 U. S., at 223.
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case
to th~e-eminent reh ·ous ur ose in enacting
this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution. 8 It was this link that concerned
the Court in Eppers?n v. Arkansas, supra, which also involved a facial challenge to a statute regulating the teaching
of evolution. In that case, the Court reviewed an Arkansas
statute that made it unlawful for an instructor to teacn evolutionor to use a textbook that referred to this scientific theory. Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law did not explicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the Court
could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the
literal interpretation of the Bible. ld., at 98, 106-107. 9
Mter reviewing the history of anti-evolution statutes, the
Court determined that "there can be no doubt that the motivation for the Arkansas law was the same [as other anti-evo8

See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264
(ED_A:r:k. ~82) (reviewing historical and contemporary antagonisms between the theory of evolution and religious movements).
9
The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of anti-evolution
statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back to the Tennessee statute
that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1927. Epperson v. Arkansas , 393 U. S. 97, 98, 101, n.8, and 109 (1968). The Court found the
Arkansas statute comparable to this Tennessee "monkey law," since both
gave preference to "religious establishments which have as one of their tenets or dogmas the instantaneous creation of ml;ln." !d., at 103, n.ll
(quoting Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289 S. W. 363, 369 (1927)
(Chambliss, J. , concurring)).
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lution statutes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it
was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." I d., at
109. The Court found that there can be no legitimate state
interest in protecting particular religions from scientific
views "distasteful to them," id., at 107 (citation omitted), and
concluded "that the First Amendment does not permit the
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored
to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma," id., at 106.
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms between the ~certain religious denominations and
the teacliin o evolution are esent in this case. The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legis ature was clearly to
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind. 10 The term "creation science" was defined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by those
responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act. Senator
Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the theory of creation science included belief in the existence of a supernatural creator. See 1 App. E421-422 (noting that "creation scientists" point to high probability that life was
"created by an intelligent mind"). 11 Senator Keith also cited
10
While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a supernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of the theory
of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept some or all of this
scientific theory as compatible with his or her spiritual outlook. During
oral argument, Jus~~E STEVENS pointed out that an individual may acceptorreJect different aspectsof the theory of evolution depending on his
or her particular religious beliefs. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29.
11
Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a theory
that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e. g. , 2 App.
E501-502 (equating creation science with a theory pointing "to conditions
of a creator"); 1 App. E153-154 ("Creation . . . requires the direct involvement of a supernatural intelligence"). The lead witness at the hearings
introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described creation science
as postulating "that everything was created by some intelligence or power
external to the universe. " !d., at E9-10.
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testimony from other experts to support the creation-science
view that "a creator [was] responsible for the universe and
everything in it." 12 2 App. E497. The legislative history
therefore reveals that the term "creation science," as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible
for the creation of humankind.
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature
required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this religious view. The legislative histor~ do~ents that the Act's
primary purpose wastOCilaiige the science curriculum of
public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a
articular religious octrme t at reJects t e factual basis of
evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism
Act,'Senator Keith, explained during the legislative hearings
that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the
support that evolutlOn'Supplied to views contrary to his own
religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of
evolution was consonant with the "cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism,
aetheistism [sic]." 1 App. E312-313; see also 2 App.
E499-500. The state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that
the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he
12
Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this view: "One
concept is that a' creator however you define that creator was responsible
for everything that is in this world. The other concept is that it just
evolved." 1 App. E280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal
legislators also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in
the official legislative history. See, e. g., id., at E441, 443 (Senator
Saunders noting that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the
Bible and other religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2
App. E561-562, 610 (Representative Jenkins contending that the existence
of God was a scientific fact).
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characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. 13
The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the sciencecurrfculum to conform with a particular
ut of many possible science subjects
religious v1ewpomt.
taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the
teaching of the one scientific theory that historically has been
opposed by certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the legislature passed the Act to give preference to those religious
groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine creator. The "overriding fact" that confronted the Court in Epperson was "that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict
with . . . a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by
a particular religious group." 393 U. S., at 103. Similarly,
the Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory
of creation science which embodies a particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught whenever
evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific
theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the
teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught.
The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory
which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma." I d ., at
106-107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of
18
See, e. g. , 1 App. E74-75 (noting that evolution is contrary to his family's religious beliefs); id. , at E313 (contending that evolution advances religions contrary to his own); id., at E357 (stating that evolution is "almost a
religion" to science teachers); id., at E418 (arguing that evolution is cornerstone of some religions contrary to his own); 2 App. E763-764 (author of
model bill, from which Act is derived, sent copy of the model bill to Senator
Keith and advised that "I view this whole battle as one between God and
anti-God forces. . . . if evolution is permitted to continue . .. it will continue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is unnecessary . .. ).
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the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First
Amendment.
·
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not
mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively
religious role in the history of Western Civilization. 449
U. S., at 42. In a similar way, teaching a variety of scien- \
tiftc theories about the origins of huffiankind to schoolclilfdren
mig!l~ne witli the clear secular intent of enhancut ecause the
ing the effectiveness of science mstruct10n.
primary purpose of~ct is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 14
IV
Petitioners contend that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." A court's finding of improper
purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by the
statli'ie on its face, its legislative history, or Its interpretation
by a responsible admimstrative agency. See:e:--g., Wallace
14

Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a clear secular purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act's primary purpose
was to advance religion. "When both courts below are unable to discern
an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to
find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 66 (1985) (POWELL, J.,
concurring).
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v. Jaffree, supra, at 56-61; Stone v. Graham, supra, at
41-42; Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 103-109. The plain
meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context
and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the
determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment);
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd,
351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has also considered
the historical context of the statute, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, and the specific sequence of events leading to
passage of the statute, e. g., Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977).
In this case, respondents' motion for summary judgment
rested on the lain language o e rea 1onism c , the legisla 1ve is ory and istor1ca con ex o e c , the specific
sequence o even s ea mg o e passage of the Act, the
State Board's report on a survey of school superintendents,
and the correspondence between the Act's legislative sponsor
and its key witnesses. Petitioners contend that affidavits
made by two scientists, two tlieolog~ans, and an educatiOiladministrator raise a genuine issue of material fact and that
summary judgment was therefore barred. The affidavits
define creation science as "origin through abrupt appearance
in complex form" and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes
a true scientific theory. See Brief of Appellants A-7 to
A-40.
We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tlie existence o!""uncontrovert-ed affidavits" does not bar summary judgment. 15
Moreover, the post-enactment testimony of outside experts
is of little use in determining the Louisiana legislature's pur16
There is "no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. - ,
(1986) (emphasis in original).
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pose in enacting this statute. The Louisiana legislature did
hear and rely on scientific experts in passing the bill, 16 but
none of the persons making the affidavits produced by the petitioners participated in or contributed to the enactment of
the law or its implementation. 17 The District Court, in its
discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning "battle of the experts" over possible technical meanings of terms
in the statute would not illuminate the contemporaneous purpose of the Louisiana legislature when it made the law. 18 We
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that petitioners failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact, and in granting summary judgment. 19
16

The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and the
legislation's other supporters, testified that creation science embodies the
religious view that there is a supernatural creator of the universe. See,
supra, at - - .
17
The petitioners contend that the affidavits are relevant because the
term "creation science" is a technical term similar to that found in statutes
that regulate certain scientific or technological developments. Even assuming arguendo that "creation science" is a term of art as represented by
the petitioners, the definition provided by the relevant agency provides a
better insight than the affidavits submitted by the petitioners in this case.
In a 1981 surve conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, the
school superinten en s m c arge of implementing the provisions of the
Creationism Act were asked to interpret the meaning of "creation science"
as used in the statute. About 75 er cent of Louisiana's superintendents
stated that they understood " rea 10n sc1enc ' to b~ a religious doctrine.
2 App. E798-799. Of this group, the largest proportion of superintendents interpreted creation science, as defined by the Act, to mean the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis. The remaining superintendents believed that the Act required teaching the view that "the universe
was made by a creator." ld., at E799.
18
The Court has previously found the post-enactment elucidation of the
meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of
the legislature contemporaneous to the passage of the statute. See W allace v. Jaffree, supra, at 57, n. 45; id. at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in
judgment).
19
Numerous other Establishment Clause cases that found state statutes
to be unconstitutional have been disposed of without trial. E. g., Larkin
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v
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a
religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety.
The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Affirmed.

v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S. 825 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
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EDWIN W. EDWARDS, ETC., ET AL. APPELLANTS v.
DON AGUILLARD ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether Louisiana's "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in
Public School Instruction" Act (Creationism .Act), La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), is facially invalid
as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
I
The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of
evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction
in "creation science." § 17:286.4A. No school is required to
teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, however, the other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of
evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the
scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences
from those scientific evidences." §§ 17.286.3(2) and (3).
Appellees, who include parents of children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in District
Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. 1 Appel1
Appellants, the Louisiana Governor, the Attorney General, the State
Superintendent, the State Department of Education and the St. Tammany
Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the Creationism Act pending the final outcome of this litigation. The Louisiana Board of Elemen-
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-lee& Louisiana officials charged with implementing the Act,
defended on the ground that the purpose of the Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom. 2 Appellees attacked the Act as facially invalid because
it violated the Establishment Clause and made a motion for
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion.
Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (ED La. 1985). The
Court held that there can be no valid secular reason for
prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a theory historically opposed by some religious denominations. The Court further
concluded that "the teaching of 'creation-science' and
'creationism,' as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the principles' of a particular religious sect or
group of sects." Id., at 427 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)). The District Court therefore held
that the Creationism Act violated the Establishment Clause
either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required the teaching of creation science with the
purpose of advancing a particular religious doctrine.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 765 F. 2d 1251 (CA5
1985). The Court observed that the statute's avowed purtary and Secondary Education, and the Orleans Parish School Board were
among the original defendants in the suit but both later realigned as
plaintiffs.
2
The District Court initially stayed the action pending the resolution of
a separate lawsuit brought by the Act's legislative sponsor and others for
declaratory and injunctive relief. After the separate suit was dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Department of Education ,
553 F . Supp. 295 (MD La. 1982), the District Court lifted its stay in this
case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana Constitution. The Court ruled that the State Constitution grants authority over
the public school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education rather than the state legislature. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which found the
Creationism Act did not violate the State Constitution, Aguillard v. Treen ,
440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983). The Court of Appeals then remanded the case
to the District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates
the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen , 720 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1983).
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pose of protecting academic freedom was inconsistent with
requiring, upon risk of sanction, the teaching of creation science whenever evolution is taught. !d., at 1257. The Court
found that the Louisiana legislature's actual intent was "to
discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every
turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief."
Ibid. Because the Creationism Act was thus a law furthering a particular religious belief, the Court of Appeals held
that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over a dissent. 778 F.
2d 225 (CA5 1985). We noted probable jurisdiction, 476
U. S. - - (1986), and now affirm.
II

The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "3 The Court
has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the
legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third,
the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of
government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S.
602, 612-613 (1971). 4 State action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.
3

The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion . .. . " Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
this "fundamental concept of liberty" applies to the States. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
' The Lemon test has been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971 ,
except in Marsh v. Chambers , 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held
that the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening a session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of
the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining the
proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted.
See Wallace v. Jaffree , 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J ., concurring

\
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In this case, the Court must determine whether the Establishment Clause was violated in the special context of the
public elementary and secondary school system. States and
local school boards are generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools. See Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. - - , - - (1986); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S.
503, 507 (1969). "At the same time . . . we have necessarily
recognized that the discretion of the States and local school
boards in matters of education must be exercised in a manner
that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First
Amendment." Board of Education v. Pica, 457 U. S. 853,
864 (1982).
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used
to advance religious views that may conflict with the private
beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball , 473
U. S. 373, 383 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60,
n. 51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 252-253
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The State exerts great
authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to
peer pressure. 5 See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
in judgment) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 238,
and n. 7 (1963) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring)).
5
The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard to
college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. "This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results." Abington School Dist . v.
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supra, a t - - ; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 81 (O'CONNOR,
J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, "[t]he public
scho.ol is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools .... " Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
Consequently, the Court has been required often to invalidate statutes which advance religion in public elementary and
secondary schools. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, supra (school district's use of religious school teachers
in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra (Alabama statute
authorizing moment of silence for school prayer); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (posting copy of Ten Commandments on public classroom wall); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U . S. 97 (1968) (statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Abington School District v. Schempp, supra (daily reading of
Bible); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962) (recitation
of "denominationally neutral" prayer).
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we
must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the
context of public elementary and secondary schools. We
now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test.

III
Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated
adoption of the Act. "The purpose prong of the Lemon test
asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). A governmental inSchempp, supra, at 253 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Thus, for instance,
the Court has not questioned the authority of state colleges and universities to offer courses on religion or theology. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U. S. 263, 271 (1981) (POWELL, J.); id., at 281 (STEVENS, J., concurring in
judgment).
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tention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a
law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, see Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 52-53 (Establishment Clause protects individual freedom of conscience "to select any religious faith or
none at all"), or by advancement of a particular religious belief, e. g, , Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41 (invalidating requirement to post Ten Commandments, which are "undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths")
(footnote omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 106
(holding that banning the teaching of evolution in public
schools violates the First Amendment since "teaching and
learning" must not "be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma"). If the law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, "no consideration
of the second or third criteria [of Lemon] is necessary."
Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56. In this case, the petitioners have identified no clear secular purpose for the Louisiana
Act.
True, the Act's stated purpose is to protect academic freedom. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). This
phrase might, in common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the freedom of teachers to teach what they
will. The Court of Appeals, however, correctly concluded
that the Act was not designed to further that goal. 6 We find
6
The Court of Appeals stated that: "[a]cademic freedom embodies the
principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that which they
deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment."
765 F. 2d, at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in public
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are
not free , absent permission, to teach courses different from what is required. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. "Academic freedom," at least as it is
commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in this context. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals explained, the Act "requires, presumably
upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of creation-science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may prescribe public school curriculum concerning science instruction under ordi-
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no merit in the State's argument that the "legislature may
not [have] use[d] the terms 'academic freedom' in the correct
legal sense. They might have [had] in mind, instead, a basic
concept of fairness; teaching all of the evidence." Tr. of Oral
Arg. 60. Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean
"teaching all of the evidence" with respect to the origin of
human beings, the Act does not further this purpose. The
goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is
not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or
by requiring the teaching of creation science.
A

While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement
of such purpose be sincere and not a sham. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at 75
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham,
supra, at 41; Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
. U. S., at 223-224. As JusTICE O'CONNOR stated in Wallace:
"It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that
Government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious
practice." 472 U. S., at 75 (concurring in judgment).
It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of
the legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the
science curriculum. During the legislative hearings, Senator Keith stated: "My preference would be that neither
[creationism nor evolution] be taught." 2 App. E621. Such
nary circumstances, the compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment
Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom as it is
universally understood." 765 F. 2d, at 1257 (emphasis in original). The
Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolution without also teaching creation science, even if teachers determine that such curriculum results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction.
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a ban on teaching does not promote-indeed, it underminesthe provision of a comprehensive scientific education.
It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom.
The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about
the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' found that
no law prohibited Louisiana public schoolteachers from teaching any scientific theory. 765 F. 2d, at 1257. As the president of the Louisiana Science Teachers Association testified,
"[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation allowing this is necessary." 2 App. E616. The Act provides
Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus the
stated purpose is not furthered by it.
The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, is analogous. In Wallace, the State characterized its new law as one designed to provide a one-minute
period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as
insufficient, because a previously adopted Alabama law already provided for such a one-minute period. Thus, in this
case, as in Wallace, "[a]ppellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by [existing state law]
before the enactment of [the statute in question]." 472
U. S., at 59.
Furthermore, the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly furthered by the Act's discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation science and against the teaching of evolution. 7
The Creationism Act's provisions appear among other provisions prescribing the courses of study in Louisiana's public schools. These other
provisions, similar to those in other states, prescribe courses of study in
such topics as driver training, civics, the Constitution, and free enterprise.
None of these other provisions, apart from those associated with the
Creationism Act, nominally mandates "equal time" for opposing opinions
within a specific area of learning. See, e. g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 17:261-1'1:281 (West 1982 and Supp. 1987).
7

85-1513---0PINION

EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD

9

While requiring that curriculum guides be developed for creation science, the Act says nothing of comparable guides for
evolution. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.7A (West 1982).
Similarly, research services are supplied for creation science
but not for evolution. § 17:286. 7B. Only "creation scien- .
tists" can serve on the panel that supplies the resource services. Ibid. The Act forbids school boards to discriminate
against anyone who "chooses to be a creation-scientist" or to
teach "creationism," but fails to protect those who choose to
teach evolution or any other non-creation science theory, or
who refuse to teach creation science. § 17:286.4C.
If the Louisiana legislature's purpose was solely to maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of humankind. But under the
Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to teach
any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so.
Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science
will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught. Thus we
agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does
not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly
different purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation
science .... " 765 F. 2d, at 1257.
B

Stone v. Graham, invalidated the State's requirement that
the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms.
"The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." 449
U. S., at 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the contention
that the law was designed to provide instruction on a "fundamental legal code" was "not sufficient to avoid conflict with
the First Amendment." Ibid. Similarly Abington School
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Ditrict v. Schempp held unconstitutional a statute "requiring
the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of
verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer by the students in unison," despite the proffer of such
secular purposes as the "promotion of moral values, the
contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature."
374 U. S., at 223.
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case
to the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enacting
this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link
between the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution. 8 It was this link that concerned
the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968),
which also involved a facial challenge to a statute regulating
the teaching of evolution. In that case, the Court reviewed
an Arkansas statute that made it unlawful for an instructor to
teach evolution or to use a textbook that referred to this scientific theory. Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law
did not explicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the
Court could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of
the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the
literal interpretation of the Bible. I d., at 98, 106-107. 9
After reviewing the history of anti-evolution statutes, the
See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264
(ED Ark. 1982) (reviewing historical and contemporary antagonisms between the theory of evolution and religious movements).
9
The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of anti-evolution
statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back to the Tennessee statute
that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1927. Epperson v. Arkansas , 393 U. S., at 98, 101, n.8, and 109. The Court found the Arkansas
statute comparable to this Tennessee "monkey law," since both gave preference to " 'religious establishments which have as one of their tenets or
dogmas the instantaneous creation of man."' Id ., at 103, n. 11 (quoting
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289 S. W. 363, 369 (1927) (Chambliss,
J ., concurring)).
8
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Court determined that "there can be no doubt that the motivation for the [Arkansas] law was the same [as other antievolution statutes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man."
I d., at 109. The Court found that there can be no legitimate
state interest in protecting particular religions from scientific
views "distasteful to them," id., at 107 (citation omitted), and
concluded "that the First Amendment does not permit the
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored
to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma," id., at 106.
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms between the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution are present in this case. The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was clearly to
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind. 10 The term "creation science" was defined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by those
responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act. Senator
Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the theory of creation science included belief in the existence of a supernatural creator. See 1 App. E421-422 (noting that "creation scientists" point to high probability that life was
"created by an intelligent mind"). 11 Senator Keith also cited
0

While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a supernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of the theory
of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept some or all of this
scientific theory as compatible with his or her spiritual outlook. An indi- \ L ~
vidual may accept or reject different aspects of the theory of evolution depending on his or her particular religious beliefs. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29.
11
Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a theory
that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e. g., 2 App.
E501- 502 (equating creation science with a theory pointing "to conditions
of a creator"); 1 App. E153- 154 ("Creation . . . requires the direct involvement of a supernatural intelligence"). The lead witness at the hearings
introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described creation science
'
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testimony from other experts to support the creation-science
view that "a creator [was] responsible for the universe and
everything in it." 12 2 App. E497. The legislative history
therefore reveals that the term "creation science," as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible
for the creation of humankind.
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature
required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this religious view. The legislative history documents that the Act's
primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of
public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a
particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of
evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism
Act, Senator Keith, explained during the legislative hearings
that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the
support that evolution supplied to views contrary to his own
religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of
evolution was consonant with the "cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism,
aetheistism [sic]." 1 App. E312-313; see also 2 App.
E499-500. The state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that
the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he
as postulating "that everything was created by some intelligence or power
external to the universe." !d., at E9-10.
12
Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this view: "One
concept is that a creator however you define a creator was responsible for
everything that is in this world. The other concept is that it just evolved."
I d. , at E280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal legislators
also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in the official
legislative history. See, e. g., id. , at E441, E443 (Sen. Saunders noting
that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the Bible and other
religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2 App. E561-E562,
E610 (Rep. Jenkins contending that the existence of God was a scientific
fact).
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characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. 13
The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was torestructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular
religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects
taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the
teaching of the one scienti:Qc theory that historically has been
opposed by certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the legislature passed the Act to give preference to those religious
groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine creator. The "overriding fact" that confronted the Court in Epperson was "that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict
with . . . a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by
a particuiar religious group." 393 U. S., at 103. Similarly,
the Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory
of creation science which embodies a particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught whenever
evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific
theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the
teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught.
The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory
which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma." I d., at
13
See, e. g., 1 App. E74-E75 (noting that evolution is contrary to his
family's religious beliefs); id., at E313 (contending that evolution advances
religions contrary to his own); id., at E357 (stating that evolution is "almost a religion" to science teachers); id., at E418 (arguing that evolution is
cornerstone of some religions contrary to his own); 2 App. E763-E764 (author of model bill, from which Act is derived, sent copy of the model bill to
Senator Keith and advised that "I view this whole battle as one between
God and anti-God forces . . . . if evolution is permitted to continue . . . it
will continue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is
unnecessary ... ").

,
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106-107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of
the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First
Amendment.
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision
forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not
mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively
religious role in the history of Western Civilization. 449
U. S., at 42. In a similar way, teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren
might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction. But because the
primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 14
IV
Appellants contend that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." A court's finding of improper
purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by the
statute on its face, its legislative history, or its interpretation
by a responsible administrative agency. See, e. g., Wallace
14
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a clear secular purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act's primary purpose
was to advance religion. "When both courts below are unable to discern
an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to
find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 66 (POWELL, J., concurring).

;,
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v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 56-61; Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.,
at 41-42; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 103-109. The
plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their
context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment);
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd,
351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has also considered
the historical context of the statute, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, and the specific sequence of events leading to
passage of the statute, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977).
In this case, appellees' motion for summary judgment
rested on the plain language of the Creationism Act, the legislative history and historical context of the Act, the specific
sequence of events leading to the passage of the Act, the
State Board's report on a survey of school superintendents,
and the correspondence between the Act's legislative sponsor
and its key witnesses. Appellants contend that affidavits
made by two scientists, two theologians, and an education administrator raise a genuine issue of material fact and that
summary judgment was therefore barred. The affidavits
define creation science as "origin through abrupt appearance
in complex form" and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes
a true scientific theory. See App. to Brief for Appellants
A-7 to A-40.
We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not
raise a genuine issue of material fact. The existence of "uncontroverted affidavits" does not bar summary judgment. 15
Moreover, the postenactment testimony of outside experts is
of little use in determining the Louisiana legislature's pur5

There is "no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials n egating the opponent's claim. " Celotex Corp . v. Catrett, 477 U. S. - ,
(1986) (emphasis in original).
'
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pose in enacting this statute. The Louisiana legislature did
hear and rely on scientific experts in passing the bill, 16 but
none of the persons making the affidavits produced by the petitioners participated in or contributed to the enactment of
the law or its implementation. 17 The District Court, in its
discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning "battle of the experts" over possible technical meanings of terms
in the statute would not illuminate the contemporaneous purpose of the Louisiana legislature when it made the law. 18 We
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that petitioners failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact, and in granting summary judgment. 19
The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and the
legislation's other supporters, testified that creation science embodies the
religious view that there is a supernatural creator of the universe. See,
supra, at - - .
17
Appellants contend that the affidavits are relevant because the term
"creation science" is a technical term similar to that found in statutes that
regulate certain scientific or technological developments. Even assuming
arguendo that "creation science" is a term of art as represented by Appellants, the definition provided by the relevant agency provides a better insight than the affidavits submitted by appellants in this case. In a 1981
survey conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, the school.
superintendents in charge of implementing the provisions of the
Creationism Act were asked to interpret the meaning of "creation science"
as used in the statute. About 75 percent of Louisiana's superintendents
stated that they understood "creation science" to be a religious doctrine.
2 App. E798-E799. Of this group, the largest proportion of superintendents interpreted creation science, as defined by the Act, to mean the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis. The remaining superintendents believed that the Act required teaching the view that "the universe
was made by a creator." Id., at E799.
18
The Court has previously found the postenactment elucidation of the
meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of
the legislature contemporaneous to the passage of the statute. See W allace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 57, n. 45; id., at 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in judgment).
19
Numerous other Establishment Clause cases that found state statutes
to be unconstitutional have been disposed of without trial. E. g., Larkin
16

'1
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v
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a
religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety.
The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Affirmed.

v. Grendel's Den, Inc ., 459 U. S. 116 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
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DON AGUILLARD ET AL.
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[March - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state
and local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum.
·
I
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution.' See, e. g., Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, - - (1985) ("We have
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children"). The first requirement of the
Lemon test is that the challengtd statute have a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified,
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
As the Court recognizes , ante, at , n. 4, the one exception to this
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983).
1
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"The starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J .,
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act),
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West), provides in
part:
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science.
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory,
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4.A.
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks
and other instructional materials available for use in his classroom." § 286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences." § 286.3(2). "Evolution-science" means
"the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from
those scientific evidences." § 286.3(3).
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either is
taught, it does not define either term. "A funnamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States , 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable difference
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d.,
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts
concerning . . . a supreme being of some sort are manifestly
religious. . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity
merely because they are presented as philosophy or as a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N. J.
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate -an act
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1986); id., at
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S.
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 286.2. This statement is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers to
present information in public schools, and students to receive
it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed
by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom" does not
encompass the right of a legislature to structure the public
school curriculum in order to advance a particular religious
belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968).
Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the purpose

;
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of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I proceed to
review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined
the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." 1 App. E-1a-1b.
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific
creationism." 1 App. E-2.
While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and
"creation-science." 1 App. E-108. Although the Keith bill
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include:
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living
2

Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court
in McLean found:
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(l) [of the substantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary,
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In traditional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is
a conception of God. Indeed, <''"eation of the world 'out of nothing' is the
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." Id., at 1265.
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds."
1 App. E-298-299.
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F . Supp. 1255
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the section defining creation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and
wording .. . convey an inescapable religiosity. " Id. , at
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. According to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to
the bill." 1 App. E-438. Instead, the concern was
"whether this should be an all inclusive list." 1 App. E-438.
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill,
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "scientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." .2 App.
E-501-502. He further testified that the recognized creation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] some-
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thing like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters
degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation
Research Society. 2 App. E-503--504. Information on
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history,
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and understood by, the Louisiana legislature.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator,
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people
must eventually give account." 1 App. E-197. A goal of
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the
Institute currently is working on the "development of new
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools."
1 App. E-197-199. The Creation Research Society (CRS)
is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is the
written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout,
all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 2
App. E-583. To study creation-science at the CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins in Genesis is a
factual presentation of simple historical truth." 2 App.
E-583.3
The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS
statement of belief to which members must subscribe:
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as
3
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c
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (PowELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 97, was strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found:
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent,
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a
lower .order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted).
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creationscience parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F .
Supp., at 1260, n. 7.
'After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." 529 F. Supp., at 1265,
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religious belief. "No legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose,
there is no indication in the legislative history that the deletion of ·"creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the
theory were .intended to alter the purpose of teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the school curriculum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "divine creation of man."
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the
Court of Appeals "did not deny that the underpinnings of
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so.
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Louin. 19. It found the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000
years" and to be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the
rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs;" and the "separate ancestry of man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution
which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968)).

..
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility
for determining the educational policy of the public schools."
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980)
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)).
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is
clearly religious.
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v.
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief review at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers
came to this country from Europe to escape religious persecution that took the form of forced support of state-established churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive.
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
was adopted by the House of Burgesses in 1776. It contained a guarantee of free exercise of religion. Eight years
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in
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response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment of
religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of
Rights by its drafter, James Madison.
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education,
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State." Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted
"an unbroken history of offical acknowledgement . . . of the
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d.,
at 677.
As a matter of history, school children can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school children were taught the nature of the Founding Father's
religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes
5
J ohn Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson, "The Bible is the best book in
the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries I
have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy,
I postpone for future investigation." II Correspondence 412 (Dec. 25,
1813).
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitutionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contemporary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use
of religious documents in public school education. Although
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
There is an enonnous variety of religions in the United States. The
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major American religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches;
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Annenian Churches; The
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986).
7
State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Nevertheless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., C.
Kniker, Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The Religion
in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ.
1976); L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in the Public Schools
(1973).
6
For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate.
6

\
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ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S., at 42 (citing id., at 225). The book is, in fact, "the
world's all-time best seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is properly understood to prohibit the use of the
Bible and other religious documents in public school education only when the purpose of the use is to advance religious
belief.
III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief.
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

9

SeeN. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, section 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter,
1986 Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most
widely distributed book).
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state
and local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum.
I

This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution. 1 See, e. g., Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children"). The first requirement of the
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See
Committee fo·,· Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 755,
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified,
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
'As the Court recognizes, ante, at - , n. 4, the one exception to this
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983).
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"The starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J.,
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act),
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides
in part:
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science.
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory,
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A).
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks
and other instructional materials available for use in his classroom." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the
scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those
scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolution-science"
means "the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences
from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(3).
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either is
taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-

i
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d.,
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (N J
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); id., at
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S.
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This
statement is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers
to present information in public schools, and students to receive it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom"
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure the
public school curriculum in order to advance a particular religious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the
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purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I
proceed to review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined
the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." Id., at E-1a-E-1b.
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific
creationism." Id., at E-2.
While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and
"creation-science." /d., at E-108. Although the Keith bill
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materials," id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living
2
Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court
in McLean found:
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(l) [of the substantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary,
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In traditional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." !d., at 1265.
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds."
/d., at E-298---E-299.
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the section defining creation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and
wording . . . convey an inescapable religiosity." I d., at
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. According to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid.
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill,
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "scientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized creation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] some-
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thing like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters
degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation
Research Society. Id., at E-503-E-504. Information on
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history,
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and understood by, the Louisiana legislature.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator,
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal of
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the
Institute currently is working on the "development of new
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools."
Id., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research Society
(CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must
subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is
the written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically
true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at the
CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins in
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth."
Ibid. 3
3
The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS
statement of belief to which members must subscribe:
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are
an organization of Christ:an men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as
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c
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (PowELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found:
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent,
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted).
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creationscience parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F.
Supp., at 1260, n. 7.
'After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." Id., at 1265, n. 19. It
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religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose,
there is no indication in the legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the school curriculum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "divine creation of man."
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so.
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theories , the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Louifound the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of
divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to
be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393

u. s. 97 (1968)).
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility
for determining the educational policy of the public schools."
Board of Education v. Pica, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980)
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)).
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is
clearly religious.
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v.
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief review at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers
came to this country from Europe to escape religious persecution that took the form offorced support of state-established churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive.
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
was adopted by the House of. Burgesses in 1776. It contained a guarantee of free exercise of religion. Eight years
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when James Madison'~ Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in

'·
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response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment of
religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of
Rights by its drafter, James Madison.
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education,
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State." Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted
"an unbroken history of official acknowledgement . . . of the
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d.,
at 677.
As a matter of history, school children can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school children were taught the nature of the Founding Father's
religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes
5
J ohn Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson: "(T]he Bible is the best book
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10
Works of John Adams 85 (1856).
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitutionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contemporary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use
of religious documents in public school education. Although
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham,
6
There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major American religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches;
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986).
7
State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Nevertheless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g., C.
Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976); L.
Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973).
8
For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate.
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449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time
best seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other
religious documents in public school education only when the
purpose of the use is to advance religious belief.

III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief.
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

9

SeeN. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, section 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter,
1986 Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most
widely distributed book).
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state
and local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum.
I
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution. 1 See, e. g., Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children"). The first requirement of the
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified,
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
1
As the Court recognizes, ante, at - , n. 4, the one exception to this
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.

783 (1983).
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"The starting point in every case involving construction of
a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J.,
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act),
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides
in part:

La.

"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science.
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory,
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A).
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to
provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks
and other instructional materials available for use in his
classroom." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined
as "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from
those scientific evidences."
§ 17:286.3(2).
"Evolutionscience" means "the scientific evidences for evolution and
inferences from those scientific evidences." · § 17:286. 3(3).
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either is
taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d.,
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a·
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly religious .... These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (NJ
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act
of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985); id., at
64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S.
668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This
statement is puzzling. The "academic freedom" of teachers
to present information in public schools, and students to receive it, is, of course, broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom"
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure the
public school curriculum in order to advance a particular religious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement as rendering the
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purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I
proceed to review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956
to the Louisiana legislature. The purpose of the bill was to
"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the
theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined
the "theory.of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the origin
of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the
species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God." !d., at E-1a-E-1b.
This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific
creationism." I d., at E-2.
While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the
bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and
"creation-science." !d., at E-108. Although the Keith bill
prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materials," id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living
2

Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court
in McLean found:
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section]4(a)(l) [of the substantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary,
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In traditional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." I d., at 1265.
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kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within
fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds."
I d., at E-298--E-299.
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the section defining creation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and
wording ... convey an inescapable religiosity." Id., at
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. According to the legislator who proposed the amendment, it
was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat
the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid.
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill,
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "scientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized
creation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r]
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something like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either
or both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation
Research Society. ld., at E-503-E-504. Information on
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history,
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and understood by, the Louisiana legislature.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator,
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal of
the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as the
true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore, the
Institute currently is working on the "development of new
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public schools."
ld., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research Society
(CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must
subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is
the written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically
true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at the
CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins in
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth."
lbid. 3
3

The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS
statement of belief to which members must subscribe:
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our
Lord and Savior. The account of the special cr~ation of Adam and Eve as
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When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66 (PowELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and
the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular religious belief. The legislative history of
the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found:
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent,
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." !d., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted).
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creationscience parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a
one man and one woman , and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior. " 529 F .
Supp., at 1260, n. 7.
• After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." !d., at 1265, n. 19. It
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religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose,
there is no indication in the legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. There is
no evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's
purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the school curriculum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does not affect
my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to
make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the "divine creation of man."
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so.
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of the
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Louifound the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of
divine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to
be based "on the genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 u. s. 97 (1968)).
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II

Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility
for determining the educational policy of the public schools."
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982) (PowELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught
"'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319 (1980)
(quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)).
In the context of a challenge under the Establishment
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is
clearly religious.
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g.,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-:-14 (1947);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v.
Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief review at this point may be appropriate. The early settlers
came to this country from Europe to escape religious persecution that took the form of forced support of state-established churches. The new Americans thus reacted strongly
when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance
emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive.
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
was adopted by the House of Burgesses in 1776. Because of
James Madison's influence, the Declaration of Rights embodied the guarantee of free exercise of religion, as opposed to
toleration. Eight years later, a provision prohibiting the
establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when
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James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in response to a proposal that all
Virginia citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the
Christian religion, spurred the legislature to consider and
adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment of religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of Rights by its drafter,
James Madison.
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education,
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State." Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court has noted
"an unbroken history of official acknowledgement ... of the
role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to
"our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. I d.,
at 677.
As a matter of history, school children can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school children were taught the nature of the Founding Father's
5

John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he Bible is the best book
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10
Works of John Adams 85 (1856).
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religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes
of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitutionally appropriate. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contemporary events. 8 In.addition, it is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use
of religious documents in public school education. Although
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
"There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major American religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches;
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986).
7
State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Nevertheless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g.,
C. Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in
Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976);
L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973).
8
For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate.
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ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time
best seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other
religious documents in public school education only when the
purpose of the use is to advance religious belief.

III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate
that its ·purpose is to advance a particular religious belief.
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

9
See N. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 1986
Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most widely
distributed book).
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state
and local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum.
I
This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine
whether a particular state action violates the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution.' See, e. g., Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985) ("We have
particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children"). The first requirement of the
Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. See
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified,
then the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
'As the Court recognizes, ante, at - , n. 4, the one exception to this
consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983).
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A

"The starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J.,
concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act),
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides
in part:
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science.
Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in
classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in
textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and
taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin
of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation
or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory,
rather than as proven scientific fact." § 17:286.4(A).
"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information and instruction in both creation and evolution models
the classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks and other instructional materials available for use
in his classroom." § 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the scientific evidences for creation and inferences
from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolutionscience" means "the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(3).
Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific
evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either
is taught, it does not define either term. "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise de-

.
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fined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is
commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms
of life, and the world were created by a transcendent God out
of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
532 (unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as "the theory
that the various types of animals and plants have their origin
in other preexisting types, the distinguishable differences
being due to modifications in successive generations." I d.,
at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that
public schools present the scientific evidence to support a
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific
evidence to support the theory of evolution. "[C]oncepts
concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly religious . . .. These concepts po not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (NJ
1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 2d 197 (CA31979). From the
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an
act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56 (1985);
id., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U. S. 668, 681, n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of
purpose: to "protec[t] academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This
statement is puzzling. Of course, the "academic freedom" of
teachers to present information in public schools, and students to receive it is broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic freedom"
does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure
the public school curriculum in order to advance a particular
religious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106
(1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement in the Act as
rendering the purpose of the statute at least ambiguous.

i
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Accordingly, I proceed to review the legislative history of
the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956
in the Louisiana legislature. The stated purpose of the bill
was to "assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of
the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the
theory of evolution is taught." 1 App. E-1. 2 The bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo" as "the belief that the
origin of the elements, the galaxy, the solar system, of life, of
all the species of plants and animals, the origin of man, and
the origin of all things and their processes and relationships
were created ex nihilo and fixed by God." ld., at E-1aE-1b. This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as "scientific creationism." I d., at E-2.
While a Senate committee was studying scientific creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the bill,
requiring balanced treatment of "evolution-science" and "creation-science." ld., at E-108. Although the Keith bill prohibited "instruction in any religious doctrine or materials,"
id., at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include
"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life
from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living
kinds from a single organism; (c) changes only within
2

Creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and has been found
to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of
Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Ark. 1982). The District Court
in McLean found:
"The argument that creation from nothing in [section] 4(a)(1) [of the substantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support. To the contrary,
'creation out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western religions. In traditional Western religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is
a conception of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the
ultimate religious statement because God is the only actor." Id., at 1265.
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fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a
relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds."
I d., at E-298---E-299.
Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill relied
was also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255
(ED Ark. 1982). The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the section defining creation-science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and
wording ... convey an inescapable religiosity." Id., at
1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are
not merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;
they are identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith
bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences.
According to the legislator who proposed the amendment,
it was "not intended to try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat the purpose [for] which Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1
App. E-432, and was not viewed as working "any violence to
the bill." I d., at E-438. Instead, the concern was "whether
this should be an all inclusive list." Ibid.
The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill,
that became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of the
Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on
the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the "scientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective information
of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a creator." 2 id., at
E-501-E-502. He further testified that the recognized creation-scientists in the United States, who "numbe[r] something like a thousand [and] who hold doctorate and masters
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degrees in all areas of science," are affiliated with either or
both the Institute for Creation Research and the Creation
Research Society. Id., at E-503-E-504. Information on
both of these organizations is part of the legislative history,
and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the
nature of creation-science as it was presented to, and understood by, the Louisiana legislature.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The
Institute was established to address the "urgent need for our
nation to return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator,
who has a purpose for His creation and to whom all people
must eventually give account." 1 id., at E-197. A goal
of the Institute is "a revival of belief in special creation as
the true explanation of the origin of the world." Therefore,
the Institute currently is working on the "development of
new methods for teaching scientific creationism in public
schools." Id., at E-197-E-199. The Creation Research
Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The
Bible is the written word of God, and because it is inspired
throughout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 2 id., at E-583. To study creation-science at
the CRS, a member must accept "that the account of origins
in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth."
lbid. 3
3

The District Court in McLean noted three other elements of the CRS
statement of belief to which members must subscribe:
"[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished
only changes within the original created kinds. [ii] The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an
historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are
an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our
Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as
one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
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c
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 66
(POWELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language
and the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act
confirms that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to
promote a particular religious belief. The legislative history
of the Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution
examined in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was
strikingly similar to the legislative history of the Balanced
Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found:
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was
and is the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent,
Tennessee's 'monkey law,' candidly stated its purpose: to
make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a
lower order of animals.' Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to
adopt less explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation of man' as
taught in the Bible, but there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the teaching
of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." ld., at 107-109 (footnotes omitted).
Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creationscience parallel the Genesis story of creation, 4 and this is a
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru (sic) accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior." 529 F .
Supp., at 1260, n. 7.
' After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District Court in
McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific." I d., at 1265, n. 19. It
found the concepts of "sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of

.
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religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39, 41 (1980). Although the Act as finally enacted
does not contain explicit reference to its religious purpose,
there is no indication in the legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the
theory were intended to alter the purpose of teaching creation-science. Instead, the statements of purpose of the
sources of creation-science in the United States make clear
that their purpose is to promote a religious belief. I find no
persuasive evidence in the legislative history that the legislature's purpose was any different. The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the school
curriculum rather than detract from it as in Epperson does
not affect my analysis. Both legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school curriculum to make it compatible with a particular religious· belief:
the "divine creation of man."
That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the
Court of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence." 765
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985). And there is no need to do so.
Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state
officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of
promoting a particular religious belief. The language of tpe
statute and its legislative history convince me that the Louidivine origin, and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years" and to
be based "on the geneology of the Old Testament using the rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the "separate ancestry of
man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the theory of evolution which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 u. s. 97 (1968)).
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siana legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and
locally elected school boards should have the responsibility
for determining the educational policy of the public schools."
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 893 (1982)
(POWELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject
matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause simply because the material to be
taught "'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions."' Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 319
(1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442
(1961)). In the context of a challenge under the Establish~
ment Clause, interference with the decisions of these authori:..
ties is warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is
clearly religious.
The history of the religion clauses of the First Amendment
has been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-14 (1947); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 425-430 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 437-442. Therefore, only a brief review at
this point may be appropriate. The early settlers came to
this country from Europe to escape religious persecution that
took the form of forced support of state-established churches.
The new Americans thus reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of religious intolerance emerging in this
country. The reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the
Founding Fathers, is instructive. George Mason's draft of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by the House
of Burgesses in 1776. Because of James Madison's influence,
the Declaration of Rights embodied the guarantee of free
exercise of religion, as opposed to toleration. Eight years
later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion became a part of Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial
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and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in
response to a proposal that all Virginia citizens be taxed to
support the teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. See Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 770, n. 28. Both the
guarantees of free exercise and against the establishment
of religion were then incorporated into the Federal Bill of
Rights by its drafter, James Madison.
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education,
supra, at 14-15, this Court has also recognized that "this
Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State." Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 760. "The fact that the
Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 213 (1963). 5 The Court properly
has noted "an unbroken history of official acknowledgement
... of the role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S., at 674, and has recognized that these references to "our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. /d., at 677.
As a matter of history, school children can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religio_us
heritage. I would see no constitutional problem if school
children were taught the nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes
~ John Adams wrote. to Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he Bible is the best book
in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries
I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I postpone for future investigation." Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10
Works of John Adams 85 (1856).
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of the times and the structure of our government. 6 Courses
in comparative religion of course are customary and constitutionally appropriate·. 7 In fact, since religion permeates our
history, a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is
necessary to understand many historical as well as contemporary events. 8 In addition, it is worth noting that the EstabThere is an enormous variety of religions in the United States. The
Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed. 1987) describes 1,347 religious
organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the major American religions into: Buddhist Churches of America; Eastern Churches;
Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches; The
Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and Miscellaneous. Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed. 1986).
Our country has become strikingly multi-religious as well as multi-racial
and multi-ethnic. This fact, perhaps more than anything one could write,
demonstrates the wisdom of including the Establishment Clause in the
First Amendment. States' proposals for what became the Establishment
Clause evidence the goal of accommodating competing religious beliefs.
See, e. g., New York's Resolution of Ratification reprinted in 2 Documentary History of the Constitution 190, 191 (1894) ("[N]o Religious Sect
or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference of
others").
7
State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately half of the
state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers seven
courses: Introduction to Religion, Old Testament, New Testament, Faith
and Doubt, Jesus in History and Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and secondary
students may affect the constitutional analysis of a particular public school
policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274, n. 14 (1981). Nevertheless, many general teaching guides suggest that education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be integrated into a secondary school
curriculum in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See, e. g.,
C. Kniker, Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in
Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976);
L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public Schools (1973).
8
For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, al).d India cannot be understood properly without reference to the
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to generate.
6
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lishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use
of religious documents in public school education. Although
this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of
religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at
224, it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S., at 42 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
supra, at 225). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time
best seller" 9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart
from its religious content. The Establishment Clause is
properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other
religious documents in public school education only when the
purpose of the use is to advance a particular religious belief.

III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history
of the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate
that its purpose is to advance a particular religious belief.
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over
public school curricula is broad, "the First Amendment does
not permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at
106. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and
its judgment that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

See N. Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 2, p. 24, col. 3; N. McWhirter, 1986
Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is the world's most widely
distributed book).
9
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join in the thorough and well-reasoned opinion for
the

Court~!

write separately to emphasize why, in light

of the broad discretion accorded state and local official
......
in the selection of the public school curriculum, the
issue in this case violates the Constituti
I

This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

602 (1972) to

determine whether a particular state action violates the

2.

Establishment Clause of the Constitution.l
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 105
3222 ( 1985)

See, e.g.,

s.

Ct. 3216,

("We have particularly relied on Lemon in

every case involving the sensitive relationship between
government and religion in the education of our
children").

The first requirement of the Lemon test is

that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative
purpose."

Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612.

If no valid

secular purpose for the statute can be identified, the
"purpose" prong of the test is determinative.

lAs the Cour recognizes, ante, n. 4., the one exception
to this con istent application of Lemon is Marsh v.
Chambers, 463J 83 (1983).
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3.

A

"The starting point in every case involving
interpretation of a statute is the language itself."
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
(POWELL, J., concurring).

u.s.

Blue

723, 756 (1979)

The Balanced Treatment for
I'

Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act (Balanced
Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et seg.,
provides:
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give
balanced treatment to creation-science and to
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these
two models shall be given in classroom lectures
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook
materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public
schools, to the extent that such lectures,
textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the
origin of man, life , the earth, or the
universe. When creation or evolution is taught,
each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as
proven scientific fact." §17:286.4.

1-- 1-/J....,

4.

"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate
to provide insight into both theories in view for the
textbooks and other instructional materials available for
use in his classroom."

§286 .3 {1).

"Creation-science"

means "the scientific evidences for creation and
inferences from those scientific evidences."

§286 .3 {2).

Evolution-science" means "the scientific evidences for
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences."
§2 86 • 3 {3) •
Although the Act mandates the teaching of the
scientific evidences of both creation and evolution
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term.
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that,

5.

unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."
Perrin v. United States, 444

u.s.

37, 42 (1979).

~

ictiomuy-, --rb e creation theory is defined as "Theology •
••• The doctrine ascribing the origin of all matter and
living forms as they now exist to distinct acts of
creation by God."

The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language 311 (New College Edition 1976).
"Evolution" is defined as "Biology •••• The theory that
groups of organisms, as species, may change with passage
of time so that descendants differ morphologically and
physiologically from their ancestors."

Id., at 455.

Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates that public
schools present the scientific evidences that support a
theological theory of divine creation whenever they
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present the scientific evidences that suppor~ the
A.
biological theory of evolution.

From the face of the

statute, a purpose to advance a particular religious
belief is apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate
an act of a state legislature.

The religious purpose must

predominate.

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,

2490 (1986);

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

(1985).

u.s.

668, 681, n. 6

The Act contains a statement of purpose:

"protec [t] academic freedom."

§2 86.2.

to

This statement is

puzzling, because "academic freedom" does not encompass
the right of a legislature to structure the public school
curriculum in order to advance a particular religious
belief.

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.

97, 106 (1969).

When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an

7.

arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one."
2479, 2495 (1985)

Wallace v. Jaffree, 105

(POWELL, J., concurring).

s.

Ct.

Nevertheless,

I read this statement as rendering the purpose of the
statute at least ambiguous.

Accordingly, I proceed to

~

analyze the legislative history of the Act.
1\

B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature.

The purpose of the

bill was to "assure academic freedom" by "requiring the
?

'
teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo
in all public

--

schools where the theory of evolution is taught."
E-1.

1 App.

The bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo"

as "the belief that the origin of the elements, the
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of

8.

plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of
all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God."

1 App. E-la- E-lb.

This theory was "referr[ed] to" by Senator Keith "as
scientific creationism."

1 App. E-2.

committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolutionscience" and "creation-science."

1 App. E-108.

This bill

was based upon a "model act" supplied to Senator Keith by
Paul Ellwanger.

The model act was also the basis for a

similar statute in Arkansas.

See McLean v. Arkansas Board

of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
l~vk
Although the bill prohibited "instruction in any religious
1\

9.
:,

'I

doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined
"creation-science" to include:
"the scientific evidences and related inferences
that indicate (1) Sudden creation of the
universe, energy, and life from nothing;
(2)
The insufficiency of mutation and natural
selection in bringin about development of all
living kinds from a single organism; (3)
Changes only within fixed limits or originally
created kinds of plants and animals; (4)
Separate ancestry for man and apes; (5)
Explanation of the earth's geology by
catastrophism including the occurrence of a
worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent
inception of the earth and living kinds." 1
App. E-298.

The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model
act and concluded that "[b]oth [its] concepts and wording
••• convey an inescapable religiosity."
1265.

529 F. Supp., at

The court found "[t]he ideas of [this section] not

merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;
[but] identical and parallel to no other story of
creation."

Ibid.

10.

The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981.
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee deleted, by
amendment, the illustrative list of scientific evidences.
The amendment was "intended to try to produce some good
for the bill and not intended to try to gut it in any way,
or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith introduced this
bill. •

1 App. E-4T

ore specifically, a committee

member urged the deletion because he "had no knowledge as
to whether this should be all inclusive list.

Maybe there

are some things that are not included on here that some
person smarter than us would have thought of that should
have been included, maybe there are some things in here
that ought not have been included.

I don't know.

Whoever

drafted the bill evidently had this list and put these in,

11.
;,

,.,

my amendments would strike those out.
does any violence to the bill."
~ Because

I don't think it

1 App. E-438.

the amended version of the bill did not

contain a definition of the scientific evidences
supporting creation-science, it is necessary to
~

lo~~

legislative history to determine its meaning.

~im~e~i~~f

"

The

the bill was Dr. Edward

"""

Boudreaux, a creation scientist.

He explained the source

of the creation-science theory: "[t]here are a number of
people today in America alone numbering something like a
thousand who are members of the Creation Research Society
who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of
..;>

'i

I

science and equally affiliates with the Institute of
Creation Research."

2 App. E-503 - 504.

Information on

12.

both of these organization is part of the legislative
history.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate
of the Christian Herita9e College in San Diego,
California.

The Institute was established to address the

"urgent need for

1.

ou ~

nation to return to belief in a

personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His
creation and to whom all people must eventually give
account."

1 App. E-197.

A goal of the Institute is "a

revival of belief in special creation as the true
explanation of the origin of the world."

Therefore, the

Institute concentrates on the "development of new methods
for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 1
App. E-197-199.

The Creation Research Society is located

in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

A member must subscribe to the

13.

following statement of belief:

"The Bible is the written

work of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of
its assertions are historically and scientifically true."
2 App. E-583.

To study "creation-science" at the Society,

a member must accept "that the account of origins in
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical
truth."

2 App. E-5 83.
c

In this case even assuming that the Act on its face
is ambiguous, I see no evidence in the legislative history
that indicates an intent other than to promote religious
belief.

The legislative history of the Arkansas statute

prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson
v. Arkansas, supra, at 97, was remarkably similar to the

14.

legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act.

There,

~ the n:~~~~
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian
conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey
law,' candidly stated its purpose: to make it
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
descended from a lower class of animals.'
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no
doubt that the motivation for the law was the
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine
creation of man." Id., at 109.

Here, it is clear that religious belief is the
Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence."
Although the Act does not contain explicit reference to
its religious purpose, there is no indication in the
legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex
nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the theory were

~.

...'

15.
;,

''I

intended to alter the purpose for teaching creationscience.

Instead, the Act appears to have exactly the

same religious purpose found to have been behind the
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act invalidated in McLean

~ J..t.... ~ .._..H-.~ ~ &t.-

to pl'emote the Genesis story of creation.
'l

This Court has

recognized that "the place of the Bible as an instrument
of religion cannot be gainsaid,"
v. Schempp, 374

Abington School District

u.s. 203, 224 (1963), and "no legislative

recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to
that fact."

Stone v. Graham, 449

u.s. 39, 41 (1980).

Although the Louisiana legislature purported to add
information to the school curriculum rather than detract
from it as in Epperson, both legislatures acted with the
unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school

16.

curriculum to make it compatible with a particular
religious belief:

the "divine creation of man."

That the statute is limited to the scientific
evidences supporting the theory does not render the
purpose of the statute secular.

In reaching its

conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the Court of
Appeals did not "deny that the underpinnings of
creationism may be supported by scientific evidence."
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985).

765

And there is no need to do so.

Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion
of state officials to pick and choose among them for the
purpose of promoting a particular religious belief.
language of the statute and its legislative history

The

17.
;,

''I

convince me that the Louisiana legislature exercised its
discretion for this purpose in this case.
II
Despite the fact that I find Louisiana's Balanced
Treatment Act unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that
the States and locally elected school boards should have
the responsibility for determining the educational policy
of the public schools."

Board of Education v. Pico, 457

u.s. 853, 893 {1982) {PCMELL,

J., dissenting).

In the

context of a challenge under the Establishment Clause,
interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when no valid secular purpose for their
judgment is evident.

--

.-:-.-'

( A statute does not violate the Establishment Clause
"because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the

18.
;,

''I

tenets of some or all religions.'" Harris v. McRae, 448

u.s. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
u.s. 420, 442 (1961)).

Thus, a public school can teach

subjects or particular theories that are consistent with
religious beliefs.

Similarly, a state legislature could

require by statute that such subjects or even theories be
taught, so long as some valid secular purpose for the
enactment exists.

~

O-J~)

It i -& -i ~Yt~mph.asia e that .-t the Establishment

~-

does not prohibit general moral discourse in the
schools.

Certainly there are values that we shar

as a Nation that are necessary and important for

~

-r

to learn at a young age in order to be

~

LfI ·'·A'Jlt
v-·

of soc1' ety and personally fulfilled individuals.

~
rr1
~?

;)~J)-, '

~
produe ~e member

Court has noted, "[t] hat the Judeo-Christian religion

W'#,

r.u..~
~~~,_.~ .

19.
;,

''I

oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal
Government may not, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny."
supra, at 319.

Harris v. McRae,

I see no reason why school children should

/ not be taught the genesis of such laws:

that our society

I

l

views stealing as immoral and a violation of the rights of
other members of society.

({ _(

~

..

A,..

u1 ~

J
.
/
.
.
1
childr~~ can and should be

/;J;&JA-/./,4

I ~-a-a: school

properly informed of the religious heritage of our Nation.
"The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly
that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of
man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their
writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution
itself."
213.

Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at

Our history affects and informs our present.

In my

20.
;,

''I

view, it would be tragic if school children were deprived
of knowledge of this history due to the supposed
constraints of the Establishment Clause.

As this Court

has recognized, the Bible, although an "instrument of
religion," id., at 224, "may constitutionally be used in
an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like."

Stone v. Graham,

supra, at 42 (citing id., at 225) .2

The Establishment

Clause prohibits the use of the Bible and other religious

2state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum.
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities
offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers
seven courses:
Introduction to Religion, Old Testament,
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner
consistent with the Constitution.
See, e.g., c. Kniker,
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976);
L. Karp, Teaching the
Bible as Literature in the Public Schools (1973).

21.
~

'1

documents only when the purpose of the use is clearly to
a:_. h-~

advance

1

re~igious

belief.
III
~r

In sum, I find the language and the legislative

~~~

'l

history of the Balanced

Tre~tment Ac~

a.pl
purpose is to a d vance
re ~
1g1ous b e1.1e f •

. d.1cate
~ t h at 1ts
.
1n
""'A

Although the

A.

discretion of state and local authorities over public
school curriculum is broad, "the First Amendment does not
permit the State to require that teaching and learning
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any
religious sect or dogma."
106.

Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at

Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judment of

22.

the Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

No. 85-1513, Edwards v. Aguillard
FIRST DRAFT

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I write separately to note certain aspects of the
legislative history, and to

?

(j)

ernphasize~he

broad

discretio~

accorded state and local school officials in the selection
of the public school curriculum.
I

This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s. 602

(197~
1'

determine whether a particular state action violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.!

applicatioJ~he
n~!on

lAs the Court recognizes, ante,
to this consistent
Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983).

(j) "f:c e..v..pt.Q.rl~~ 1'h«/ .-fd~J
flu
dtst!A.L,{~ . . . .
Jl

a._

'11u

tr.,ur".i

See, e.g.,

one exception
is Marsh v.

oru-''"" c/;MM.tr4.r

2.

;,

''I

wu,.sm)

Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,

;.

~( 1985)

i es s.

Ct. 3216t,?

("We have particularly relied on Lemon in

every case involving the sensitive relationship between
government and religion in the education of our
children").

The first requirement of the Lemon test is

that the challenged statute have a "secular legislative
purpose."

Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612.

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413
773 (1973).

If no

can be identified,
QQ term j

'

'

nat;~ .

'

See

u.s.

756,

;,

3•

'·'!

A

~'.,.,;c_/;;;)

"The starting point in every case involving

~~terpret&~ien

of a statute is the language itself."

Blue

Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (197 ~
(POWELL, J., concurring).

The Balanced Treatment for

Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act ( ~ Act or

,L\()1\.
Balanced Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. §17:286.1 et

provide~

"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give
balanced treatment to creation-science and to
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these
two models shall be given in classroom lectures
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook
materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public
schools, to the extent that such lectures,
textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the
origin of man, lif~ the earth, or the
universe. When creation or evolution is taught,
each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as
proven scientific fact." §17 :286.4 -~

,, 0/

'•

/ ··
~

4.

~

''I

"Balanced treatment" means "providing whatever information
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate
to provide insight into both theories in view
textbooks and other instructional materials available for
use in his classroom."

§286.3(1).

"Creation-science"

"-J

,f,s
~i ev>
mea1::uJ "bre scient1f 1c evidences for creation and

k

inferences from those scientific evidences."

§286.3(2).

\\

~vol ution-science" means "the scientific evidences for
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences."
§2 86 • 3 ( 3) •

~~v~

Although the Act ~aftaaeee ~e teaching of the
DQSf'

fU.. (?)

scientific edgeftoes of both creation and evolution
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term.
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that,

5.

unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."

J

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).

I

-'Php

creation theory8i(?__defined as "Theology.Afi ••. The doctrine

~

~

ascribing the origin of all matter and living forms as
they now exist to distinct acts of creation by God."

The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 311
(New College Edition 1976).

"Evolution" is defined as

"Biology •.•. The theory that groups of organisms, as
species, may change with passage of time so that
descendants differ morphologically and physiologically
from their ancestors. "

I d. , at 455.2

Thus, the Balanced

Treatment Act mandates that public schools present the

2other dictionary definitions will be added.

6.

scientific

evidence~ort

a theological theory of

divine creation whenever they present the scientific

evidence~t

is

thoug~o

of evolution.

From the face of the statute, a purpose to

support the biological theory

~<Particula5>religious

rn~~k;
s· L fai:Jd:

belief is apparent.

A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate
an act of a state legislature.

The religious purpose must
d

predominate.

f

<l98 ) ;

~).

.!flZu · S. ~ , " ' /

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105
Lynch v. Donnelly,

465

s. Ct.

~cs;

247~

U.S. 668, 681, n. 6

The Act contains a statement of purpose:

"protec[t] academic freedom."

~uc~

§286.2.

to

This statement is

~

puzzling, because ~'academic freedom "J does not encompass
'\

the right of a legislature to structure the public school

j

curriculum in order to advance a particular religious
belief.

Ej1person v. Arkansas, 393

~ JJ• cW' ~v

yU'

~-vrcf t\. ~
~1 {[-l,tv•HS~I\\-{c\

r

\))

~h

u.s.

)

'I "de

•

97, 106 (

196~; ·

t~ t ~ J,~'1

~n.~

vV\ Jrvp-u.d O'V'- ''

Bt-rbrw (,(.
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7.

When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should
hesitate to find one."

Wallace v. Jaff ree,

S. C~,
~J~¥:9
____...,

H 7 g, 24r"~ (PCMELL, J., concurrin~ Nevertheless,

I read this statement as rendering the purpose of the
statute at least ambiguous.

Accordingly, I proceed to

review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature.

~~

The purpose of thel'( ~~

____.J<_

bill was to "assure academic f reedo~<:!!:?equi ring the
teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public
schools where the theory of evolution is taught."

1 App.

y

~

fe,().!

VoY
J(l&L~~

~~~

~~)

;,

,.,

E-1.3

8.

The bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo"

as "the belief that the origin of the elements, the
galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of
all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God."

This theory was

U' scientific

]:

App("~lb.

~~~ena::r ' Keith -a!--

creationism."

3creation "ex nihilo" means creation "from nothing" and
has been found to be an "inherently religious concept."
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255,
1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
The District Court in McLean
found:
"The argument that creation from nothing in
[section]
4 (a) ( 1)
[of
the
substantially
ieerttieel Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does
not
involve
a
supernatural
deity
has
no
evidentiary
or
rational
support.
To
the
contrary, 'creation out of nothing' is a concept
unique to Western religions.
In traditional
western religious thought, the conception of a
creator of the world is a conception of God.
Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing'
is the ultimate religious statement because God
is the only actor." Id., at 1265.

9.

While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolutionscience" and "creation-science."
was- bas.e

1 App. E-108.

~

upon a ""model act" supplied to Senator Keith by

~ nl Ellw~er.

nr~~ nucation,

The model act was also the basis f

529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
bill prohibited "instruction in any

religious doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined
"creation- science" to include:

~ences

~~v}~~den

~

"the scientifi
and related inferences
that indicate
creation of the
( / . c...
~iverse, energy, and life from nothing;
(f )h1
/ ·ne insufficiency of mutation and natural ~

10.

• • • convey
1265.

The

merely similar to the literal interpretation of Genesis;

[eyt~fi:> and parallel
creation."

to no other story of

Ibid.

The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981.
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate
amendJtreii

~iLd fu_ fetfk 6i(
committee{ael8ted, fP fo det!R_.fe

the illustrative 1 ist of scientific evidences.

11.

jhe amendment was "intel'leeg to try to prod1:1se
for the bill a f

not intended to try to gut ·

c,,(
or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith
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supporter o£ the bill was Dr. Edward

L~'1('
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1o f ~\CL-i ~ fL(.,.t
a( 1l rl 1!;.,.. ~

4More specifically,
the deletion because

a

committee

" "\--"

member

urged

h ~: ~

"~ no knowledge as to w ether this should be
all-inclusive list. Maybe there are some things
that are not included on here that some person
smarter than us would have thought of that
should have been included, maybe there are some
things
in here
that ought not have been
included.
I don't know.
Whoever drafted the
bill evidently had this list and put these in,
my amendments would strike those out.
I don't
think it does any violence to the bill." 1 App.
E-438.

CU......W

tL

who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of
r--cu.c -...Cr II X'eA t.e') 'hv ~(~ oC ~0
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science and [siel t equally affiliatee wiUr tne Institute of
Creation Research '

>

2 App. E-503 - 504.

Information on

both of these organization is part of the legislative
history.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego,
California.

------

The Institute was established to

"urgent need for our nation to return to belief
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose
creation and to whom all people must eventually give

Joel" ,{.
SCc.t.f

fof (J

the ~

~~wtw<

7

13.

account."

1 App. E-197 •

...A

goal of the Institute

is"~

rev i~al of. bel i..ef: in special creation . as the true
explanation of the origin of the world. • f ; :er
Institute

oaneen~•ate~v:l~~of

~e,

the

new methods

for teaching scientific creationism in public schools." 1
App.

E-19~he Creation Research Society

in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

is located

A member must subscribe to the

following statement of belief:

"The Bible is the written

because it is inspired throughout, all of
its assertions are historically and scientifically true."
2 App. E-5 83.

To

stu~creation-science

at the Society,

a member must accept "that the account of origins in
Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical
truth. •

2 App. E-583.
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that indicates an intent J~-than.. to promote religiou l

belief-~ The

legislative history of the Arkansas statute

prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson
v. Arkansas,

wv .J~
supra ~at\lf7, was

remarkably similar to the

legislative history of the Balanced Treatment
the Court found:
"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian
conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey
aw, candi y s a e 1 s p rp
to make it
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
~
descended from a lower olas..i" of animals. 1
~
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no
doubt hat the motivation for the law was the
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory
c , it was thought, 'denied' the~d~
iv
~·~--------
creation of man." Id., at, lO U
(f.oo{.y,t~ k.r~tfn/)

~

.·

15.

Here, it is clear that religious belief is the
Balanced Treatment's Act's "reason for existence."

\ a

((I

\

Although the Act ~does not contain explicit reference to
its religious purpose, there is no indication in the
legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex

I
I

nihilo" and the four primary tenets of the theory were

I

intended to alter the purpose for teaching creationct appears to have exactly the

~CJw~ ..

found to e av e bee;J;ehind the
Arkansas

alan~Treatm

~

the

~~~

lftvaF1ea~~in~ean

caching in the putdic &aaools of the

Genesis story of creat1.on.

This Court has recegnizea -that

"the place of the B-ihl.e as an instrument of religion

1

cannot b
374

,. u. . s.

C)

gainaaid,"

Abington School District v. Schempp,
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203, 224 (1963), and ~'no legislative recitation
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supposed secular purpose can blind us to that

~

fact."~
~

tf'-,_~ ~t-- ~~•Stone v. Graham,
xvY \Y
~

u.s. 39, 41 (1980)
~-

449

1

Although the

~~I ~ Louisiana legislature purported to add information to the

~ ¥0 k
\0 ~ ().VI"school

curriculum rather than detract from it as in

~~~~~ EE~rson,
~c ~
}J>'l\~

~~

if~~

unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public school
curriculum to make it compatible with a particular

'/".b/'c ~ el

~~I;~

-rl
vr

both legislatures acted with the

igious belief:

the "divine creation of man."

That the statute is limited to the scientific
evidences supporting the theory does not
purpose of the

sta~te

secular.

vtJ

render~

In reaching its

conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the Cour; ,f

Appeals~did

not

~ny

that the underpinnings of

creationism may be supported by scientific evidence."
F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985).

"

v'

765

And there is no need to do so.
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...

Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion
of state officials to pick and choose among them for the

t~rThe

purpose of promoting a particular religious belief.

language of the statute and its legislative history
convince me that the Louisiana legislature exercised its
discretion for this purpose in this case.

Balanced

Deo}?ite the fagt

Treatment Act unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that
the States and locally elected school boards should have
the responsibility for determining the educational policy
of the public schools."
U.S. 853, 893 (1982)

Board of Education v. Pico, 457

(PC:WELL, J., dissenting).

In the

11.

jhe amendment was "inteaded to try to
for the bill a f

p£Odl:lG8

not intended to try to gut ·

C1\

r

or defeat the purpose which Senator Keith introduced~
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J
\A. t

t\1 ~

\--e(OY\\..e

~

ill."

1 App. E-432/
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bill;~did not contain a definition of the scientific
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4More specifically,
the deletion because
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th~

bill was Dr. Edward
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1!.-r
committee

c\ '\--"

member

urged

h 1~

" ~no knowledge as to w ether this should be
all-inclusive list. Maybe there are some things
that are not included on here that some person
smarter than us would have thought of that
should have been included, maybe there are some
things
in here
that ought not have been
included.
I don't know.
Whoever drafted the
bill evidently had this 1 ist and put these in,
my amendments would strike those out.
I don't
think it does any violence to the bill." 1 App.
E-438.
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evidences s_upporting creation-science, ±t-i-s neees-sary- to
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2 App. E-503 - 504.

Information on

both of these organization is part of the legislative
history.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate
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of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego,
California.

The Institute was established to

doe.c '{-
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the ~

"urgent need for our nation to return to belief
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His
creation and to whom all people must eventually give
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interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when no valid secular purpose for their
judgment is evident.

A statute does not violate the

Establishment Clause "because it 'happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'"
Harris v. McRae, 448
v. Maryland, 366

u.s.

u.s.

297, 319 (1980)

420, 442 (1961)).

(quoting McGowan
Thus, a public

school can teach subjects or particular theories that are
(

consistent with religious beliefs.

Similarly, a state

legislature could require by statute that such subjects or
even theories be taught, so long as

~~

purpose for the enactment exists.
As a matter of history, school children, of course,
can and should be properly informed of the religious
heritage of our Nation.

"The fact that the Founding

19.

Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that
the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is
clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower
Compact to the Constitution itself."
District v. Schempp, supra, at 213.
and informs our present.

Abington School
Our history affects

In my view, it would be tragic

if school children were deprived of knowledge of this
history due to the supposed constraints of the
Establishment Clause.

As this Court has recognized, the

Bible, although an "instrument of religion," id., at 224,
"may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or
the like."

Stone v. Graham,

supr~,

at 42 (citing id., at

'·

20.

225} .5

The Establishment Clause prohibits the use of the

Bible and other religious documents only when the purpose
of the use is clearly to advance religious belief.
III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative
history of the Balanced Treatment Act indicate beyond
question that its purpose is to advance a particular
religious belief.

Although the discretion of state and

5state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum.
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities
offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers
seven courses:
Introduction to Religion, Old Testament,
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner
consistent with the Constitution.
See, e.g., C. Kniker,
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985}; The
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976};
L. Karp, Teaching the
Bible as Literature in the Public Schools (1973}.

21.

local authorities over public school curriculum is broad,
"the First Amendment does not permit the State to require
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma."

Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at

Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and
Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

the

[p,

1-5

,.,i

of evolution.

6.

a supreme being

"[C]oncepts concerning

of some sort are manifestly religious •••• These concepts
do not shed that religiosity merely because they are
presented as philosophy or as a science."

Malnak v. Yogi,

440 f. supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam,
592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979).

Thus, from the face of the

statute a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate
of a state legislature.
predominate.

1};, I k

The religious purpose must

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 38, 56

vL\

l P5 c · J

(1986);

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668, 681, n. 6

(1984).

The Act contains a statement of purpose:

"protec[t] academic freedom."

§286.2.

to

This statement is

puzzling, because the "academic freedom" of teachers to

7.

present information and students to receive it in public
schools is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause.
Thus, "academic freedom" does not encompass the right of a
legislature to structure the public school curriculum in
order to advance a particular religious belief.
v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.

97, 106 (1968).

Epperson

Nevertheless, I

read this statement as rendering the purpose of the
statute at least ambiguous.

Accordingly, I proceed to

review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature.
bill was to

11

The purpose of the

assure academic freedom by requiring the

teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public
schools where the theory of evolution is taught.

11

1 App.

8.

E-1.2
as

11

The bill defined the

11

theory of creation ex nihilo 11

the belief that the origin of the elements, the

galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of
all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God. "

1 App. E-la- lb.

This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as
11

scientific creationism ...

1 App. E-2.

f'vr~

,

2creation ex nihilo ) means creation from nothing 11 and
has been found to be an 11 inherently religious concept. 11
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255,
1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
The District court in McLean
found:
11

11

11

The argument that creation from nothing in
[section) 4(a) (1) [of the substantially similar
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act]
does not
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary
or rational support. To the contrary, 'creation
out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western
religions.
In traditional western religious
thought, the conception of a creator of the
world is a conception of God. Indeed, creation
of the world 'out of nothing' is the ultimate
religious statement because God is the only
actor. 11 Id., at 1265.
11

9.

While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of "evolutionscience" and "creation-science."

1 App. E-108.

Although

the Keith bill prohibited "instruction in any religious
doctrine or materials," 1 App. E-302, it defined
"creation-science" to include:
"the scientific evidences and related inferences
that indicate (a} sudden creation of the
universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b)
the insufficiency of mutation and natural
selection in bringing about development of all
living kinds from a single organism; (c)
changes only within fixed limits or originally
created kinds of plants and animals;
(d)
separate ancestry for man and apes; (e)
explanation of the earth's geology by
catastrophism, including the occurrence of a
worldwide flood; and (6} a relatively recent
inception of the earth and living kinds." 1
App. E-298 - 299.

10.

Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill
relied was also the basis for a similar statute in
Arkansas.

See McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529

F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982}.

The District Court in

McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the
section defining creation-science, and concluded that
"[b]oth [its] concepts and wording ••• convey an
inescapable religiosity ...

Id., at 1265.

The court found

that "[t]he ideas of [this section] are not merely similar
to the literal interpretation of

Genesis~

they are

identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981.
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the
Keith bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific

11.
;

'I

-~ ~ ----evidences.

~

j~

Tll.e-amendment was "not intended to try to gut

Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 App. E-43 (

viewed as working •jany violence to the bill.
438.

e

Instead, the

1 App. E-

concern ~ islator who

ame~hether

list."

u

--

this should be an all inclusive

1 App. E-438.

The legislature then held hearings on the amended
bill which became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of
the Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux.

He did not elaborate on

the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the
uscientific evidences" of the theory are "the objective
information of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a
creator."

2 App. E-501- 502.

He further testified,

12.
;,

'I

however, that the recognized creation-scientists in the
United States, who

~numbe[r]

something like a thousand

[and] who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas
of

science~

are affiliated with either or both the

Institute of Creation Research and the Creation Research
Society.

2 App. E-503 - 504.

Information on both of

these organization is part of the legislative history.
The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego,
California.

The Institute was established to address the

"urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His
creation and to whom all people must eventually give
account."

1 App. E-197.

A goal of the Institute is "a

revival of ' belief in special creation as the true

I

.
~

13.
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explanation of the origin of the world.H

Therefore, the

Institute currently is working on the "development of new
methods for teaching scientific creationism in public
schools." 1 App. E-197- 199.

The Creation Research

Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

A member

must subscribe to the following statement of belief:

"The

Bible is the written word of God, and because it is
inspired throughout, all of its assertions are
historically and scientifically true."

2 App. E-583.

To

study creation-science at the CRS, a member must accept
"that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual
presentation of simple historical truth.

11

2 App. E-583.3

3The District Court in McLean noted three
other elements of the CRS statement of belief to
which members must subscribe:
(2) All basic types of living things, including
man, were made by direct creative acts of God
(Footnote continued)

14.
:,

•·'!

c
When, as here, "both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court
normally should hesitate to find one."

wallace v.

Jaffree, supra, at 66 (POWELL, J., concurring).

My

examination of the language and the legislative history of
the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the
a....p.~~

Louisiana legislature was to promote religious belief •
.-\

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
during Creation Week as described in Genesis.
Whatever biological changes have occurred since
Creation have accomplished only changes within
the original created kinds.
(3)
The great
Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to
as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event,
world-wide in its extent and effect.
(4)
Finally, we are an organization of Christian men
of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord
and Savior. The account of the special creation
of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and
their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all
mankind.
Therefore, salvation can come only
thru
[sic]
accepting Jesus Christ as our
Savior. 11 529 F. Supp., at 1260, n. 7.

15.
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l~

The legislative history of the Arkansas statute

prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.,

at 97, was

r~trmilar

to

A

the legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act.
Epperson, the Court found:
uit is clear that fundamentalist sectarian
conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's •monkey
law,• candidly stated its purpose: to make it
unlawful •to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
descended from a lower order of animals.•
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation
of man• as taught in the Bible, but there is no
doubt that the motivation for the law was the
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine
creation of man." Id., at 107-109 (footnotes
omitted).
--

In

16.

Here, it is clear that religious belief is the
Balanced Treatment's Act's Hreason for existence.H

The

tenets of creation-science parallel the Genesis story of
Ali wit~ ~crftdnre.Hts,

the

' ~~
s a religious belief . b d

11

Genes ts;>-

¥0

legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can

4After hearing testimony from numerous
District Court in McLean concluded:

experts,

The parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific:
(1) "sudden creation ·from nothing 11 is taken from
Genesis, 1:1-10; (2) destruction of the world by
a flood of divine origin is a notion peculiar to
Judeo-Christian tradition and is based on
Chapters 7 and 8 of Genesis; (3) the term
"kinds 11 has no fixed scientific meaning, but
appears repeatedly in Genesis; (4) "relatively
recent inception 11 means ·an age of the earth from
6,000 to 10,000 years and is based on the
genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather
astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs;
(5) separate ancestry of man and ape focuses on
the portion of the theory of evolution which
Fundamentalists find most offensive, Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 11 529 F. Supp., at
1265, n. 19 •

.

'·

the

17.
~
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blind us to that fact.H
(1980}.

Stone v. Graham, 449

u.s.

39, 41

Although the Act as finally enacted does not

contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, there
is no indication in the legislative history that the
deletion of Hcreation ex nihiloH and the four primary
tenets of the theory were intended to alter the purpose
for teaching creation-science.

Instead, the statements of

purpose of the sources of creation-science in the United
States make clear that their purpose is to promote a
~

religious belief.

I~
'\

v-z..,

no evidence in the legislative

history that the legislature's purpose was any different.
The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add
information to the school curriculum rather than detract
from it as in Epperson does not affect my analysis.

Both

legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of

18.
i,

''I

structuring the public school curriculum to make it
compatible with a particular religious belief:

the

"divine creation of man."
That the statute is limited to the scientific
evidences supporting the theory does not render its
purpose secular.

In reaching its conclusion that the Act

is unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals

11

did not deny

that the underpinnings of creationism may be supported by
scientific evidence."

765 F. 2d 1251, 1256 (1985).

there is no need to do so.

And

Whatever the academic merit of

particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause
limits the discretion of state officials to pick and
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a

19.

particular religious belief.S

The language of the statute

and its legislative history convince me that the Louisiana
legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view

11

that the States

and locally elected school boards should have the

~~tA

crdo~he

Spor this reason, I
shntt
argument that the affidavits submitted in this case
rendered the grant of summary judgment by the District
Court erroneous. To preclude summary judgment, affidavits
must raise a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
As I read the affidavits, they primarily
purport to prove that a scientific basis for creationscience exists.
But this proof is not material to the
legal issue of whether the legislature intended to promote
religious belief in requiring that these scientific
evidences be taught.
To the extent that the affidavits
express
the
opinion
that
creation-science
is
not
religious, they do not put into issue the legislature's
understanding of the nature of the theory. This intent is
properly determined by examination of the language of the
Act and the legislative history contemporaneous with its
enactment.

20.
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responsibility for determining the educational policy of
the public schools ...
853, 893 {1982)

Board of Education v. Pico, 457

{POWELL, J., dissenting).

u.s.

A decision

respecting the subject mat 7'er to be taught in public
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply
because the material to be taught "'happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'
Harris v. McRae, 448
v. Maryland, 366

u.s.

u.s.

11

297, 319 {1980) {quoting McGowan

420, 442 {1961)).

In the context of

a challenge under the Establishment Clause, interference
with the decisions of these authorities is warranted only
when no valid secular purpose for their judgment is
evident.
The history of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment has been chronicled by this Court before in

21.

detail.

See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330

U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947);
Engel v. Vitale, 370

McGowan v. Maryland, supra, a t _ ;

u.s.

421,

( 1962) •

Therefore,

only a brief review at this point is necessary.

The early

settlers of this country came to escape religious
persecution in Europe in the form of forced support of
state-established churches.

The new Americans thus

reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of
religious intolerance emerging in this country.

The

reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the Founding
Fathers, is instructive.

George Mason's draft of th

Virginia Declaration of Rights,

~ fJd. ~~,t
adopted ~ n 177~

a guarantee of free exercise of religion.

Eight years

later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of
religion became a part of Virginia

22.

Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, written in response to a proposal by Patrick
Henry that all Virginia citizens be taxed to support the
teaching of the Christian religion, spurred the
legislature to consider and adopt Thomas Jefferson's Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom.

See Committee for

Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 770, n. 28.

Both

the guarantees of free exercise and against the
establishment of religion were then incorporated into the
federal Bill of Rights by James Madison, its drafter.
While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils that
it was designed forever to suppress,"
Education, 330
recognized that

u.s.,
11

Everson v. Board of

at 14-15, this Court has also

[t]his Nation's history has not been one

23.

,.,;,

of entirely sanitized separation between Church and
State."

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra,

at 760.

"The fact that the Founding Fathers believed

devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable
rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in
their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the
Constitution itself."

Abington School District v.

Schempp, supra, at 213.6

The Court has noted "an unbroken

history of offical acknowledgement ••• of the role of

fo

religion in American life...

Lynch v. Donnelly, 4~ u.s.,

at 674, and implied that these references to "our

6John Adams wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 11 The
Bible is the best book in the world. It contains more of
my little philosophy than all the libraries I have seen;
and such parts of it as I cannot reconclie to my little
philosophy,
I
postpone
for
future
investigation."
Correspondence II 412 (Dec. 25, 1813).

?

24.

religious heritage 11 are constitutionally acceptable.

Id.,

at 677.
As a matter of history, school children, of course,
can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this
Nation's religious heritage.

I would see no

constitutional problem if school children were taught the
nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how
these beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the
structure of our government.

J.!~ urseo/in comparative

"1~~~~---..-(

rel igion wonl d. al ~e -i:re-1 constitutionally appropriate. 7

1

In

fact, since religion permeates our history, a familiarity
with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to
understand many historical as well as contemporary

?The Encyclopedia of American
describes 1,347 churches.
~

71

~0-l

Religions

(2d ed.

events~
1987)

25.

---

T~

~
xamp es on a worldwide seale { the political

( controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East and
cannot be understood properly

India,
without

to the underlying religious beliefs and

-~J
view, it would be tragic if school
ildren were deprived of a full and complete
understanding of the history of this country and the world
due to the supposed constraints of the Establishment
Clause.
also

~ ~lsi..ze

that the

1'/.c ,4--"~
Establishment Clause does not prohibit

aGsol ~ ~y

the ~use

of religious documents in public school education.
Although this Court has recognized that the Bible is "an
instrument of religion," Abington School District v.
~ ~-.&...~-'1·-le... c.h•JSchempp, supra, at 224, it has~ that the Bible
1\

11

may

26.

constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or
the like."
225) .8

Stone v. Graham, supra, at 42 (citing id., at

The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time best

seller"9 with undoubted literary and historic value apart
from its religious content.

The Establishment Clause is

properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and

8state-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer
courses integrating religious studies into the curriculum.
Approximately half of the state-sponsored universities
offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers
seven courses:
Introduction to Religion, Old Testament,
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and
Tradition, Eastern Religions,- and Philosophy of Religion.
Many general teaching guides indicate that education as
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., c. Kniker,
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final
Report (Fla. State Univ. · 1976);
L. Karp, Teaching the
Bible as ·Literature in the Public Schools (1973).
9see N.Y. Times, §2, p. 24, col. 3 (May 10, 1981);
McWhirter, 19 86 Guiness world Records 144 (the Bible is
the world's most widely distributed book).

27.
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other religious documents in public school education only
when the purpose of the use is clearly to advance
religious belief.
III
In sum, I find that the language and the legislative
history of the Balanced Treatment Act indicate beyond
question that its purpose is to advance a particular
religious belief.

Although the discretion of state and

local authorities over public school

curricul ~ is broad,
t'\

11

the First Amendment does not permit the State to require

that teaching and learning must be tailored to the

0A4-'~~J
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
1\

dogma.

11

Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 106.

Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the

2 8.

Cou·rt that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
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SECOND DRAFT yV

JUSTICE PCMELL, concurring.

/

I write separately to note certain aspects of the
legislative history, and to emphasize that nothing in the
Court's opinion diminishes the traditionally broad
discretion accorded state and local school officials in
the selection of the public school curriculum.
I

This Court has consistently applied the three-pronged
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s. 602 (1971) to

determine whether a particular state action violates the

•

I

2.

Establishment Clause of the Constitution.!
Grand Rapids
(1985)

~chool

District v. Ball, 473

See, e.g.,

u.s.

373, _

("We have particularly relied on Lemon in every

case involving the sensitive relationship between
government and religion in the education of our
children").

The first requirement of the Lemon test is

that the challenged statute have a
purpose."

11

secular legislative

Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612.

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413
773 (1973).

If no valid secular purpose

See

u.s.

756,

~~the

can be identified, then the statute violates the
Establishment Clause.

lAs the Court recognizes, ante, at
, n. 4., the one
exception to this consistent applicatic>r1of Lemon is Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983).

3.

A
~The

starting point in every case involving

construction of a statute is the language itself."

Blue

Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 {1975)
{POWELL, J., concurring).

The Balanced Treatment for

Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act {Act or
Balanced Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §17:286.1 et
seq. {West), provides in part:
"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give
balanced treatment to creation-science and to
evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these
two models shall be given in classroom lectures
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook
materials taken as a whole for each course, in
library materials taken as a whole for the
sciences and taken a a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public
schools, to the extent that such lectures,
textbooks, library materials, or educational
programs deal in any way with the subject of the
origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe.
When creation or evolution is taught, each shall
be taught as a theory, rather than as proven
scientific fact." §17:286.4.A •

.•'

. r

4.

"Balanced treatment" means

~providing

whatever information

and instruction in both creation and evolution models the
classroom teacher determines is necessary and appropriate
to provide insight into both theories in view of the
textbooks and other instructional materials available for
USe in hiS ClaSSrOOm.

II

§286 .3 (1) •

11

CreatiOn-SCienCe 11 iS

defined as "the scientific evidences for creation and
inferences from those scientific evidences.

11

§286.3(2).

'Evolution-science" means "the scientific evidences for

1

evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences."
§2 86 • 3 ( 3) •
Although the Act requires the teaching of the
scientific evidences of both creation and evolution
whenever either is taught, it does not define either term.
"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that,

I .

5.

unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."
Perrin v. United States, 444
theory

u.s.

37, 42 (1979).

~

" a doctrine or theory of creation

v

~

holding that matter, the various forms of life, and the
world were created by a transcendent God out of nothing."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 532
(unabridged 1981).

"Evolution" is defined as "the theory

that the various types of animals and plants have their
origin in other preexisting types, the distinguishable
difference being due to modifications in successive
generations."

Id., at 789.

Thus, the Balanced Treatment

Act mandates that public schools present the scientific
evidence to support a theory of divine creation whenever
they present the scientific evidence to support the theory

(})

6.

of evolution.

a supreme being

H[C]oncepts concerning

of some sort are manifestly religious •••• These concepts
do not shed that religiosity merely because they are
presented as philosophy or as a science.
440

f.

11

Malnak v. Yogi,

Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff 1 d per curiam,

592 F. 2d 197 (CA3 1979).

Thus, from the face of the

statute a purpose to advance a religious belief is
apparent.
A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate
an act of a state legislature.
predominate.

The religious purpose must

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472

u.s. 38, 56

(1986); id., at 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465

u.s. 668, 681, n. 6 (1984).

contains a statement of purpose:
freedom.~

§286.2.

The Act

to uprotec[t] academic

This statement is puzzling, because

7.

the "academic freedom_. of teachers to present informatior

0ubl~ is
J'e_: ;I

and students to receive itA

circumscribed by the Establishment Clause.

~cademic freedom"

~

-

'l'htt~

does not encompass the right of a

0u-p

/(._

legislature to structure the public school curriculum in
order to advance a particular religious belief.
v. Arkansas, 393

u.s. 97, 106 (1968).

Epperson

Nevertheless, I

read this statement as rendering the purpose of the
statute at least ambiguous.

Accordingly, I proceed to

review the legislative history of the Act.
B

In June 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate
Bill 956 to the Louisiana legislature.
bill was to

11

The purpose of the

assure academic freedom by requiring the

teaching of the theory of creation ex nihilo in all public

8•

schools where the theory of evolution is taught."
E-1.2
as

11

1 App.

The bill defined the ~theory of creation ex nihilo~

the belief that the origin of the elements, the

galaxy, the solar system, of life, of all the species of
plants and animals, the origin of man, and the origin of
all things and their processes and relationships were
created ex nihilo and fixed by God."

1 App. E-la- lb.

2creation 11 ex nihilo" -ef coat ~means creation 11 from
nothing" and has been found to be an "inherently religious
concept." McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982). '!'he District Court in
McLean found:
'l'he argument that creation from nothing in
[section] 4(a) (1) [of the substantially similar
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act]
does not
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary
or rational support. To the contrary, 'creation
out of nothing' is a concept unique to Western
religions.
In traditional western religious
thought, the conception of a creator of the
world is a conception of God. Indeed, creation
of the world 'out of nothing' is the ultimate
religious statement because God is the only
actor." Id., at 1265.
11

9.

This theory was referred to by Senator Keith as
~•scientific

creationism.

1 App. E-2.

u

While a Senate committee was studying scientific
creationism, Senator Keith introduced a second draft of
the bill, requiring balanced treatment of
science 11 and

~creation-science

the Keith bill prohibited
doctrine or materials,
11

11

11

...

11

evolution-

1 App. E-108.

Although

instruction in any religious

1 App. E-302, it defined

creation-science 11 to include:
the scientific evidences and related inferences
that indicate (a} sudden creation of the
universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b)
the insufficiency of mutation and natural
selection in bringing about development of all
living kinds from a single organism; (c)
changes only within fixed limits or originally
created kinds of plants and animals; (d)
separate ancestry for man and apes; (e)
explanation of the earth's geology by
catastrophism, including the occurrence of a
worldwide flood; and (~ a relatively recent
inception of the earth and living kinds. 11 1
App. E-298 - 299.
11

10.

Significantly, the model act on which the Keith bill
relied was also the basis for a similar statute in
Arkansas.

See McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529

F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

The District Court in

McLean carefully examined this model act, particularly the
section defining creation-science, and concluded that
h[b]oth [its] concepts and wording ••• convey an
inescapable religiosity ...
that

11

Id., at 1265.

The court found

[t]he ideas of [this section] are not merely similar

to the literal interpretation of Genesis;

they are

identical and parallel to no other story of creation."
Ibid.
The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981.
On May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the
Keith bill to delete the illustrative list of scientific

11.

evidences.

According to the legislator who proposed the

amendment, it was Hnot intended to try to gut [the bill]
in any way, or defeat the purpose [for] which Senator
Keith introduced

[it],~·

1 App. E-432, and was not viewed

as working "any violence to the bill.'•

1 App. E-438.

Instead, the concern was "whether this should be an all
inclusive list."

1 App. E-438.

The legislature then held hearings on the amended
bill which became the Balanced Treatment Act under review.
The principal creation-scientist to testify in support of
the Act was Dr. Edward Boudreaux.

He did not elaborate on

the nature of creation-science except to indicate that the
Hscientific evidencesH of the theory are "the objective
information of science [that] point[s] to conditions of a
creator.H

2 App. E-501 - 502.

He further

testified~

12.

~

that the recognized creation-scientists in the

United States, who "numbe[r] something like a thousand
[and] who hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas
of

scienc~

are affiliated with either or both the

)

Institute of Creation Research and the Creation Research
Society.

2 App. E-503 - 504.

these organization

Information on both of
the legislative

The Institute
of the Christian Heritage College in San Diego,
California.

The Institute was established to address the

"urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a
personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His
creation and to whom all people must eventually give
account. ·-

1 App. E-197.

A goal of the Institute is

revival of belief in special creation as the true

11

a

13.

explanation of the origin of the world."
Institute currently is working on the

11

Therefore, the

development of new

methods for teaching scientific creationism in public
schools.'' 1 App. E-197 - 199.

The Creation Research

Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

A member

must subscribe to the following statement of belief:

"The

Bible is the written word of God, and because it is
inspired throughout, all of its assertions are
historically and scientifically true.

11

2 App. E-583.

To

study creation-science at the CRS, a member must accept
"that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual
presentation of simple historical truth."

2 App. E-583.3

3The District Court in McLean noted three
other elements of the CRS statement of belief to
which members must subscribe:
All basic types of living things, including
were made by direct creative acts of God
(Footnote continued)

14.

c
When, as here,

~both

courts below are unable to

discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court
normally should hesitate to find one." J wau:!': v.

Jaffree, supra, at 66 (POWELL, J., concurring).

My

examination of the language and the legislative history of
the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the intent of the

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
during Creation week as described in Genesis.
Whatever biological changes have occurred since
Creation have accomplished only chan es within
]
the original created kinds.
The grea
[ti
Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to
as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event,
rr~·;]
world-wide in its extent and effect.
("#-- (.!'"
Finally, we are an organization of Christian men
of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord
and Savior. The account of the special creation
of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and
their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for
our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all
mankind.
Therefore, salvation can come only
thru
sic
accepting Jesus Christ as our
Savior.
29 F. Supp., at 1260, n. 7.

15.
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Louisiana legislature was to promote a particular
religious belief.

The legislative history of the Arkansas

statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

u.s.,

at 97, was strikingly

similar to the legislative history of the Balanced
Treatment Act.

In Epperson, the Court found:

~It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian
conviction was and is the law's reason for
existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey
law,' candidly stated its purpose: to make it
unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in
the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
descended from a lower order of animals.'
Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon
the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less
explicit language. It eliminated Tennessee's
reference to 'the story of the Divine creation
of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no
doubt that the motivation for the law was the
same: to suppress the teaching of a theory
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine
creation of man." Id., at 107-109 (footnotes
omitted).
--

16.

Here, it is clear that religious belief is the
Balanced Treatment's Act's Hreason for existence.H

The

tenets of creation-science parallel the Genesis story of
creation,4 and this is a religious belief.

~No

legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can
blind us to that fact.H

Stone v. Graham, 449

4After hearing testimony from numerous
District Court in McLean concluded:

u.s. 39, 41

experts,

The parallels between [the definition section of
the model act] and Genesis are quite specific:
{1) usudden creation from nothing•• is taken from
Genesis, 1:1-10; {2) destruction of the world by
a flood of divine origin is a notion peculiar to
Judea-Christian tradition and
is based on
Chapters 7 and 8 of Genesis; {3) the term
"kinds•• has no fixed scientific meaning, but
appears repeatedly in Genesis; {4) urelatively
recent inceptionH means an age of the earth from
6,000 to 10,000 years and is based on the
genealogy of the Old Testament using the rather
astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs;
{5) separate ancestry of man and ape focuses on
the portion of the theory of evolution which
Fundamentalists find most offensive, Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 u.s. 97 {1968)." 529 • Supp., at
1265, n. 19
~ 1~

(,.·~ tnt~ h *'~~ IMA.t~)

the

17.
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(1980).

Although the Act as finally enacted does not

contain explicit reference to its religious purpose, there
is no indication in the legislative history that the
deletion of ••creation ex nihilo" and the four primary
tenets of the theory were intended to alter the purpose
for teaching creation-science.

Instead, the statements of

purpose of the sources of creation-science in the United
States make clear that their purpose is to promote a
religious belief.

There is no evidence in the legislative

history that the legislature•s purpose was any different.
The fact that the Louisiana legislature purported to add
information to the school curriculum rather than detract
from it as in Epperson does not affect my analysis.

Both

legislatures acted with the unconstitutional purpose of
structuring the public school curriculum to make it

18.
\

·~

compatible with a particular religious belief:
11

divine creation of man.

the

11

That the statute is limited to the scientific
evidences supporting the theory does not render its
purpose secular.

In reaching its conclusion that the Act

is unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals "did not deny
that the underpinnings of creationism may be supported by
scientific evidence ...

765 F. 2d 1251, 1256 {1985).

there is no need to do so.

And

Whatever the academic merit of

particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause
limits the discretion of state officials to pick and
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a

19.

particular religious belief.s

The language of the statute

and its legislative history convince me that the Louisiana
legislature exercised its discretion for this purpose in
this case.
II
Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States
and locally elected school boards should have the

5For this reason,
I reject the argument that the
affidavits submitted in this case rendered the grant of
summary judgment by the District Court erroneous.
To
preclude summary judgment, affidavits must raise a genui~
e
issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As I rea
~
the affidavits, they primarily purport to ..PE;PVe that a
1>
scientific basis for creation-science exil€s":" But this
proof is not material to the 1 egal issue of whether the
legislature intended to promote religious belief in
requiring that these scientific evidences be taught. "'Pe,. -t-he ex-tent-tha-t the affidavits express the opinion that
creation-science is not rel igious ,\1 they do not put into
issue the legislature's understanding of the nature of the
theory. This intent is properly determined by examination
of the language of the Act and the legislative history
contemporaneous with its enactment.

20.

responsibility for determining the educational policy of
the public schools."
853, 893 {1982)

Board of Education v. Pi co, 45 7

{POWELL, J., dissenting).

u.s.

A decision

respecting the subject matter to be taught in public
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply
because the material to be taught

11

'happens to coincide or

harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.'"
Harris v. McRae, 448
v. Maryland, 366

u.s. 297, 319 {1980) {quoting McGowan

u.s. 420, 442 {1961)).

In the context of

a challenge under the Establishment Clause, interference
the decisions of these authorities is warranted only
alid secular purpose for their judgment is
evident.

r

The history of the religion clauses of the First
chronicled by this Court

in

21.

detail.

u.s.

See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330

1, 8-14 (1947);

~cGowan v~Maryland,

~ v. Vitale, 370

u.s.

421,

supra,

~~

at~

(1962) -·~----~~

only a brief review at this point is

C~ ./.o~~)Ar'F~ .W..,444t~
religious
support of

persecutio~·

)

state-established churches.

The new Americans thus

reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of
religious intolerance emerging in this country.

The

reaction in Virginia, the home of many of the Founding
Fathers, is instructive.

George Mason's draft of the

Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by the House of
Burgesses in 1776

It contained a guarantee of free

,)

exercise of religion.

Eight years later, a provision

prohibiting the establishment of religion became a part of

.

22 •

'I

·~

Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, written in
response to a proposal by

l'lltt

±7

that all Virginia

citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the Christian
religion, spurred the legislature to consider and adopt
Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom.

. . . .f.tf!.

See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,

~

770, n. 28.

Both the guarantees of free

exercise and against the establishment of religion were
then incorporated into the federal Bill of Rights
~

by ~~ames

Madison~ts drafte~

ec

J

While the umeaning and scope of the First Amendment"
must be read "in light of its history and the evils
it was designed forever to suppress,"
Education,

~

Everson v. Board of

this Court has also

23.
i

,I

recognized that

"~on's

history has not been one

of entirely sanitized separation between Church and
State ...

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra,

at 760.

11

The fact that the Founding Fathers believed

devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable
rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in
their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the
Constitution itself."

~

Schempp, snpJT a~ 213

District v.
has noted

~an

unbroken

history of offical acknowledgement ••. of the role of
religion in American life.''

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

u.s.,

6John Adams wrote ~ a lett, Pto Thomas Jefferson, "The
Bible is the best book in the world.
It contains more of
my little philosophy than all the libraM·es I have seen;
and such parts of it as I cannot recon · to my 1 ittle
.. ; Philosophy, _I .-:;:-:;---r.ostpone
for
future
investigation."
x correspondenc ~ 412 (Dec. 25, 1813).

24.

that these references to "our
religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable.

Id.,

at 677.
As a matter of history, school children r-o f

coors~

can and should properly be informed of all aspects of this
Nation's religious heritage.

I would see no

constitutional problem if school children were taught the
nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how
these beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the
structure of our government.?

Courses in comparative

religion of course are customary and constitutionally

7There is an enormous variety of religions in the United
States.
T hEe (~! ! ! edia of American Religions ( 2d ed.
1987) describe 1,34 churches.
The United States Census
Bureau groups
aj or American religions into: Buddist
Churches of America~ Eastern Churches~ Jews~ Old Catholic,
Polish National Catholic, and Armenian Churches~ The Roman
Catholic
Church~
Protestants~
and
Miscellaneous.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th ed.
1986).

25.

appropriate.8

In fact, since religion permeates our

history, a familiarity with the nature of religious

as contemporary events.9

In addition, it

that the Establishment Clause does not
educational use of religious documents in public school

tate-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer
ourses integrating religious studies into the curriculum.
pproximately half of the state-sponsored universities
offer one or more courses involving religion.
As an
example, Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge offers
seven courses:
Introduction to Religion, Old Testament,
New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.
Many general teaching guides indicate that education a~
to the nature of various religious beliefs could be
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner
consistent with the Constitution.
See, e.g., c. Kniker,
Teaching about Religion in the Public Schools (1985); The
Religion in Elementary Social Studies Project, Final
Report (Fla. State Univ. 1976);
L. Karp, Teaching the
Bible as Literature in the Public Schools (1973).

'i'Orldwt~e <

iReotlJ6i?.J;e~~/al

9Exetmflle&t OR a
:es a:Ji g
t oversies in Northern Ireland, the MfOdle Eas~ and
cannot be understood properly without reference
to
e underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts
~-th
_e ~ to generate.

I I

26.

education.

Although this Court has recognized that the

Bible is "an instrument of religion, .. Abington School
District v. Schempp, supra, at 224, it also has made clear
that the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an
appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,

I

'i ()"':.

~~ ~

at 225).

The book is, in fact,

"the world's all-time best sellerulO with undoubted

fS.

(.' 0'\1\..4 c.

,

~ .f,aoPt'-"
/1 f3

literary and historic value apart from its religious
content.

{

The Establishment Clause is properly understood

to prohibit the use of the Bible and other religious
documents in public school education only when the purpose

f

Cll (

t!

27.

III
In sum, I find that the language

7
history of the Balanced Treatment Act

gue~ that its purpose is to advance a particular
religious belief.

Although the discretion of state and

local authorities over public school curricula is broad,
11

the First Amendment does not permit the State to require

that teaching and learning must be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma ...

Epperson v. Arkansas,

106.

Accordingly, I concur in the opinion
Court that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

;

'
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JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
Even if I agreed with the questionable premise that legislation can be invalidated under the Establishment Clause on
the basis of its motivation alone, without regard to its effects,
I would still find noTustification fortoday's de'cision. The
Louisiana legislators who passed the "Balanced Treatment
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act" (Balanced
Treatment Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7
(West 1982), each of whom had sworn to support the Constitution, 1 were well aware of the potential Establishment
Clause problems and considered that aspect of the legislation
with great care. After seven hearings and several months of
study, resulting in substantial revision of the original proposal, they approved the Act overwhelmingly and specifically
articulated the secular urpose they meant it to serve. Althoug t e record contams a undant evidence of the sincerity
of that purpose, the Court today holds, essentially on the
basis of "its visceral knowledge regarding what must have
motivated the legislators," 778 F. 2d 225, 227 (CA5 1985)
(Gee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), that the members of the Louisiana Legislature knowingly violated their oaths and

a:.~k_

~~/4.~~
,,~

'Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "the Members of
the several State Legislatures . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation,
to support this Constitution."

L/- ,,

I

85-1513---DISSENT
2

EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD

then lied about it. I dissent. Had requirements of the Balanced Treatment Act that are not apparent on its face been
clarified by an interpretation of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, or by the manner of its implementation, the Act might
well be found unconstitutional; but the question of its constitutionality cannot rightly be disposed of on the gallop, by
impugning the motives of its supporters.
I

This case arrives here in the following posture: The Louisiana Supreme Court has never been given an opportunity to
interpret the Balanced Treatment Act, State officials have
never attempted to implement it, and it has never been the
subject of a full evidentiary hearing. We can only guess at
its meaning. We know that it forbids instruction in either
"creation-science" or "evolution-science" without instruction
in the other, § 17:286.4A, but the parties are sharply divided
over what creation science consists of. Appellants insist
that it is a collection of educationally valuable scientific data
that has been censored from classrooms by an embarrassed
scientific establishment. Appellees insist it is not science at
all but thinly veiled religious doctrine. Both positions find
considerable support in the legislative history.
At least at this stage in the litigation, it is plain to me that
we must accept appellants' view. To begin with, the statute
itself defines "creation-science" as "the scientific evidences
for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences."
§ 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added). If, however, that definition
is not thought sufficiently helpful, the means by which the
Louisiana Supreme Court will give the term more precise
content is quite clear-and again, at this stage in the litigation, favors the appellants' view. "Creation science" is unquestionably a "term of art," see Brief for 72 Nobel Laureates, 17 State Academies of Science, and 7 Other Scientific
Organizations as Amicus Curiae 20, and thus, under Louisiana law, is "to be interpreted according to [its] received

85-1513-DISSENT
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD

3

meaning and acceptation with the learned in the art, trade or
profession to which [it] refer[s]." La. Civ. Code art. 15
(West 1952). 2 The only evidence in the record of the "received meaning and acceptation" of "creation science" is
found in five affidavits filed by appellants. In those affidavits, two scientists, a philosopher, a theologian, and an
educator, all of whom claim extensive knowledge of creation
science, swear that it is essentially a collection of scientific
data supporting the theory that the physical universe and life
within it appeared suddenly and have not changed substantially since appearing. See App. to Juris. Statement A19
(Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A41 (Miethe). These
experts insist that creation science is a strictly scientific concept that can be presented without religious reference. See
id., at A19-A20, A35 (Kenyon); id., at A36, A37, A38 (Morrow); id., at A40, A41, A43 (Miethe); id., at A47, A48 (Most);
id., at A49 (Clinkert). At this point, then, we must assume
that the Balanced Treatment Act does not require the presentation of religious doctrine.
Nothing in today's opinion is plainly to the contrary, but
what the statute means and what it requires are of rather little concern to the Court. Like the Court of Appeals, 765 F.
2d 1251, 1253, 1254 (CA5 1985), the Court finds it necessary
to consider only the motives of the legislators who supported
the Balanced Treatment Act, ante, at 6, 14, 17. Mter examining the statute, its legislative history, and its historical and
social context, the Court holds that the Louisiana Legislature
acted without "a secular legislative purpose" and that the Act
therefore fails the "purpose" prong of the three-part test set
' Thus the popular dictionary definitions cited by JuSTICE POWELL,
ante, at 3 (POWELL, J., concurring), and appellees, see Brief for Appellees
25, 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 34, are utterly irrelevant, as are the views of
the school superintendents cited by the majority, ante, at 16, n. 17. Three
quarters of those surveyed had "[n]o" or "[l]imited" knowledge of
"creation-science theory," and not a single superintendent claimed "[e]xtensive" knowledge of the subject. 2 App. E798.
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forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971). As
I explain below, infra, at - - - - - , I doubt whether that
"purpose" requirement of Lemon is a proper interpretation of
the Constitution; but even if it were, I could not agree with
the Court's assessment that the requirement was not satisfied here.
This Court has said little about the first component of the
Lemon test. Almost invariably, we have effortlessly discovered a secular purpose for measures challenged under the
Establishment Clause, typically devoting no more than a sentence or two to the matter. See, e. g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind,- U. S. - , - (1986);
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383
(1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 394-395 (1983);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 123-124 (1982);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981); Committee for
Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654, 657 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363 (1975); Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472,
479-480, n. 7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672,
678-679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
supra, at 613. In fact, only once before deciding Lemon, and
twice since, have we invalidated a law for lack of a secular
purpose. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968).
Nevertheless, a few principles have emerged from our
cases, principles which should, but to an unfortunately large
extent do not, guide the Court's application of Lemon today.
It is clear, first of all, that regardless of what "legislative purpose" may mean in other contexts, for the purpose of the
Lemon test it means the "actual" motives of those responsible for the challenged action. The Court recognizes this, see
ante, at 5, as it has in the past, see, e. g., Witters v. Washing-
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ton Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, supra, at--; Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, at 56. Thus, if those legislators who supported the Balanced Treatment Act in fact acted with a "sincere" secular purpose, ante, at 7, the Act survives the first
component of the Lemon test, regardless of whether that
purpose is likely to be achieved by the provisions they
enacted.
Our cases have also confirmed that when the Lemon Court
referred to "a secular ... purpose," 403 U. S., at 612, it
meant "a ~e~a.L.ml..!J2.0Se." The author of Lemon, writing
for the court~,
that invalidation under the purpose
prong is appropriate when "there [is] no question that the
statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 680 (1984)
(Burger, C. J.) (emphasis added); see also id., at 681, n. 6;
Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56 ("the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion") (emphasis added;
footnote omitted). In all three cases in which we struck
down laws under the Establishment Clause for lack of a secular purpose, we found that the legislature's sole motive was
to promote religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56,
57, 60; Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41, 43, n. 5; Epperson v.
Arkansas, supra, at 103, 107-108; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 680 (describing Stone and Epperson as cases
in which we invalidated laws "motivated wholly by religious
considerations"). Thus, the majority's invalidation of
Balanced Treatment Act is defensible only if the record indicates that the Louisiana Legislature had no secular purpose.
It is important to stress that the purpose forbidden by
Lemon is the purpose to "advance religion." 403 U. S., at
613; accord ante, at 6 ("promote" religion); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, supra, at-- ("endorse
religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56 ("advance religion"); ibid. ("endorse ... religion"); Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 788 (1973) ("'advanc-
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ing' ... religion"); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 481 (1973) ("advancing religion"); Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970) ("establishing,
sponsoring, or supporting religion"); Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 (1968) ("advancement or inhibition
of religion") (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203, 222 (1963)). Our cases in no way imply that the
Establishment Clause forbids legislators merely to act upon
their religious convictions. We surely would not strike down
a law providing money to feed the hungry or shelter the
homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been
approved. Also, political activism by the religiously motivated is part of our heritage. Notwithstanding the majority's implication to the contrary, ante, at 10-11, we do not
presume that the sole purpose of a law is to advance religion
merely because it was supported strongly by organized religions or by adherents of particular faiths. See W alz v. Tax
Commission, supra, at 670; cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 319-320 (1980). To do so would deprive religious men
and women of their right to participate in the political process. Today's religious activism may give us the Balanced
Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the abolition of
slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims.
Similarly, we will not presume that a law's purpose is to
advance religion merely because it "'happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions,"' Harris
v. McRae, supra, at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)), or because it benefits religion,
even substantially. We have, for example, turned back
Establishment Clause challenges to restrictions on abortion
funding, Harris v. McRae, supra, and to Sunday closing
laws, McGowan v. Maryland, supra, despite the fact that
both "agree[] with the dictates of [some] Judaeo-Christian religions," id., at 442. "In many instances, the Congress or
state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of soci-
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ety, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands
such regulation." Ibid. On many past occasions we have
had no difficult finding a secu ar purpose for governmental
ac 10n ar more i"Kely to a vance re 1g1 n than the Balanced
Treatment Act. See, e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388,
394-395 (1983) (tax deduction for expenses of religious education); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (aid to religious schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U. S. 349, 363 (1975) (same); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 773 (same); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971) (same); Walz v. Tax Commission,
supra, at 672 (tax exemption for church property); Board of
Education v. Allen, supra, at 243 (textbook loans to students
in religious schools). Thus, the fact that creation science coincides with the beliefs of certain religions, a fact upon which
the majority relies heavily, does not itself justify invalidation
of the Act.
Finally, our cases indicate that even certain kinds of governmental actions undertaken with the specific intention of
improving the position of religion do not "advance religion" as
that term is used in Lemon. 403 U. S., at 613; see Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, - - U.S. - - , - (1987). Rather, we have said that in at least two circumstances government must act to advance religion, and that in
a third it may do so.
First, since we have consistently described the Establishment Clause as forbidding not only state action motivated by
the desire to advance religion, but also that intended to "disapprove," "inhibit," or evince "hostility" toward religion, see,
e. g., ante, at 5 ("disapprove") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)); Lynch
v. Donnelly, supra, at 673 ("hostility"); Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 788 ("'inhibit[]'"); and since
we have said that governmental "neutrality" toward religion
is the preeminent goal of the First Amendment, see, e. g.,
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 382
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(1985); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S.
736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 792-793; a state which dis-

covers that its employees are inhibiting religion must take
steps to prevent them from doing so, even though its purpose
would clearly be to advance religion. Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 673. Thus, if the Louisiana Legislature
sincerely believed that the State's science teachers were
being hostile to religion, our cases indicate that it could act to
eliminate that hostility without running afoul of Lemon's purpose test.
Second, we have held that intentional governmental advancement of religion is sometimes required by the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. - - (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U. S. ,707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), we held that in some circumstances
states must accommodate the beliefs of religious citizens by
exempting them from generally applicable regulations. We
have not yet come close to reconciling Lemon and our Free
Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try. See,
e. g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla.,
supra, at--; Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.,
supra, at 719-720. It is clear, however, that members of the
Louisiana Legislature were not impermissibly motivated for
purpose of the Lemon test if they believed that approval of
the Balanced Treatment Act was required by the Free Exercise Clause.
We have also held that in some circumstances government
may act to accommodate religion, even if that action is not
required by the First Amendment. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,-- U. S. - - , - - (1987); Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., supra, at--.
"It is well established ... that '[t]he limits of permissible
state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive
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with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause."' Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra,
at-- (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 673
(1970)); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453
(1971). We have implied that voluntary governmental accommodation of religion is not only permissible, but desirable. See, e. g., ibid. Thus, few would contend that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both forbids religious discrimination by private-sector employers, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), and requires them reasonably to accommodate the religious practices of their employees,
§ 2000e(j), violates the Establishment Clause, even though its
"purpose" is, of course, to advance religion, and even though
it is almost certainly not required by the Free Exercise
Clause. While we have warned that "[a]t some point, accommodation may devolve into 'an unlawful fostering of religion,"' Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, at
--(quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of
Fla., supra, at --), we have not suggested precisely (or
even roughly) where that "point" might be. It is possible,
then, that even if the sole motive of those voting for the Balanced Treatment Act was to advance religion, and its passage was not actually required, or even believed to be required, by either the Free Exercise or Establishment
Clauses, the Act would nonetheless survive scrutiny under
Lemon's purpose test.
One final observation about the application of that test: Although the Court's opinion gives no hint of it, in the past we
have repeatedly affirmed "our reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States."-" Mue"'ller v. 'A llen,- 463
U. .
4 1
; see a so Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S.
688, 699 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). We "presume
that legislatures act in a constitutional manner." Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U. S. - - , - - (1987); see also Clements v.
Fashing, 457 U. S. 957, 963 (1982) (plurality opinion);
Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64; McDonald v. Board of
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Election, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969). Whenever we are called
upon to judge the constitutionality of an act of a state legislature, "we must have 'due regard to the fact that this Court is
not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment
upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government."' Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64 (1981)
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U. S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
This is particularly true, we have said, where the legislature
has specifically considered the question of a law's constitutionality. I d.
With the foregoing in mind, I now turn to the purposes underlying adoption of the Balanced Treatment Act. __....
II
A

We have relatively little information upon which to judge
the motives of those who supported the Act. About the only
direct evidence is the statute itself and transcripts of the
seven committee hearings at which it was considered. U nfortunately, several of those hearings were sparsely attended, and the legislators who were present revealed little
about their motives. We have no com_]p.ittee r.~grts, no
fl.~ debates, no remarks inserted into the legislatiVe
history, no statement from the Governor, and no postenactment statemen s or testimony rom the bill's sponsor or
any other legislators. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U. S. 38, 43, 56-57 (1985). Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the majority is wrong in holding that the Balanced
Treatment Act is without secular purpose.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Balanced
Treatment Act did not fly through the Louisiana Legislature
on wings of fundamentalist religious fervor-which would be
unlikely, in any event, since only a small minority of the
State's citizens belong to fundamentalist religious denomina-
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tions. See B. Quirin, H. Anderson, M. Bradley, P. Goetting,
& P. Shriver, Churches and Church Membership in the
United States 16 (1982). The Act had its genesis (so to
speak) in legislation introduced by Senator Bill Keith in June
1980. After two hearings before the Senate Committee on
Education, Senator Keith asked that his bill be referred to a
study commission composed of members of both houses of the
Louisiana Legislature. He expressed hope that the joint
committee would give the bill careful consideration and determine whether his arguments were "legitimate." 1 App.
E29-E30. The committee met twice during the interim,
heard testimony (both for and against the bill) from several
witnesses, and received staff reports. Senator Keith introduced his bill again when the Legislature reconvened. The
Senate Committee on Education held two more hearings and
approved the bill after substantially amending it (in part over
Senator Keith's objection). After approval by the full Senate, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Education. That committee conducted a lengthy hearing, adopted
further amendments, and sent the bill on to the full House,
where it received favorable consideration. The Senate concurred in the House amendments and on July 20, 1981, the
Governor signed the bill into law.
Senator Keith's statements before the various committees
that considered the bill hardly reflect the confidence of a man
preaching to the converted. He asked his colleagues to
"keep an open mind" and not to be "biased" by misleading
characterizations of creation science. I d., at E33. He also
urged them to "look at this subject on its merits and not on
some preconceived idea." ld., at E34; see also 2 App. E491.
Senator Keith's reception was not especially warm. Over
his strenuous objection, the Senate Committee on Education
voted 5-1 to amend his bill to deprive it of any force; as
amended, the bill merely gave teachers permission to balance the teaching of creation science or evolution with the
other. 1 App. E442-E461. The House Committee restored

•
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the "mandatory" language to the bill by a vote of only 6-5, 2
App. E626-E627, and both the full House (by vote of 52-35),
id., at E700-E706, and full Senate (23-15), id., at
E735-E738, had to repel further efforts to gut the bill.
The legislators understood that Senator Keith's bill involved a "unique" subject, 1 App. E106 (Rep. M. Thompson),
and they were repeatedly made aware of its potential constitutional problems, see, e. g., id., at E26-E28 (McGehee);
id., at E38-E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E241-E242 (Rossman);
id., at E257 (Probst); id., at E261 (Beck); id., at E282 (Sen.
Keith). Although the Establishment Clause, including its
secular purpose requirement, was of substantial concern to
the legislators, they eventually voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the Balanced Treatment Act: The House approved it
71-19 (with 15 members absent), 2 App. E716-E722; the Senate 26-12 (with all members present), id., at E741-E744.
The legislators specifically designated the protection of "academic freedom" as the ·purpose of the Act. La. Rev. Stat.
§ 17:286.2 (West 1982).
We cannot accurately assess
whether this purpose is a "sham," ante, at 7, until we first
examine the evidence presented to the Legislature far more
carefully than the Court has done.
Before summarizing the testimony of Senator Keith and his
supporters, I wish to make clear that I by no means intend to
endorse its accuracy. But my views (and the views of this
Court) about creation science and evolution are (or should be)
beside the point. Our task is not to judge the debate about
teaching the origins of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana Legislature believed. The vast majority of them voted to approve a bill which explicitly stated a
secular purpose; what is crucial is not their wisdom in believing that purpose would be achieved by the bill, but their sincerity in believing it would be.
Most of the testimony in support of Senator Keith's bill
came from the Senator himself and from scientists and
educators he presented, many of whom enjoyed academic
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credentials that may have been regarded as quite impressive
by members of the Louisiana Legislature. To a substantial
extent, their testimony was devoted to lengthy, and, to the
layman, seemingly expert scientific expositions on the origin
of life. See, e. g., 1 App. Ell-E18 (Sunderland); id., at
E50-E60 (Boudreaux); id., at E86-E89 (Ward); id., at
E130-E153 (Boudreaux paper); id., at 321-326 (Boudreaux);
id., at E423-E428 (Sen. Keith). These scientific lectures
touched upon, inter alia, biology, paleontology, genetics, astronomy, astrophysics, probability analysis, and biochemistry. The witnesses repeatedly assured committee members that "hundreds and hundreds" of highly respected,
internationally renowned scientists believed in creation science and would support their testimony. See, e. g., id., at
E5 (Sunderland); id., at E76 (Sen. Keith); id., at E100-E101
(Reiboldt); id., at E327-E328 (Boudreaux); 2 App.
E503-E504 (Boudreaux).
Senator Keith and his witnesses testified essentially as set
forth in the following numbered paragraphs:
(1) There are two and only two scientific explanations for
the beginning of
-=-e ution an crea ion sc e ce. 1
App. E6 (Sunderland); id., at E34 (Sen. Keith); id., at E280
(Sen. Keith); id., at E417-E418 (Sen. Keith). Both are bona
fide "sciences." /d., at E6-E7 (Sunderland); id., at E12
(Sunderland); id., at E416 (Sen. Keith); id., at E427 (Sen.
Keith); 2 App. E491-E492 (Sen. Keith); id., at E497-E498
(Sen. Keith). Both posit a theory of the origin of life and
subject that theory to empirical testing. Evolution posits
that life arose out of inanimate chemical compounds and has
gradually evolved over millions of years. Creation science
posits that all life forms now on earth appeared suddenly and
relatively recently and have changed little. Since there are
·only two possible explanations of the origin of life, any evi3

Although creation scientists and evolutionists also disagree about the
origin of the physical universe, both proponents and opponents of Senator
Keith's bill focused on the question of the beginning of life.
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dence that tends to disprove the theory of evolution necessarily tends to prove the theory of creation science, and viceversa. For example, the abrupt appearance in the fossil
record of complex life, and the extreme rarity of transitional
life forms in that record, are evidence for creation science. 1
App. E7 (Sunderland); id., at E12-E18 (Sunderland); id., at
E45-E60 (Boudreaux); id., at E67 (Harlow); id., at
E130-E153 (Boudreaux paper); id., at E423-E428 (Sen.
Keith).
(2) The body of scientific evidence supporting creation sci- ~
ence is as strong as that supporting evolution. In fact, it
may be stronger. !d., at E214 (Young statement); id., at 310
(Sen. Keith); id., at E416 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E492 (Sen.
Keith). The evidence for evolution is far less compelling
than we have been led to believe. Evolution is not a scientific "fact," since it cannot actually be observed in a laboratory. Rather, evolution is merely a scientific theory or
"guess." 1 App. E20-E21 (Morris); id., arE'B'5(Ward); id.,
at ElOO (Reiboldt); id., at E328-E329 (Boudreaux); 2 App.
E506 (Boudreaux). It is a very bad guess at that. The scientific problems with evolution are so serious that it could accurately be termed a "myth." 1 App. E85 (Ward); id., at
E92-E93 (Kalivoda); id., at E95-E97 (Sen. Keith); id., at
E154 (Boudreaux paper); id., at E329 (Boudreaux); id., at
E453 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E505-E506 (Boudreaux); id., at
E516 (Young).
(3) Creation science is educationally valuable. Students
exposed to it better understand the current s ate of scientific
evidence about the origin of life. 1 App. E19 (Sunderland);
id., at E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E79 (Kalivoda); id., at E308
(Sen. Keith); 2 App. E513-E514 (Morris). Those students
even have a better understanding of evolution. 1 App. E19
(Sunderland). Creation science can and should be presented
to children without any religious content. I d., at E 12 (Sunderland); id., at E22 (Sanderford); id., at E35-E36 (Sen.
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Keith); id., at E 101 (Reiboldt); id., at E279-E280 (Sen.
Keith); id., at E282 (Sen. Keith).
(4) Although creation science is educationally valuable and
strictly scientific, it is now being censored from or misrepresented in the public schools. I d., at E 19 (Sunderland); id.,
at E21 (Morris); id., at E34 (Sen. Keith); id., at E37 (Sen.
Keith); id., at E42 (Sen. Keith); id., at E92 (Kalivoda); id., at
E97-E98 (Reiboldt); id., at E214 (Young statement); id., at
E218 (Young statement); id., at E280 (Sen. Keith); id., at
E309 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E513 (Morris). Evolution, in
turn, is misrepresented as an absolute truth. 1 App. E63
(Harlow); id., at E74 (Sen. Keith); id., at E81 (Kalivoda); id.,
at E214 (Young statement); 2 App. E507 (Harlow); id., at
E513 (Morris); id., at E516 (Young). Teachers have been
brainwashed by an entrenched scientific establishment composed almost exclusively of scientists to whom evolution is
like a "religion." These scientists discriminate against creation scientists so as to prevent evolution's weaknesses from
being exposed. 1 App. E61 (Boudreaux); id., at E63-E64
(Harlow); id., at E78-E79 (Kalivoda); i d., at E80 (Kalivoda);
id., at E95-E97 (Sen. Keith); id., at E129 (Boudreaux paper);
id., at E218 (Young statement); id., at E357 (Sen. Keith); id.,
at E430 (Boudreaux).
(5) The censorshi of creation science has at least two
harmful effects.
irst, it epnves s u ents of knowledge of
one of the two scientific explanations for the origin of life and
leads them to believe that evolution is proven fact; thus, their
education suffers and they are wrongly taught that science
has proven their religious beliefs false. Second, it violates
the Establishment Clause. The United States Supreme
Court has held that secular humanism is a religion. I d., at
E36 (Sen. Keith) (referring to Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S.
488, 495, n. 11 (1961)); id., at E418 (Sen. Keith); 2 App. E499
(Sen. Keith). Belief in evolution is central tenet of that religion. 1 App. E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E312-E313 (Sen.
Keith); id., at E317 (Sen. Keith); id., at E418 (Sen. Keith); 2
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App. E499 (Sen. Keith). Thus, by censoring creation science and instructing students that evolution is fact, public
school teachers are now advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 1 App. E2-E4 (Sen. Keith); id., at
E36-E37, 39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E154-E155 (Boudreaux
paper); id., at E281-E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E313 (Sen.
Keith); id., at E315-E316 (Sen. Keith); id., at E317 (Sen.
Keith); 2 App. E499-E500 (Sen. Keith).
Senator Keith repeatedly and vehemently denied that his
purpose was to advance a particular religious doctrine. At
the outset of the first hearing on the legislation, he testified,
"We are not going to say today that you should have some
kind of religious instructions in our schools. . . . We are not
talking about religion today .... I am not proposing that we
take the Bible in each science class and read the first chapter
of Genesis." 1 App. E35. At a later hearing, Senator Keith
stressed that "to . . . teach religion and disguise it as
creationism . . . is not my intent. My intent is to see to it
that our textbooks are not censored." I d., at E280. He
made many similar statements throughout the hearings.
See, e. g., id., at E41; id., at E282; id., at E310; id., at E417;
see also id., at E44 (Boudreaux); id., at E80 (Kalivoda).
We have no way of knowing, of course, how many legislators believed the testimony of Senator Keith and his witnesses. But in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 4 we
'Although appellees and amici dismiss the testimony of Senator Keith
and his witnesses as pure fantasy, they did not bother to submit evidence
of that to the District Court, making it difficult for us to agree with them.
The State, by contrast, submitted the affidavits of two scientists, a philosopher, a theologian, and an educator, whose academic credentials are rather
impressive. See App. to Juris. Statement A17-A18 (Kenyon); id., at A36
(Morrow); id., at A39-A40 (Miethe); id., at A46-A47 (Most); id., at A49
(Clinkert). Like Senator Keith and his witnesses; the affiants swear that
evolution and creation science are the only two scientific explanations for
the origin of life, see id., at A19-A20 (Kenyon); id., at A38 (Morrow); id.,
at A41 (Miethe); that creation science is strictly scientific, see id., at A18
(Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A40-A41 (Miethe); id., at A49
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have to assume that many of them did. Given that assumption, the Court today plainly errs in holding that the Louisiana Legislature passed the Balanced Treatment Act for exclusively religious purposes.
B

Even with nothing more than this legislative history to go
on, I think it would be extraordinary to invalidate the Balanced Treatment Act for lack of a valid secular purpose.
Striking down a law approved by the democratically elected
representatives of the people is no minor matter. "The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to
destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to
adopt that which will save the act." Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937). So, too, it seems to me,
with .discerning statutory purpose. Even if the legislative
history were silent or ambiguous about the existence of a secular purpose-and here it is not-the statute should survive
Lemon's purpose test. But even more validation than mere
(Clinkert); that creation science is simply a collection of scientific data that
supports the hypothesis that life appeared on earth suddenly and has
changed little, see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A41
(Miethe); that hundreds of respected scientists believe in creation science,
see id., at A20 (Kenyon); that evidence for creation science is as strong as
evidence for evolution, see id., at A21 (Kenyon); id., at A34-A35 (Kenyon);
id., at A37-A38 (Morrow); that creation science is educationally valuable,
see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A36 (Morrow); id., at A38-A39 (Morrow);
id., at A49 (Clinkert); that creation science can be presented without religious content, see id., at A19 (Kenyon); id., at A35 (Kenyon); id., at A36
(Morrow); id., at A40 (Miethe); id., at A43-A44 (Miethe); id., at A47
(Most); id., at A49 (Clinkert); and that creation science is now censored
from classrooms while evolution is misrepresented as proven fact, see id.,
at A20 (Kenyon); id., at A35 (Kenyon); id., at A39 (Morrow); id., at A50
(Clinkert): It is difficult to conclude on the basis of these affidavits-the
only substantive evidence in the record-that the laymen serving in the ·
Louisiana Legislature must have disbelieved Senator Keith or his
witnesses.
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legislative history is present here. The Louisiana Legislature explicitly set forth its secular purpose ("protecting academic freedom") in the very text of the Act. La. Rev. Stat.
§ 17:286.2 (West 1982). We have in the past repeatedly relied upon or deferred to such expressions, see, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1980);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363, 367-368 (1975); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S.
472, 479-480, n. 7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S.
672, 678-679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971); Board of Education v. Allen, 392
u. s. 236, 243 (1968).
The Court seeks to evade the force of this expression of
purpose by stubbornly misinterpreting it, and then finding
that the provisions of the Act do not advance that misinterpreted purpose, thereby showing it to be a sham. The Court
first surmises that "academic freedom" means "enhancing the
freedom of teachers to teach what they will," ante, at 6-even though "academic freedom" in that sense has little scope
in the structured elementary and secondary curriculums with
which the Act is concerned. Alternatively, the Court suggests that it might mean "maximiz[ing] the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction," ante, at 9though that is an exceeding strange interpretation of the
words, and one that is refuted on the very face of the statute.
See § 17:286.5. Had the Court devoted to this central question of the meaning of the legislatively expressed purpose a
small fraction of the research into legislative history that produced its quotations of religiously motivated statements by
individual legislators, it would have discerned quite readily
what "academic freedom" meant: students' freedom from indoctrination. · The legislature wanted to ensure that students would be free to decide for themselves how life began,
based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific
evidence-that is, to protect "the right of each [student] vol-
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untarily to determine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures from the State." Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 385 (1985).
The legislature did not care whether the topic of origins was
taught; it simply wished to ensure that when the topic was
taught, students would receive "'all of the evidence.'"
Ante, at 7 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 60).
As originally introduced, the "purpose" section of the Balanced Treatment Act read: "This Chapter is enacted for the
purposes of protecting academic freedom . . . of students . . .
and assisting students in their search for truth." 1 App.
E292 (emphasis added). Among the proposed findings of
fact contained in the original version of the bill was the following: "Public school instruction in only evolution-science
. . . violates the principle of academic freedom because it denies students a choice between scientific models and instead
indoctrinates them in evolution science alone." I d., at E295
(emphasis added). Senator Keith unquestionably understood "academic freedom" to mean "freedom from indoctrination." See id., at E36 (purpose of bill is "to protect academic
freedom by providing student choice"); id., at E283 (purpose
of bill is to protect "academic freedom" by giving students a
"choice" rather than subjecting them to "indoctrination on
origins").
If one adopts the obviously intended meaning of the statutory terms "academic freedom," there is no basis whatever
for concluding that the purpose they express is a "sham."
Ante, at 7. To the contrary, the Act pursues that purpose
plainly and consistently. It requires that, whenever the
subject of origins is covered, evolution be "taught as a theory, rather than as proven scientific fact" and that scientific
evidence inconsistent with the theory of evolution (viz., "creation science") be taught as well. La. Rev. Stat.. Ann.
§ 17:286.4A (West 1982). Living up to its title of "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act,"
§ 17.286.1, it treats the teaching of creation the same way.

i
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It does not mandate instruction in creation science,
§ 17:286.5; forbids teachers to present creation science "as
proven scientific fact," § 17:286.4A; and bans the teaching of
creation science unless the theory is (to use the Court's terminology) "discredit[ed] ' . . . at every turn'" with the
teaching of evolution. Ante, at 9 (quoting 765 F. 2d, at
1257). It surpasses understanding how the Court can see in
this a purpose "to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint," ante, at 13, "to
provide a persuasive advantage to a particular religious doctrine," ante, at 12, "to promote the theory of creation science
which embodies a particular religious tenet," ante, at 13, and
"to endorse a particular religious doctrine, ante, at 14.
The Act's reference to "creation" is not convincing evidence of religious purpose. The Act defines creation science
as "scientific evidence[]," § 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added), and
Senator Keith and his witnesses repeatedly stressed that the
subject can and should be presented without religious content. See supra, at - - . We have no basis on the record
to conclude that creation science need be anything other than
a collection of scientific data supporting the theory that life
abruptly appeared on earth. See n. 4, supra. Creation science, its proponents insist, no more must explain whence life
came than evolution must explain whence came the inanimate
materials from which it says life evolved. But even if that
were not so, to posit a past creator is not to posit the eternal
and personal God who is the object of religious veneration.
Indeed, it is not even to posit the "unmoved mover" hypothesized by Aristotle and other notably nonfundamentalist philosophers. Senator Keith suggested this when he referred
to "a creator however you define a creator." 1 App. E280 (emphasis added).
The Court cites three provisions of the Act which, it argues, demonstrate a "discriminatory preference for the
teaching of creation science" and no interest in "academic
freedom." Ante, at 8. First, the Act prohibits discrimina-
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tion only against creation scientists and those who teach creation science. § 17:286.4C. Second, the Act requires local
school boards to develop and provide to science teachers "a
curriculum guide on presentation of creation-science."
§ 17:286.7A. Finally, the Act requires the governor to designate seven creation scientists who shall, upon request, assist local school boards in developing the curriculum guides.
§ 17:286. 7B. But none of these provisions casts doubt upon
the sincerity of the legislators' articulated purpose of "academic freedom"-unless, of course, one gives that term the
obviously erroneous meanings preferred by the Court. The
Louisiana legislators had been told repeatedly that creation
scientists were scorned by most educators and scientists,
who themselves had an almost religious faith in evolution.
It is hardly surprising, then, that in seeking to achieve a balanced, "nonindoctrinating" curriculum, the legislators protected from discrimination only those teachers whom they
thought were suffering from discrimination. (Also, the legislators were undoubtedly aware of Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U. S. 97 (1968), and thus could quite reasonably have
concluded that discrimination against evolutionists was already prohibited.) The two provisions respecting the development of curriculum guides are also consistent with "academic freedom" as the Louisiana Legislature understood the
term.
Witnesses had informed the legislators that, because of the hostility of most scientists and educators to creation science, the topic had been censored from or badly misrepresented in elementary and secondary school texts. In
light of the unavailability of works on creation science suitable for classroom use (a fact appellees concede, see Brief for
Appellees 27, 40) and the existence of ample materials on
evolution, it was entirely reasonable for the Legislature to
conclude that science teachers attempting to implement the
Act would need a curriculum guide on creation science, but
not on· evolution, and that those charged with developing the
guide would need an easily accessible group of creation scien-
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tists. Thus, the provisions of the Act of so much concern to
the Court support the conclusion that the Legislature acted
to advance "academic freedom."
The legislative history gives ample evidence of
it of the Balanced Treatment Act s articu ated urpose.
a r witness urge t e egis ators to sup ort the
Act so that students would not be "indoctrinated" but would
instead be free to decide for themselves, based upon a fair
presentation of the scientific evidence, about the origin of
life. See, e. g., 1 App. E18 (Sunderland) ("all that we are
advocating" is presenting "scientific data" to students and
"letting [them] make up their own mind[s]"); id. , at E 19-E20
(Sunderland) (Students are now being "indoctrinated" in evolution through the use of "censored school books . .. . All that
we are asking for is [the] open unbiased education in the
classroom ... your students deserve."); id., at E21 (Morris)
("A student cannot [make an intelligent decision about the origin of life] unless he is well informed about both [evolution
and creation science]."); id., at E22 (Sanderford) ("We are
asking very simply [that] ... creationism [be presented] ...
alongside . . . evolution and let people make their own
mind[s] up."); id., at E23 (Young) (the bill would require
teachers to live up to their "obligation to present all theories"
and thereby enable "students to make judgments themselves"); id., at E44 (Boudreaux) ("Our intention is truth and
as a scientist, I am interested in truth."); id., at E60-E61
(Boudreaux) ("[W]e [teachers] are guilty of a lot of brainwashing .... We have a duty to ... [present the] truth" to
students "at all levels from gradeschool on through the college level."); id., at E79 (Kalivoda) ("This [hearing] is being
held I think to determine whether children will benefit from
freedom of information or if they will be handicapped educationally by having little or no information about creation.");
id., at E80 (Kalivoda) ("I am not interested in teaching religion in schools. . . . I am interested in the truth and [students] having the opportunity to hear more than one side.");
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id., at E98 (Reiboldt) ("The students have a right to know
there is an alternate creationist point of view. They have a
right to know the scientific evidences which support[] that alternative."); id., at E218 (Young statement) (passage of the
bill will ensure that "communication of scientific ideas and
discoveries may be unhindered"); 2 App. E514 (Morris)
("[A]re we going to allow [students] to look at evolution, to
look at creationism, and to let one or the other stand or fall on
its own merits, or will we by failing to pass this bill ... deny
students an opportunity to hear another viewpoint?"); id., at
E516-E517 (Young) ("We want to give the children here in
this state an equal opportunity to see both sides of the theories."). Senator Keith expressed similar views. See, e. g.,
1 App. E36; id., at E41; id., at E280; id., at E283.
Legislators other than Senator Keith made only a few
statements providing insight into their motives, but those
statements cast no doubt upon the sincerity of the Act's articulated purpose. The legislators were concerned primarily
about the manner in which the subject of origins was presented in Louisiana schools-specifically, about whether
scientifically valuable information was being censored and
students misled about evolution. Representatives Cain,
Jenkins, and F. Thompson seemed impressed by the scientific evidence presented in support of creation science. See 2
App. E530 (Rep. F. Thompson); id., at E533 (Rep. Cain); id.,
at E613 (Rep. Jenkins). At the first study commission hearing, Senator Picard and Representative M. Thompson questioned Senator Keith about Louisiana teachers' treatment of
evolution and creation science. See 1 App. E71-E74. At
the close of the hearing, Representative M. Thompson told
the audience:

"We as members of the committee will also receive from
· the staff information of what is currently being taught in
the Louisiana public schools. We really want to see [it].
I . . . have no idea in what manner [biology] is presented
and in what manner the creationist theories [are] ex-

·~
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eluded in the public school[s]. We want to look at what
the status of the situation is." 1 App. E104.
Legislators made other comments suggesting a concern
about censorship and misrepresentation of scientific information. See, e. g., Id., at E386 (Sen. McLeod); 2 App. E527
(Rep. Jenkins); id., at E528 (Rep. M. Thompson); id., at
E534 (Rep. Fair).
It is undoubtedly true that what prompted the Legislature
to direct its attention to the misrepresentation of evolution in
the schools (rather than the inaccurate presentation of other
topics) was its awareness of the tension between evolution
and the religious beliefs of many children. But even appellees concede that a valid secular purpose is not rendered impermissible simply because its pursuit is prompted by concern for religious sensitivities. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 56. If a
history teacher falsely told her students that the bones of
Jesus Christ had been discovered, or a physics teacher that
the Shroud of Turin had been conclusively established to be
inexplicable on the basis of natural causes, I cannot believe
(despite the majority's implication to the contrary, see ante,
at 13) that legislators or school board members would be constitutionally prohibited from taking corrective action, simply
because that action was prompted by concern for the religious beliefs of the misinstructed students.
In sum, even if one concedes, for the sake of argument,
that a majority of the Louisiana Legislature voted for the
Balanced Treatment Act partly in order to foster (rather
than merely eliminate discrimination against) Christian fundamentalist beliefs, our cases establish that that alone would
not suffice to invalidate the Act, so long as there was a genuine secular purpose as well. We have, moreover, no adequate basis for disbelieving the secular purpose set forth in
the Act itself, or for concluding that it is a sham enacted to
conceal the legislators' violation of their oaths of office. I am
astonished by the Court's unprecedented readiness to reach
such a conclusion, which I can only attribute to an intellectual
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predisposition created by the facts and the legend of Scopes
v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927)-an instinctive
reaction that any governmentally imposed requirements
bearing upon the teaching of evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamentalist repression. In this case,
however, it seems to me the Court's position is the repressive
one. The people of Louisiana, including those who are
Christian fundamentalists, are quite entitled, as a secular
matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be
against evolution presented in their schools, just as Mr.
Scopes was entitled to present whatever scientific evidence
there was for it. Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature
has done is unconstitutional because there is no such evidence, and the scheme they have established will amount to
no more than a presentation of the Book of Genesis. But we
cannot say that on the evidence before us in this summary
judgment context, which includes ample uncontradicted testimony that "creation science" is a body of scientific knowledge rather than revealed belief. Infinitely less can we say
(or should we say) that the scientific evidence for evolution is
so conclusive that no one could be gullible enough to believe
that there is any real scientific evidence to the contrary, so
that the legislation's stated purpose must be a lie. Yet that
illiberal judgment, that Scopes-in-reverse, is ultimately the
basis on which the Court's facile rejection of the Louisiana
Legislature's purpose must rest.
Since the existence of secular purpose is so entirely clear,
and thus dispositive, I will not go on to discuss the fact that,
even if the Louisiana Legislature's purpose were exclusively
to advance religion, some of the well established exceptions
to the impermissibility of that purpose might be applicablethe validating intent to eliminate a perceived discrimination
against a particular religion, to facilitate its free exercise, or
to accommodate it. See supra, at - - . I am not in any
case enamored of those amorphous exceptions, since I think
them no more than unpredictable correctives to what is (as
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the next Part of this opinion will discuss) a fundamentally unsound rule. It is surprising, however, that the Court does
not address these exceptions, since the context of the legislature's action gives some reason to believe they may be
applicable. 5
· Because I believe that the Balanced Treatment Act had a
secular purpose, which is all the first component of the
Lemon test requires, I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand for further consideration.

III
I have to this point assumed the validity of the Lemon
"purpose" test. In fact, however, I think the pessimistic
evaluation that the CHIEF JUSTICE made of the totality of
Lemon is particularly applicable to the "purpose" prong: it is
"a constitutional th
th
has no b sis in the history of
the amen
ment
it
seeks
to
interpret,
is difficult to app y and
-------'
5
As the majority recognizes, ante, at 12, Senator Keith sincerely believed that "secular humanism is a bona fide religion," 1 App. E36; see also
id., at E418; 2 App. E499, and that "evolution is the cornerstone of that
religion," 1 App. E418; see also id., at E282; id., at E312-E313; id., at
E317; 2 App. E499. The Senator even told his colleagues that this Court
had "held" that secular humanism was a religion. See 1 App. E36, id., at
E418; 2 App. E499. (In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495, n. 11
(1961), we did indeed refer to "Secular Humanism" as a "religion[].") Senator Keith and his supporters raised the "religion" of secular humanism
not, as the majority suggests, to explain the source of their "disdain for the
theory of evolution," ante, at 12, but to convince the Legislature that the
State of Louisiana was violating the Establishment Clause because its
teachers were misrepresenting evolution as fact and depriving students of
the information necessary to question that theory. 1 App. E2-E4 (Sen.
Keith); id., at E36-E37, E39 (Sen. Keith); id., at E154-E155 (Boudreaux
paper); id., at E281-E282 (Sen. Keith); id., at E317 (Sen. Keith); 2 App.
E499-E500 (Sen. Keith). The Senator repeatedly urged his colleagues to
pass his bill to remedy this Establishment Clause violation by ensuring
state neutrality in religious matters, see, e. g., 1 App. E36; id., at E39; id.,
at E313, surely a permissible purpose under Lemon. Senator Keith's argument may be questionable, but nothing in the statute or its legislative
history gives us reason to doubt his sincerity or that of his supporters.
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yields unprincipled results." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S.
38, 112 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have
made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the
most conscientious governmental officials can only guess
what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said
essentially the following: Government may not act with the
purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to do so by
the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when
eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which
exists sometimes); or even when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at
some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation
results in the fostering of religion, which is of course unconstitutional. See supra, at - - .
But the difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is
looking for is as nothing compared with the difficulty of
knowing how or where to find it. For while it is possible to
discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i. e., the public
good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even
the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set
forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. The number of possible
motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite. In the present case, for example, a particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted
to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education.
He may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of
his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have
been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been
repaying a favor he owed the Majority Leader, or he may
have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make
a fundraising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or
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by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking
favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the
feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he
may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly
unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have accidentally voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may
have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of
the above and many other motivations. To look for the sole
purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for
something that does not exist.
Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we to
look for the individual legislator's purpose? We cannot
of course assume that every member present (if, as is unlikely, we know who or even how many they were) agreed
with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's preenactment floor or committee statement. Quite obviously,
"[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 384
(1968). Can we assume, then, that they all agree with the
motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee reports they might have read-even though we are unwilling to
assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in
the very statute that they voted for? Should we consider
post-enactment floor statements? Or post-enactment testimony from legislators, obtained expressly for the lawsuit?
Should we consider media reports on the realities of the legislative bargaining? All of these sources, of course, are eminently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived
and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and
post-enactment recollections conveniently distorted. Perhaps most valuable of all would be more objective indications-for example, evidence regarding the individuallegisla-
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tors' religious affiliations. And if that, why not evidence
regarding the fervor or tepidity of their beliefs?
Having achieved, through these simple means, an assessment of what individual legislators intended, we must still
confront the question (yet to be addressed in any of our cases)
how many of them must have the invalidating intent. If a
state senate approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one
of the 26 intended solely to advance religion, is the law unconstitutional? What if 13 of the 26 had that intent? What if
three of the 26 had the impermissible intent, but three of the
25 voting against the bill were motivated by religious hostility or were simply attempting to "balance" the votes of their
impermissibly motivated colleagues? Or is it possible that
the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate
it-on a theory, perhaps, that even though everyone else's
intent was pure, what they produced was the fruit of a forbidden tree?
Because there are no good answers to these questions, this
Court has recognized from Chief Justice Marshall, see
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (1810), to Chief Justice
Warren, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383-384
(1968), that determining the subjective intent of legislators is
a perilous enterprise. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U. S. 217, 224-225 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97, 113 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). It is perilous, I might
note, not just for the judges who will very likely reach the
wrong result, but also for the legislators who find that they
must assess the validity of proposed legislation-and risk the
condemnation of having voted for an unconstitutional measure-not on the basis of what the legislation contains, nor
even on the basis of what they themselves intend, but on the
basis of what others have in mind.
Given the many hazards involved in assessing the subjec- \'
tive intent of governmental decisionmakers, the first prong of
Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the Establishment Clause demands it. That is surely not the case. The
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Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." One could argue, I suppose, that
any time Congress acts with the interj,t of advancing religion,
it has enacted a "law respecting an establishment of religion";
but far from being an unavoidable reading, it is quite an unnatural one. I doubt, for example, that the Clayton Act, 15
U. S. C. §§ 12 et seq., could reasonably be described as a "law
respecting an establishment of religion" if bizarre new historical evidence revealed that it lacked a secular purpose,
even though it has no discernible nonsecular effect. It is, in
short, far from an inevitable reading of the Establishment
Clause that it forbids all governmental action intended to advance religion; and if not inevitable, any reading with such
untoward consequences must be wrong.
In the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing
Establishme~t Clause jurisprudence 6 on the ground that it
"sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Com6

Professor Choper summarized our school aid cases thusly:
"[A] provision for therapeutic and diagnostic health services to parochial
school pupils by public employees is invalid if provided in the parochial
school, but not if offered at a neutral site, even if in a mobile unit adjacent
to the parochial school. Reimbursement to parochial schools for the expense of administering teacher-prepared tests required by state law is
invalid, but the state may reimburse parochial schools for the expense of
administering state-prepared tests. The state may lend school textbooks
to parochial school pupils because, the Court has explained, the books can
be checked in advance for religious content and are 'self-policing'; but the
state may not lend other seemingly self-policing instructional items such as
tape recorders and maps. The state may pay the cost of bus transportation to parochial schools, which the Court has ruled are 'permeated' wjth
religion; but the state is forbidden to pay for field trip transportation visits
'to governmental, industrial, cultural, and scientific centers designed to enrich the secular studies of students."' Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673,
680-681 (1980) (citations omitted).
Since that was written, more decisions on the subject have been rendered, but they leave the theme of chaos securely unimpaired. See, e. g.,
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985).-
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mittee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 662
(1980). One commentator has aptly characterized this as "a
euphemism . . . for ... the absence of any principled rationale." Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 681
(1980). I think it time that we sacrifice some "flexibility" for
"clarity and predictability." Abandoning Lemon's purpose
test-a test which exacerbates the~ree
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the language or history of the amendment, and, as today's decision
shows, has wonderfully flexible consequences-would be a
good place to start.
~

